How Should the U.S. Execute a Surge in Afghanistan?

[jmm99]

Once "Pashtunistan" and "Baluchistan" are stripped away from Pakistan, the narrowness of Pakistan becomes apparent. So, it has been very logical for the Pakis to ally as much as possible with the Pashtuns. Another outstanding geographic feature is the nearness of Islamabad to the hot spots - sort of a forward command bunker.

Currently, the Paki focus is on military operations against its Pashtun allies - not in Pakistan's best interest from an historical standpoint.

Leaving aside Chinese and Russian interests in the region, the major player is India - which traditionally has allied with the Non-Pashtun Afghans. The animosity between India and Pakistan runs deep and has lasted throughout my lifetime.

The symbolic region where that animosity has been focused is Kashmir - which conveniently is located at the confluence of the Non-Pashtun Afghan, Pashtun, Pakistani and Indian areas. Since Kashmir is symbolic, its "solution" would require a real solution of the problems between Pakistan and India.

Based on the geography, our problem in Astan and "getting AQ" is a Pashtun problem, which will be only partially addressed by our efforts in Astan itself - no matter how well they are carried out. The largest part of "Pashtunistan" sits in Pakistan (as does the Taliban "government in exile" and AQ "HQs").

Since the present Afghan government (Karzai and some aside) is regarded as Non-Pashtun and an Indian ally, extension of its governance over Pashtun areas would be contrary to Pakistan's historical policies based on prevention of Indian influence in Astan. Which brings us back to the problems between India and Pakistan, symbolized by Kashmir.

[reed11b]

So perhaps we have a connection between the Pak and India conflict after all. Perhaps the best way to help Pakistan is to facilitate diplomacy between them and India? Wheres Bob's World? I would love to hear his thoughts on this one.
Reed

[jmm99]

Wheres Bob's World? I would love to hear his thoughts on this one.

to the extent that he can share them with us.

[jmm99]

An interesting, in-depth article by RFE/RL on an apparent change in posture in the center of Deobandi Islam, which is in India, intended to affect and effect events in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Taliban's Spiritual Fathers Denounce Terror. Could Taliban Be Next?
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty November 18, 2008 By Jeffrey Donovan, Abubakar Siddique

What would happen if the Taliban’s spiritual fathers denounced terrorism? That, in effect, is what has taken place in Deoband, the northern Indian hometown of the austere form of Sunni Islam followed by the Taliban.

In May, Darul Uloom Deoband Madrasah, located north of New Dehli, issued an unprecedented fatwa, or religious decree, against terrorism. Earlier this month, 4,000 senior Indian ulema and muftis -- Muslim clerics with the authority to interpret Islamic law -- backed the fatwa in a mass gathering in the city of Hyderabad.

Now, the Deobandi political leader in India has told RFE/RL that the next step is to gather Muslim leaders from across South Asia, including the Taliban, to discuss endorsing the antiterror decree.

It looks set to be a hot debate.

“The killing of innocents or atrocities against them is terrorism,” Maulana Mahmood Madani, general-secretary of Jamiat Ulama-i Hind (JUH), the conservative political party founded by Darul Uloom Deoband, told RFE/RL in explaining the May 31 fatwa. “That is how terrorism is defined.” ....

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...v182008.html#6

One certainly wishes them well if their movement would cause the Pashtuns and Taliban to say goodbye to AQ.

Please note well the following quote from Maulana Syedul Aarifeen, the Deobandi spokesman in Peshawar, capital of Pakistan’s restive Northwest Frontier Province:

In the 1980s, Aarifeen’s late father -- Maulana Rahat Gul -- was instrumental in bringing together ulema to issue a fatwa declaring the fight against Afghanistan’s Soviet occupiers as jihad. But Araifeen now wants an end to nearly three decades of war in the region. He tells RFE/RL the jirga between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the best forum to bring an end to the Taliban insurgencies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

“This jirga should be held among Muslims,” Aarifeen said, “because Allah and his Prophet [Muhammad] said that when two Muslims have differences among themselves, you should seek rapprochement among them though consultation. And this process is called jirga in Pashto [language]. Now we see that there are differences among Muslims, who were united before. Now, the jirga is a good forum for us to unite again.”

In short, non-Muslims should stay out of the process - as he notes "called jirga in Pashto".

--------------------------------------------
However, before becoming too happy, the news is full of the Taliban rejection of Karzai's peace feelers. E.g., 17 & 18 Nov:

Taliban Chief Mullah Omar Fails to Renounce Violence, U.S. Says
Bloomberg By Michael Heath Nov 18 , 2008
Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar has failed to renounce violence and shown no inclination to negotiate, the Bush administration said, after Afghan President Hamid Karzai proposed peace talks with the Islamist movement. ....

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...v182008.html#1

Taliban spurn Afghan president's offer for talks
By Noor Khan Associated Press November 17, 2008
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan – Taliban militants rejected an offer of peace talks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, saying Monday there would be no negotiations until foreign troops leave Afghanistan. ....

http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com...v172008.html#1

Zawahiri's response to the Deobandi fatwa will be that, for example, all those killed in the 9/11 attacks (except for his martyrs) were not innocents, or were religiously acceptable collateral damage - he has already written that ("Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents", issued prior to 9/11).

