In a couple of the accounts, the US Soldiers on the ground fired at the Pakis in retaliation.Originally Posted by reed11b
There's been firing across the border by
both sides since 2002. It surfaces to the media on occasion but not always.
Some times, there are casualties. Here's one I happen to know personally; note the date. The articles is not quite correct -- some of the Pakistanis helped the US, others engaged and a healthy fire fight was going on before it got calmed down. LINK
Pakistan Policy, 29 Sep 08: Ahmed Shuja Pasha, New ISI Chief
Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha has replaced Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj as director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
The Australian reports that Washington had been pressing Islamabad/Rawalpindi hard to replace Taj as late as Sunday night. President Asif Zardari reportedly met with CIA Director Michael Hayden this weekend in New York. What they discussed specifically is unclear — but Hayden reportedly provided Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani will a proposal for “ISI reform” in July.
Taj, a Musharraf relative and appointee, is depicted as the face of the organization’s alleged double game vis-a-vis militants along the border with Afghanistan. He will now head Gujranwala’s XXX Corps.
Pasha, just promoted from major general, had been director general of military operations (DGMO). In this capacity, he headed the Pakistan Army’s operations in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and so his appointment provides no indication of a change in the military establishment’s war on terror policy.....
USIP, 2 Oct 08: The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan
.....Washington needs to rethink its approach to Pakistan. If we genuinely believe that a stable, prosperous Pakistan is in our interest, we must be much smarter about how we work with Pakistan and what sort of assistance we provide. As the September 19th bombing of the Marriott hotel in Islamabad demonstrates, there is little time to waste. Our options in Pakistan are diminishing rapidly.
Political developments in both Pakistan and the United States, however, make this an opportune moment to recalibrate U.S. policy. A new civilian government headed by the Pakistan People’s Party has emerged in Pakistan, and President Pervez Musharraf has departed the scene after nine years of military rule. The upcoming U.S. presidential election will similarly bring a new set of policymakers to power and a potential willingness to consider fresh approaches to managing the difficult but exceedingly important U.S.–Pakistan relationship.....
CFR Report on Pakistan
Apologies for late addition thought I'd dropped the link in.
IN mid-September the American think tank Council Foriegn Relations published a report on 'The next chapter in US-Pakistan relations', a good overview and described the options available for the next US President:
http://www.cfr.org/content/publicati...roupReport.pdf
davidbfpo
Picking our allies in the 'Stan
The more I follow the complexities of the Pakistan and Indian involvement in A-stan, the more I fear we are trying to sit on the fence, with all the risk of serious groin injury that this entails. I think the time has come to seriously re-evaluate the sides we have chosen in this fight. In the following LINK, two passages stand out to me. One.
Does anyone here have confirmation of this? To me this is big, if the Pak Intelligence community is still supporting terrorist activities in A-stan, my support for them would be gone.Wednesday's attack could have a negative impact on Indo-Pakistani ties, which--due to revelations of Pakistani intelligence involvement in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008--were already strained.
Two.
My embarrassing random thought of supporting India as the key counter-terrorist agent in the region has begun to seem less whacko to me all the time. I understand the desire to appease everyone in the region, but my gut says that this is a bad idea, and we will lose ALL support and influence in the region if we keep it up.The historical animosity between Pakistan and India has also begun to increasingly manifest itself in Afghanistan, where Pakistan fears it is losing influence to India. New Delhi has pledged over $1 billion in assistance to the Afghan government and increased its political and economic influence throughout the country over the last few years. Pakistan's ability to maintain influence in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s stemmed from its support to the Taliban, whose leadership is allied with al-Qaeda. Other than strengthening ties to Kabul through stronger economic and trade linkages, Pakistan now finds itself with few options to project influence in Afghanistan; any further dealings with the Taliban risk isolation from the international community.
Reed
Any thought on how peacekeepers from either Pak or India would be viewed by the Afghan populace compared to the US and NATO?
Rand Paper Abstract
I would love to get the whole document but this abstract sums up the challenge and options fairly well.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-10-2008 at 10:29 PM.
The Indians would be regarded as just as foreign as NATO, and—given how Indian RoE work out when they are under threat—likely involve even more collateral damage against the civilian population as things got messy. More important, any Indian troop deployment would be considered by the Pakistani military-intelligence complex as confirmation that the Karzai government is a major strategic threat, and would lead them to throw their full-blown support behind the Taliban as a strategic counter. (While there is no doubt that elements in ISI currently provide some support to the Taliban now, it is very, very far from full fledged institutional support at present.)
