Anyone interested in the history of the current fight in Afghanistan will definitely want to save this.

To be fair to MG Freakley, Mountain Thrust was a critical part of his overall campaign plan, the third in a sequenced series of operations. The arrival of several NATO contingents and the imminent expansion of ISAF complicated and constrained his tactical options. Whatever one might think of the efficacy of the US effort during that period, it is indisputible that the Americans were not able to conduct business as they would have wished.

Two other points to highlight.
First, the impact of differing national styles can be (and was) incredibly disruptive. The Brits and Canadians, for instance, held the quaint notion that commanders did not interfere two levels below them; definitely not a core belief of the 10th Mountain Division. For quite a while the allies considered the US as overbearing micromanagers, while the Americans thought of their comrades-in-arms as obstructive, timid, red-card flashers. Not conducive to close cooperation.
Second, how incredibly 'sticky' early deployments became. Once in place, it became almost impossible politically to leave any district capital or isolated outpost. If NATO were doing it over, they might reconsider the way they attempted to open new territories rather than concentrate in a single area. By going into Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan they definitely became fixed in place - and would have been regardless of whether the Taliban chose to fix itself alongside them. The Taliban could have easily economized on their fixing forces and caused us even more trouble during the various battles around Kandahar. Luckily for us, they are even worse at the operational level than we are.