*Cough* Somali Pirates *Cough*
Yep, the pirates are winning over the cargo ship population by first coercing them to act in accordance within pirate expectations, and then as the world's cargo fleets realize that the world's navies can't protect them they'll recognize the pirates as the new government of the sea and willingly start supporting them. This must be an insurgency, and it is obviously the Navy's problem. In all seriousness, pirates like other organized criminal groups do present a challenge to the State. I still think our definitions for COIN, FID, UW, etc. are inadequate to address the security challenges we face today. Words have meaning, and many times those meanings can lmit our understanding of reality.

As for joint operations, our joint doctrine has some flaws, for example the aspects of it that are ATO centric (time table driven operations that nests well with the way the Air Force manages operations, but not necessarily with the other services), which is one example of a process that should be largely service doctrine, yet in many ways the ATO drives our joint targeting process.

I think the reality is that most of the problems with joint operations (I don't want to touch procurement and similiar issues) is not the doctrine, but rather how the doctrine is put into practice (if it is put into practice). In this case the shortfalls are due to the personalties involved, not the doctrine. All people, even our best commanders, are not without fault. It is a human trait we cannot overcome (even with EBO); it is simply part of the uncertainty of war. So when I read comments on one joint command being Army centric, and another Navy centric, that isn't a reflection of our joint doctrine, it is a recognition of the failure of people to transition from service centric methodology to joint methodology. Still I believe we are getting better at joint operations each year. I personally wouldn't want to fight an OIF-1 like fight without the synergized capabilities of our joint force empowered by our joint doctrine. Call me bias, but like many of you I have seen the power that this joint force can bring to bare on a situation.

Admittedly our joint doctrine is largely focused on warfighting, NEO, etc., so it doesn't sufficiently address the role of the services in an irregular warfare scenario (we'll get there). The reality is IW is largely ground pounder focused, with air and sea power providing critical enablers. All the services play critical roles, but part of our service culture, based perhaps on our captialist social norms and our Congressional funding process, motivates many officers to attempt to undermine the other services and overly boost the value of their service (or branch). This iis what causes jointness to fail.

Look at the bright side, we know we have our faults, but generally our enemies are much worse. They're stuck with the imperfection of being human too.