Pakistani peacekeepers in Afghanistan? I wouldn't assume that they would be seen as much more "local"—the Pakistani army is seen as already "foreign" by many Pakistani Pashtuns in the FATA/NWFP/etc. It would also be resented by many local pro-Karzai Afghans as an extension of (malevolent) Pakistani influence. Finally, I have serious doubts about the PKO or combat efficiency of the Pakistani armed forces (their performance against radical Islamists within Pakistan, or on PKO missions such as Somalia, is far from stellar).
It's not known for sure, but it's likely ISI had some involvement in the attack. Whether this was limited to general support for the group or whether it provided direct assistance in support of this particular attack isn't known. There is a very important distinction there between general support and specific support for a particular attack.
Also, one thing you have to keep in mind about Pakistan is that it is a factional country that lacks the kind of centralized power and authority that we have here in the US. The civilian government, military and intelligence services all have a lot of independent power - indeed the civilian government serves at the pleasure of the Army - so there are many times when the right hand not only doesn't know what the left is doing, but the foot is doing something completely different and lying to both hands about it. And there are times when the government may want to do something and the military say's no. In those arguments, the military usually wins and gets its way.
This makes choosing "sides" difficult when talking about India/Pakistan because when something like the India Embassy bombing occurs, and there are indications of Pakistani involvement, we don't know if that involvement was an official act of the Pakistani government, or just another in a long line of ISI going off the reservation and pursuing its own, independent agenda. It must be quite frustrating to the civilian government as well, who might find out that an instrument of its supposed national power has gone and done something from al Jezeera or when the US Ambassador calls.
This reality in Pakistan makes dealing with them very complex and frustrating, but they still remain an ally of necessity. Even if parts of the Pakistani government are working against us, we need those parts which are working for us if we want to continue operations at all in Astan.
I also strongly endorse Rex's comments. Pakistan has long sought to control Afghanistan to gain strategic depth against India. It's one of several reasons why Pakistan does not want to see a strong, independent government in Afghanistan. Indian "peacekeepers" in that context would be seen as an existential threat to Pakistani interests. In fact, the main reason India is playing in Afghanistan at all has little to do with Afghanistan and everything to do with causing problems for Pakistan.
Back In my misspent youth, the Afghans liked Americans and
strongly disliked in order, Pakistanis, Brits and Russians. Guy I know with two tours and current contacts there tells me that's still true.
That suggests that any thought of Pakistani troops in Afghanistan would not be a good idea...
Entropy is of course correct on the problems that Pakistan possesses as a nation. There is no easy solution there or in Afghanistan and there was never going to be one. We did something that needed to be done, are still doing that as best we can and that's good. The bad thing is that it seems to me we have yet to determine what we can and will accept as an achievable end state. We really need to do that, be very clear and public about it and set out to achieve that goal.
Reed...
I think your take on the ISI is well placed. I think the Pak govt serves at the pleasure of the army, while the ISI upholds the agenda of the "true believers", while allowing the govt and army "plausable deniability".
Every so often the ISI will provide a scape goat and talk about reform.
The bottom line, IMO, is Pakastan's pathological fear of India. That fear determines Pak foreign policy. If Pak continues to see US policy as favoring India we can only expect more "disappointments" from Pak.
Unfortunately, others are not operating without a strategic goal. Events may pass us by while we try and figure out what to do. The SCO grows, while NATO shows it's impotence.The bad thing is that it seems to me we have yet to determine what we can and will accept as an achievable end state.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JL09Df02.html
Since about 1965 China has been Pak's most important strategic partner, while USSR/Russia has ebbed and flowed with India. I don't think the GWOT has altered the China/Pak relationship at all.
I read these recently and thought there were some interesting points.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JL06Df03.html
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JL09Df01.html
Some people don't like the source, but I think it provides a good start point to do further research. I think the region gives a new meaning to "Byzantine politics". Just 2cents from someone trying to learn about the region.
The entire document is here: The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India
Picking our allies
I accept "sitting on the fence" can be painful, but the campaign in Afghanistan does not face the dilemma of choosing between India and Pakistan.
Neither nation can really supply "boots on the ground", for a variety of reasons, although I'd be interested to learn how the small Indian para-military presence, guarding road builders, has gone down with the Afghans (sibject of a thread a long time ago).
IMHO India can only play a small part whilst without Pakistan's assistance we cannot campaign fully in Afghanistan; as discussed on the supply routes thread recently.
We do need to work on ensuring India and Pakistan do not return to their historical bickering etc. Reinforced by the Mumbai attacks and the attendant allegations of a Pakistani state role.
