about the last three posts - something about being separated by a common language - or, in this case, a common color scheme.
You all realize that everyone is right here.
Hat tip to JTF for his black example.
about the last three posts - something about being separated by a common language - or, in this case, a common color scheme.
You all realize that everyone is right here.
Hat tip to JTF for his black example.
Hallafu@#ingluyah ... The only time MNF-I actually got on the front foot in the info game was when BG Lessell smashed the IO, PA, and PD guys into one room and forced them to talk, and work together as MNF-I Stratcom. The info sucesses in Al FAJR are directly attributable to the synchronisation and coordiantion that occurred as a result. Unfortunatley as sooon as the BG rotated out it was white-anted ... mostly by the PA guys (and led by a nameless reservist pusser with rank that far outstripped his ability).NATO to "Merge" Public Affairs, Info Ops, Psy Ops Offices in AFG?
If everyone got over their stupid bloody capbadge issues and focused on the actual mission it is plain to see the there is no argument against having them work together. Doesn't mean they do each other's job ... just means they know what the hell is going on in the domain in which they are meant to be the SME.
I manage to be an IO guy/PA guy/PSYOPer and general ops planner all in one (and a pretty good looking one a that). Why the hell is it always so difficult for everyone else?
I wasn't on MNF-I staff, but I had high visibility of - for lack of a better term - our "IO" in Iraq. I reject even the most guarded suggestion that we are "losing the information war" or any similar claim. The fact that many people hold that pessimistic view is a tribute either to
a) our good OPSEC
b) the crappy intelligence gathering and propaganda development of our adversaries
c) both
Mullah Atari sure was a nice guy to reign in his militia in 2007. Lucky us! Good thing that AQI pushed their luck with the Sunnis - we were getting antsy waiting around and doing nothing, waiting for something to change the situation. And, of course, praise Allah that the pan-Arab media's negative coverage of US operations in Iraq significantly moderated (even before Obama burst onto the scene) - that was probably their "turn the other cheek" reaction to our unilateral, overbearing ways.
When the history of this war is written, after current operations are declassified, the skill and cunning of our leaders in navigating the media, culture, and political realm of Iraq since early 2007 will be as impressive to behold as the the mismanagement of the first three years was mind-boggling.
Schmedlap I think you're reading between the lines too much mate ... the last thing that an IO guy is ever going to say is "we're losing the info war." That line is solely reserved for operators who screw up royally and then lay blame on the info team for not fixing it when they cop a caning in the press .
What I was trying to say is getting everyone back in the one room and working together is a fantastic success (but I doubt that it will last long now that it has negative media coverage). I've seen it work and I've also seen it not work when FA assignments and sheep stations get in the way of commonsense.
As for 2007 ... my experience in that year is the other side of the NAG. Having said that I did sit through a pretty good brief from the MNC-I IO chief at that period a couple of months ago who reconfirmed all the lessons we learned in 04/05. I still find it amazing that we can continue kinetic ops, log, int etc every time we have a headquarters changeover but we always manage to start the IO game from scratch again ... there has not (to date anyway) been any continuity in the ID&I BOS in either theatre. That unfortunately leaves me very
FOr What it's worth, I wrote a little bit about this same sore subject the other day here. Cheers.
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