As has been said, an assumption is the mother of all foul ups and here are three of them early on in the monograph:The first two are questionable at best while the third is correct."The United States currently faces three major strategic challenges that will dominate its defense policy over the next decade or longer: defeating Islamist terrorist groups, hedging against the rise of a hostile and more openly confrontational China, and preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers."
Why war? Is there perhaps a better way? That is not to preclude military action; it does raise the question of what kind of action, when and where. I think those things need to be considered. No sense in a war if it can be preempted and stopped before it starts. Why do we have to accord the opponent the right to initiate action?
Is China confrontational or just single mindedly pursuing its interests? I doubt the author can answer that question, I certainly can't and suspect no one outside the politburo in Beijing can answer it...
This statement:is I believe incorrect on two levels; such preparation need not be difficult; the simple fact is that we have not done it, preferring to keep our world War I and II Draft-filled Army training and personnel models instead of adapting to the professional force that we have. I also question the use of the tag line 'center of gravity' in this context and I'm not at all sure the Army has done what he suggests. Too early to tell, I think."For a variety of reasons, including the difficulty of preparing for both irregular and conventional conflicts, the Army has continued to place its institutional center of gravity squarely in the area of conventional warfare.
While the monograph proposes some fixes to those things, I doubt it's sweeping enough to make much -- enough -- difference.
The idea of 'Security Cooperation Brigade Combat Teams (SC BCTs)' is not a good one. We cannot afford the specialization suggested and to train to a specific capability is to insure that capability is employed. That is breeding a self fulfilling prophecy...
A prophecy that will consign us into a series of conflicts of a type wherein our very strength is an impediment and that plays to the opponents strengths. This is smart?
In discussing personnel strenghs and problems, this statement is made with respect to Viet Nam:It is partly true -- it need not have been, had the training on those NCO Candidate been better (not longer, just better) it might well not have been true."itself compelled to adopt accelerated promotions to fill shortages in the NCO ranks. The widespread promotion of enlisted soldiers (sometimes referred to as “shake-and-bake” sergeants) unprepared to handle NCO responsibilities played a major role in the breakdown in order, discipline, and unit effectiveness during that war."
Point is, the monograph equates that to today's rapid promotions and the shortfall in NCOs -- and I suggest that by extension, it could apply to Officers. Part of the problem then and now was that the perception of need; i.e. one MUST have a CPT and a SFC to fill spaces designated for a CPT and a SFC; drove and drives too many actions. The real issues are (1) the level of competence at which the task must be performed; and (2) the competence of the individual selected to do that job and (3) the appropriateness AND thoroughness of the training for the job. We do not do that at well. His or her rank is immaterial. Or should be. In an Army that is over Officered and which has experienced significant NCO grade creep, raw numbers and ranks do NOT tell the whole story. Far from it.
In addressing the future, FM 3-0 Operations is cited:
"For maximum effectiveness, stability and civil support tasks require dedicated training, similar to training for offensive and defensive tasks. Likewise, forces involved in protracted stability or civil support operations require intensive training to regain proficiency in offensive or defensive tasks before engaging in large-scale combat operations."
I think two points in that statement require considerable thought. Is 'maximum effectiveness' truly achievable? Far more importantly, is it necessary (and sustainable given US unit rotation policies and necessities)? The second issue is 'intensive training.' I submit that IF we did a far better job of training new entrants in all ranks using outcome based training instead of the archaic standards based system system we now use, 'intensive' would be an unnecessary word. I mention this to point out that the current Army techniques of mellifluous as opposed to dry military-speak invite using the Army's apparent rhetoric against the institution.
All in all, the monograph is quite questionable. Given the comparison of its prescriptions to those recently seen here in the briefing prepared by COL Macgregor; I'd support the latter as more realistic and more visionary.
An added note. The monograph quotes these issues as being noted in the 90s and dictating the need for 'transformation:'
> Operations will shift from linear to nonlinear;
> Forces will operate much more dispersed;
> Operations will be conducted at a much higher tempo, leading to greater reliance on speed in mobilizing, deploying, and conducting combat operations;
> Advanced information technologies will allow ground forces to form networks, enabling them to violate the principle of mass to better protect themselves by dispersion, while losing little of their ability to coordinate or mass combat capability;
> Although close combat will remain a key element in land warfare, advanced information capabilities and munitions will enable ground forces to conduct decisive engagements at far greater ranges than has historically been the case;
> Adversaries who cannot compete effectively in open battle will gravitate toward combat in complex terrain (urban areas in particular);
> Operations will be much more dependent on maritime and air forces for their success
than has been the case — in short, land warfare will become even more of a
joint endeavor than it is today; and
> The spectrum of land warfare will become blurred, with various forms of warfare merging, requiring unprecedented levels of flexibility from land forces.
All probably true. I was fascinated with the similarity of those points to the ones cited by the Army in 1955 to explain why it needed to reorganize into the Pentomic structure; an organization that was ahead of its time -- and which was consigned to an early (and undeserved ) grave mostly because it was different and demanded too much of senior people. Secondarily because Congress couldn't understand and didn't like it...
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