In 1997, we (I was assigned to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office) suggested DoD significantly invest in UCAVS. The CONOPS was not the "tastes great-less filing" arguments of manned (expensive) vs un-inhabited (less expensive) aircraft for CAS, but a combining capabilites using both. Think F/A-18F or F-15E, and tethering 4-6 UCAVS to the mother ship via TADILC or Link 16. As mission requirements surface, a single UCAV is handed over to a terminal controller for employment. By using UCAVS with a human-in-the-loop in a tactical air commander (airborne) mode, one could stretch defense dollars while, arguably, increasing availability exponentially. After a lot of money was spent in analyzing this possibility and assessing the maturity of technologies required (they were ready), the USAF Heismanned the idea during the 1997 QDR by ignoring the results of the study. Eleven years later, we see UCAVs only on the advertising pages of of professional journals. . . . and now have the F-22/F-35 discussion butressing the "Old think" of the USAF as they see new aricraft only in the context of legacy missions (i.e., replacements for Eagles and Falcons).