Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?

[wm]

We might try to substitute "success," but I'm not sure that this much better. We would only be defining that success from our own frame of reference. As Eden notes in the following quote, either process is unlikely to yield much of a long term solution.

. . . the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long.

A long term solution is a solution that is freely adopted by the conglomeration of folks that make up Afghanistan, not one that is forced down their throats by a bunch of do-gooder Westerners. If the US/NATO coalition can do things to help the local denizens achieve their goals, then that is what should be the way ahead for the coalition. If not, then the coalition troops need to redeploy to home station. I suspect we have overstayed our welcome. We have already done about as much as we can to show the "terrorists" that we can kick butt when we want and need to. All we now show them is that we are not as good at some other things (like nation building). The longer we stay, the more we will show them how small is the wardrobe of clothes that the emperor has for wear.

Separate point about the comments on airpower discussion below:

8. End coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.
Frankly, I don't think we execute many strikes that have a 'high probability of killing civilians'. The problem is, air strikes are the only way we have of attacking some of these folks. Minus air strikes, you have to go in with ground troops, and pulling off a surprise strike with ground troops is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and requires a lot more ground troops. Oh, and by the way, it doesn't always reduce the number of civilian casualties.

Airstrikes, the "easier wrong", are not the only way we have to attack. They are the only way we have to do so without putting too many of our own troops at risk. Maybe we ought to take the "harder right" of putting our forces (rather than the non-combatant locals) at risk and force our decision makers to see what it really costs to go do "nation-building" in oddball places. That might readjust the Washington bureaucrats' sight picture enough to make them rethink such adventures in the future.

(Yes, Ken, I know that is a forlorn wish. )