So, the Sharia legal argument hinges on how one parses the definition: “The killing of innocents or atrocities against them is terrorism.”

[Eden]

I suspect that AQ and the loose conglomeration of multiple entities known as the Taliban have tipped over the edge from messengers of ideology to ongoing commercial concerns. Terrorist 'organizations' inevitably develop in one of two ways: either sustainment of the organization becomes an end in and of itself (see IRA, FARC, PLO) or they disappear from view (Red Brigades et al).

I doubt that any number of anti-terror fatwas, while welcome, will at this point have much effect on 'matured' Islamic terror groups.

[jmm99]

I doubt that any number of anti-terror fatwas, while welcome, will at this point have much effect on 'matured' Islamic terror groups.

The hope (realizing that is not a strategy) is that more Muslim states and national groups will find it to be in their enlightened self-interest to take action against 'matured' Islamic terror groups. Baby step by baby step.

[SWJED]

Afghanistan: What Lessons to Apply from Iraq? - SWJ Blog

Last month the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) solicited feedback concerning a statement made by General David Petraeus (Commander, US Central Command) as quoted by the New York Times:

People often ask, "What did you learn from Iraq that might be transferable to Afghanistan?" he said. "The first lesson, the first caution really, is that every situation like this is truly and absolutely unique, and has its own context and specifics and its own texture," he said.

Counterinsurgents have to understand that in as nuanced a manner as possible, and then with that kind of understanding try to craft a comprehensive approach to the problems.

The COIN Center's OPSO, Major Niel Smith, put out the challenge - We would like to ask for feedback - what lessons from Iraq are applicable to our operations in Afghanistan? and in the October COIN Center SITREP, the CO - Colonel Daniel Roper - summarized the key points from the responses as follows:

(1) Basic COIN principles of protecting the population, connecting the government with the people and permanently isolating insurgents from the population apply in either conflict but must be adapted for local conditions.

(2) Shift emphasis from top-down (strong central government) to bottom-up (locally provided security) to leverage tribal structure in Afghanistan.

(3) Seek neither to apply directly the Anbar strategy to Afghanistan nor simply surge more forces; more troops (2–4 BCTs) are unlikely to measurably change the effort with the current strategy.

(4) Increase efforts in advisory and PRT initiatives to enhance Afghan capabilities.

(5) Put an Afghan face on all CERP. Use Jirgas to solicit needs from the local populace to bolster local government entities.

And in a note: the COIN Center continues to solicit additional feedback on the CERP issue and invites comments on a blog entry titled "Money as a tool in COIN, mission enhancer or detractor?"

[Rex Brynen]

Afghanistan could see 30,000 new U.S. troops
JASON STRAZIUSO
The Associated Press

Globe and Mail
December 20, 2008 at 6:15 PM EST

KABUL — The Pentagon may double the number of American troops in Afghanistan by next summer to 60,000 – the largest estimate of potential reinforcements ever publicly suggested, the top U.S. military commander said Saturday.

Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said between 20,000 and 30,000 additional U.S. troops could be sent to Afghanistan to bolster the 31,000 already there.

[Bob's World]

to the extent that he can share them with us.

A few thoughts (mine) on Afghanistan and U.S. involvement there:

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

3. We helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban, but I don't recall the people of Afghanistan then signing on to help the US wage our war on terror. Somewhere we twisted "we are here to help you" into "we are here so you must help us." We need to back up 10 yards and reassess why we are there before we just plow ahead with executing the current mission harder and faster.

4. Finally, we can't "fix" Afghanistan. Particularly if our definition of fixed is that they look just like us. One, they don't want fixed. Two, its none of our business. As I have always said, insurgents and terrorists do not find sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, they find it within poorly governed populaces. Seems to me we are being damn hard on the populace of Afghanistan in the name of fixing the governance of Afghanistan. Sounds a lot like we might be creating the very sanctuary we are trying to eliminate simply because we have misidentified what makes up a sanctuary in the first place.

[Eden]

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

Excellent points which illustrate the fundamental paradoxes that will plague our efforts in Afghanistan until we 'change the game'. Our end-state right now is an effective central government. I think we are smart enough to have scaled back what we would accept as effective central governance - we're never going to turn this place into Switzerland - but the very concept of ECG places us at odds with a number of players in the region who would otherwise have little in common.

Neither the various insurgents nor the narcotic traffickers want ECG, for obvious reasons. There are also powerful regional figures - what the press normally refers to as 'warlords' - who have no desire for it either. And there are many local power groups to whom 'effective central governance' merely means more money picked from their pockets and less influence for them. Even some in the central government are happy for it to remain ineffectual, or at least unable to interfere with peculation, graft, and influence peddling.

Unfortunately, setting a lower goal for all the blood and treasure we're expending risks eroding political (and ultimately military) support. "Make Afghanisatn safe for warlords" is not likely to be much of a clarion call.

