I wish I had answers. All I have is the three paradoxes of Afghanistan that bedeviled me as a planner and make achievement of an 'acceptable end-state' there, well...impossible?

Paradox #1. You can't eliminate the military threat posed by the insurgents without destroying their sanctuaries in Pakistan...but you can't destroy their sanctuaries in Pakistan without creating a much larger and more dangerous situation (now with nukes!). Effective action against the sanctuaries would turn Pakistan into...well, Afghanistan.

Paradox #2. The more you build effective governance, the more opposition you generate. The majority of local and regional power brokers in Afghanistan have little stake in a strong central government. Why is the north quieter than the south? Because the Germans, Italians, and Spanish are so ineffective at interfering with their various satrapies. Want to see an increase in violence around Herat? Send in some Marines.

Paradox #3. The more achievable your strategic end-state, the less likely NATO will support it. I predict that most of our allies will have abandoned the field by 2011 in the best case. Scaling back your goals will only accelerate the process -and adding more US troops will also accelerate NATO withdrawals, as anyone who has attended a force gen conference can attest.