Alas neither nation is readily amenable to diplomacy and pressure. The two rival intelligence agencies are known to "play games" in Afghanistan, much to the annoyance of former Western government figures. The Indian Embassy attack has been widely leaked as being linked to ISI, sometimes in surprising detail in semi-public forums; whether there is any foundation to this remains elusive.
The real issue in Afghanistan is securing Afghan support, preferably in the fight; I exclude what our objective is (covered in another thread) and whether an Afghan nation state exists that can provide that support.
Reed - I hope this helps.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-11-2008 at 08:50 PM. Reason: Sentence by sentence additions due to IT issues at home
Why Pakistan is so difficult
Found on another site and on my first read an interesting story, which I suspect has gained prominence with Gordon Brown's visit to the region: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle5337881.ece
Note the dead Pakistani general is SF.
davidbfpo
(Added here as the latest thread on the issue, although there are other threads).
Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-14-2008 at 10:21 PM. Reason: My spelling corrected
Good Catch...
Wheels inside of wheels...
CSIS, 27 Jan 09 The Afghan-Pakistan War: The Rising Threat: 2002-2008
NATO/ISAF, the US government, and UN have provided some unclassified data on the rising intensity of the conflict, but coverage has often been limited and much of the data are contradictory. Other material has been leaked by the UN, or has been complied by private organizations like Senlis -- whose results are generally more negative than those of the US and NATO/ISAF.
This paper provides a graphic comparison of such data in graphic and map form. No one source can be said to be reliable and no one set of trends is definitive. The only way to track the the trends in the war is to look at different sources and metrics.
The reader should also be aware that there are particularly sharp differences in estimates of Taliban and other insurgent influence depending on whether that influence is measures in terms of clashes, poll, presence, or risk to NATO/ISAF, and UN/NGO personnel. This is clearly reflected in the maps in showing the rise of violence, high risk areas, and areas of Taliban influence.
The data are further limited by the fact that NATO/ISAF, the US and other sources do not cover the Pakistani side of the fighting. This ignores one of the most critical aspects of the conflict.
Excellent, to the point comments/ref materials
CSIS, 27 Jan 09 The Afghan-Pakistan War: The Rising Threat: 2002-2008
Jedburg's comments are deeply appreciated and on target.
Pakistan has been "overlooked" for way too long.
A rebellion is going on inside the FATA, Waziristan, and related parts of the NWFP for some months now.
In Swat the Taliban and al Qaida, but especially the Taliban, are slaughtering the locals, who ethnically are not all Pukhtuns.
I get pleas for help frequent via private e-mails, starting from when I wrote/published a letter during 2008 testing the waters on theme "what if the US/NATO" came across the borders in force, literally?
Nub of most replies I got was they would prefer "us" the Pakistan Army and their ISI.
Problem is this is a backward, feudal, tribal society which cannot be changed for time to come, could take 100s of years. Bad as the Pak Army and ISA may be, they of late appear to be doing a better job, and should police up their theoretical provinces.
However, it is worth noting that these and related areas in Northern Paksitan allege to hate and oppose the terrorists, Taliban and al Qaida, but they, themselves have to get their guns and butter from somewhere? Guess who? From the Taliban and al Qaida, and lately from the Pakistan Army who have tried to sign up "enmasse" whole tribes to fight against sthe Taliban.
Convoluted and confusing for sure.
Again, thanks much for Jedburg's remarks and references.
PS about Swat
During 2008 a perhaps young Pukhtun man 20s age, posted on HUJRA ONLINE website (part of Khyber Watch.com syndicate of websites) a photo of himself in front of an Austrian syndicate built in Swat ski lodge/resort, coupled with photos (this was spring, 2008) of fast flowing area/nearby streams/river.
Within a few months the Taliban or al Qaida, probably the Taliban, had burned/blown up the former ski resort hotel and the young man who made the mistake of posting his own photo standing in front of this now gone Swat ski resort has not been back "on the air," most likely, my guess only, murdered by the Taliban.
The Taliban are using low strength FM radios to communicate and push their agenda in Swat and elsewhere in these northern areas. My antique knowledge of radio is that AM radio waves bounce and work best in mountaineous/hilly terrain. FM radio waves move in a straight line.
I assume you all know what I am saying.
Tough doings over there. Also last spring [2008] the Taliban fighters in some strength came into the NW city limits of Peshawar, a sprawling frontier city of a couple million folks, while Musharraf was still in power. Pakistani Army, Froniter Corp, and Peshawar Police battled for weeks, on and off, and lost then regained a major auto tunnel used on a main highway in and out of northern parts of City of Peshawar.