As for your comment on 'controlling the border', it is just another example of how applying standard COIN wisdom in Afghanistan can have as many negative as positive consequences. Not that I think we can do it, regardless of how many troops we ship over there - it would be like closing down the Appalachians from Harper's Ferry to Chatanooga, if the Appalachians were as tall and rugged as the Rockies. But even making the effort might be misguided, as you say, if it further exacerbates our problems with the Pashtun.

We have to rethink what we are doing. I will be very interested to see the results of the current CENTCOM review of our effort in Afghanistan. Anybody have any idea what it might contain?

[Ron Humphrey]

A few thoughts (mine) on Afghanistan and U.S. involvement there:

1. What was our endstate when we first went in, and what is it now? If it changed for political reasons, ok. If it changed because the intel community keeps adding new teams to the "bad guy" list we have a big problem on our hands...

It does seem like everytime you turn around theres something or someone new in the mix. However not quite sure that it can be laid completely at the feet of IC. Although it might seem so unfortunately a lot of it seems to actually be coming out of the woodwork so to speak almost as if there were efforts to overwhelm the operational capacity of coalition forces.

Can't imagine why anyone would want to do that

That said IMHO the biiigger problem we do face is the seeming necessity to GIT er Dun now, today This not only placing more and more requirements on less and less forces but generally stunts their ability to step back long enough to see the forest for the trees. That means a lot of hip pocket solutions which although sometimes effective in the long run equate to more trouble.

2. Driving a wedge (i.e., trying to establish an effective controlled border) through the heart of Pashto territory does not seem like an effective way to gain the support of this populace that is so critical to much of the instability in both of the countries they live within. I think this is a bad case of Westphalian logic that just does not apply here. At some point we will have to begin getting creative about recognizing new forms of sovereignty. COL Maxwell just posted a sound concept of "co-existence." The rules are changing whether we recognize that fact or not. This would be a great place to debut some form of lesser included sovereignty for this populace that grants certain rights to the Pashto populace regardless of state of residence, but that also honors the sovereignty of the states. Free passage throughout their territory would have to be part of this.

Seems like yourself, Ken, and others have made it fairly clear from their experiences exactly how effectively any borders can or can't be controlled, so no arguments there. How then does one work out ways to restrict traffic of the "bad guys" while still facilitating commerce and social engagement among the populace. Perhaps the answer is that you don't really do either but rather find ways to recognize each and interact accordingly. Adding to that the fact that as oft as possible (less-is-more) can be much more comfortable for both the CI and the populace.

Are the rules really changing or has it just taken some of us a long time to realize that the rules we thought we knew weren't quite what we thought they were?

3. We helped the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban, but I don't recall the people of Afghanistan then signing on to help the US wage our war on terror. Somewhere we twisted "we are here to help you" into "we are here so you must help us." We need to back up 10 yards and reassess why we are there before we just plow ahead with executing the current mission harder and faster..

If we aren't saying (help us, help you) why exactly are we still there?

4. Finally, we can't "fix" Afghanistan. Particularly if our definition of fixed is that they look just like us. One, they don't want fixed. Two, its none of our business. As I have always said, insurgents and terrorists do not find sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, they find it within poorly governed populaces. Seems to me we are being damn hard on the populace of Afghanistan in the name of fixing the governance of Afghanistan. Sounds a lot like we might be creating the very sanctuary we are trying to eliminate simply because we have misidentified what makes up a sanctuary in the first place.

Agreed and would add FWIW Exactly what Poorly Governed looks like is not something that I've yet found an acceptable definition for in regards to Afghanistan with its particular dynamics.

Think of it this way- Can you define without a doubt what well governed will look like there yet if not than isolating and "fixing" whats wrong is still hiding out there in the ether somewhere.

[Fuchs]

I'd like to check something that maybe I don't understand:

The central state is weak, corrupt and without strong traditions in Afghanistan, but the regional/local institutions succeed at governing the country.
The COIN strategy will likely pay tribute to this in the future and aim to make local powers more effective, respected and resilient to Taliban (if they aren't Taliban or reliable Taliban allies themselves).

Some problems;

a)
Doesn't that exactly create a "failed state", something that we want to avoid?
b)
Aren't local powers historically dominoes in Afghanistan who change sides if the other team does some impressive power projection?
c)
Doesn't decentralized governance require a simple law code like Sharia that does not require a professional justice system?
d)
Doesn't decentralized power mean more drug production and more warlords in the future?
e)
On the other hand - why aren't we willing to stage a democratic coup and get rid of the central government and its discredited puppets for a 2nd attempt with the central approach?


Finally I'm interested in how the hell our stupid politicians had the idea to occupy the country with the most terrible occupation military history of mankind, but that's another issue.

[jmm99]

in hearing your answers and solutions to the questions and problems you cite.

Given Germany's experience with decentralized and centralized governance over the last 1000 years, a German perspective on these issues should be better informed than most.

Were all the big, medium and small "states" that made up Germany during the later HRE era all that bad ? Was what ensued from Westphalia all that good ?