Last edited by George L. Singleton; 01-31-2009 at 04:05 AM.
Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan & India
Some bits and pieces of references as background for a few observations.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jammu_K...t_(Yasin_Malik)
http://www.khyberwatch.com/forums/sh...gle+Parliament
http://www.asinstitute.org/
(I referred in a Jan. 31, 2008 posting to University of Lahore. CORRECTION: I should have referred to University of Punjab in Lahore, Pakistan. George Singleton.)
Here are some opinions which I invite comment, criticism on from my fellow SWJ thinkers and writers.
- Russia has agreed to have it's territory used vs. Pakistan for land movement of military supplies for NATO in Afghanistan.
- I believe that the sudden collapse of the Russian oil and gas money based national economy created to me a literally overnight opportunity for NATO shipments as this is a new revenue source to a financially upset and distressed Russian national and provincial economy(s).
- The hoped for benefit as we attempt a new form of surge inside Afghanistan is now based, for the time being, on a less threatened by Taliban and al Qaida land route vs. Pakistan where the Khyber Pass has been a narrow bottleneck attacked more regularly in recent months with pretty much impunity by the Taliban terrorists.
- Pakistan's government and military can now suck air and contemplate cooperating more fully in what was supposed to be a common war on terrorism, as Pakistan, too is faced with a heavily upset national and provincial economy(s) and in great need of the revenue from movement of NATO supplies on land through Pakistan.
- The newly opened Port of Gwadar, in Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea, built by the Chinese for Pakistan, needs the cargo revenue of continued movement of NATO supplies through Gwadar, by road up to the Khyber pass and thence into Afghanistan.
- Confused with the terrorist war with the Taliban and al Qaida is one camp of peaceful proponents of an independent Kashmir, composed of both Pakistan and Indian occupied parts of Kashmir. One of the above posts provides background on a heavily overlooked [my opinion] profile of Yasin Malik, who is Chairman of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front.
- One of Yasin Malik's chief fund raisers is Sagir Ahmed of Bedford, England. Sagir started e-mail correspondence with me at the end of 2001 when I started having artices and letters giving an American's point of view, one who lived and worked in then West Pakistan at the old US Embassy, Karachi, as the liaison officer for the US U-2 base [U-2s and comm intel] at Badabur, which is a suburb of Peshawar, Pakistan.
- As is true historically with Europe, the Indian Subcontinent is filled with different cultures, tribes, alliances which in many instances are violent, but in his instance the JKLF has moved past violence to a peaceful process to seek political change in Kashmir.
- Side note: There is a third small piece of Kashmir held by China since their invasion of Tibet in 1960 (date ?). I don't attempt to address it, nor does Yasin Malik clearly try to address it, either, but you guys and gals may want to add it to the discussion I am seeking here.
- A final thought: Yasin Malik did a speaking tour of campuses and other groups here in the US circa 2006. I noted at the time that Howard University in DC was a major point of his visitation and lectures. I tried hard, without success, to get the then Chancellor of Vanderbilt University to invite Yasin Malik to speak with or without a panel at Vanderbilt in Nashville. Lack of a more open academic platform to such peaceful revolutionaries here in the US bothers me, but understand, I don't pretend to know everything about anything. I just think we could have and can in future do better.
Hoping for discussions of any tangental or synthesis nature now from you all.
Last edited by George L. Singleton; 02-01-2009 at 03:03 PM.
Pakistan...and America
The problem is Pakistan and our self-deceit.
This war, and the taliban, have no traction in the absence of external sancturary provided by the GoP. In the absence of such, all things ARE possible and we hardly can imagine what the possible positive permutations might have arisen.
It's not to be so long as we aid our enemy in making war upon ourselves. There is, evidently, little recognition by Pakistan of the infectious influence the "good" taliban and their associates- A.Q. Haqqani & Son, and Hekmatyar have had upon the likes of locals like Nazir, Bahadur, and (most notably) Mehsud.
Equally, in their obsessive quest to deny Afghanistan to India and thus dodge the "envelopement" bullet, the GoP fails to see the final manifestation of a re-empowered taliban gov't and its friends.
That, of course, will be the cooperation between "good" and "bad" taliban to seize Pakistan. And they shall.
We've deliberately steered politely around this harsh reality about our ostensible "ally"- rationalizing our need for access to trans-ship goods/equipment. We've justified this by believing that no alternative exists and that we must "engage" them to gently sway their perspectives our way.
We've failed and now aid an enemy opposed to the U.N. mandate and prepared to use proxy armies to achieve it's ends.
Everything else trickles from that leaky faucet...
"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski, a.k.a. "The Dude"
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