COIN Perspectives From On Point

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

hit several nails right on the head.

Bill said:

I have to disagree with one of his points though, he said said the terrorists wouldn't know where we're at, they would just know that we could be everywhere (paraphrasing), so their freedom of movement would be severely limited. U.S. military forces in an urban environment for he most part would still be identified by the locals, and that information could be relayed to the enemy by suportive locals.

I believe that the crux of Sgt Hanson's point was that by saturating an area with numerous fire teams operating as stealthily (tactically) as possible, vice squads moving in the open acting more as a ‘presence,’ that some would always be undetected. Granted in urban areas the more locals you operate around the greater the chance of being dimed out by them, but with enough fire teams operating in an area some would inevitably escape observation or detection (e.g. by infil and exfil at night). So eventually the bad guys would never be absolutely 100% sure they were not about to take a round in the back while planting an IED or operating freely in what was once a secure area. In COIN when we dance to their tune, they win. It's time we started setting a new tune of our own. And not a technical tune that has some gazillion dollar price tag attached (JIEDDO and MRAP come to mind).

Of course this would mean a major paradigm shift in the way our infantry operates and leadership thinks, the grunts would have to operate less like a ground pounder and more like SF. Boy oh boy, SOCOM would be in a tizzy then.

There are many who have made the fatal mistake of underestimating the intellectual prowess of Marine NCOs.

[William F. Owen]

I believe that the crux of Sgt Hanson's point was that by saturating an area with numerous fire teams operating as stealthily (tactically) as possible, vice squads moving in the open acting more as a ‘presence,’ that some would always be undetected.

The UK did this all the time in Northern Ireland. "Bricks" - UK Fire teams - would alternate between open patrolling and "lurking", while co-operating with other "satellite" patrols.

Of course this would mean a major paradigm shift in the way our infantry operates and leadership thinks, the grunts would have to operate less like a ground pounder and more like SF. Boy oh boy, SOCOM would be in a tizzy then.

It is really not useful to distinguish between SF and Infantry when it comes to small unit tactics. WHY the differentiation and antagonism persists is a mystery

There are many who have made the fatal mistake of underestimating the intellectual prowess of Marine NCOs.

The intellectual powers of ENLISTED Marines have never worried me.....

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

It is really not useful to distinguish between SF and Infantry when it comes to small unit tactics. WHY the differentiation and antagonism persists is a mystery

I believe it may stem from the belief that one portion of the service is stepping on someone else's "turf." Unfortunately there are some in SF who feel that the tactic of "lurking" is their purview alone, just as there are conventional infantry folk who feel "lurking" is beneath them.

Plus there might be a protectionist aspect to it all. If the average GI was suddenly able to do all those things SF tout they solely do then SF wouldn't be so "special."

[Ken White]

and there is a fence there...

It's turf and dollars on the part of the senior folks, it's what the British call 'cap badge' loyalty for most -- simple unit loyalty and the unfortunate human tendency to make ones self feel better by trashing others (even if partly in jest).

It is counterproductive and my sensing is that it's less a problem now than it used to be. Still around and needs to get better As more elements from both sides of that fence work together, it will.

[Sabre]

Little excerpt from the Washington Post ("U.S. to Raise 'Irregular War' Capabilities")

The policy also supports continued growth in Special Operations forces -- elite troops such as Army Green Berets skilled in partnering with foreign forces and civil affairs soldiers who conduct nation-building.

As irregular warfare is likely to be conducted by Special Operations forces, the policy directs the U.S. Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, to "develop capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low visibility operations."

In terms of equipment, the directive supports the expansion of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, as well as aviation assets for irregular warfare, Vickers said.

Hmmm... no mention of more infantry, or training them for the types of ops that the Sergeant suggests, or any change in tactics (still the exclusive purview of the SF, apparently), but instead includes the tired, old "more intelligence!" mantra. That investment in "more intelligence" hasn't worked YET. ...and won't. 100 Intel specialists won't learn as much as 4 grunts in the field, with the added bonus that those 4 grunts can DO SOMETHING. Sad to see that the prognosis is for "more of the same".

[Ken White]

They're bone ignorant and don't know what to look for.

Go to this LINK (.pdf) and read Paragraphs 8. and 11 of the Responsibilities Enclosure. I think they've done a pretty fair job of tabbing out responsibilities and stating requirements. The changes in the paper are subtle but there are changes and all, IMO are pretty much for the better. Massive changes would be good but that is not the American way of guvmint...

The elements you quote above are all worthwhile and I don't see business as usual in them. As a long time Grunt, I understand the value of Infantry -- I also understand that there are always only going to be so many Infantrymen, thus there will never be 'enough' of them and that force multipliers like IRS assets are beneficial to those four Grunts.

There is no question in my mind that we have significant need for ability to reach into denied areas; we have neglected that since a need was shown in 1979. More aviation assets are needed to reduce road exposure of convoys.

Bad article by the WaPo (not much new there...); good paper by DoD, I think.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

"...to ensure the U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns involving IW-related activities and operations..."

Although (1) through (5) look to be in part lifted from here.

It looks like this DoDD is trying to eliminate some of the residual parochialism and institutionalization. I agree with Ken that it has gotten better in the last 20 years or so and this looks to be an even larger effort to make the point that each service is really part of one team.

So while, as Sabre points out, there is no specific mention of more infantry or specific training thereof (DoDDs try not to be too specific in taskings, they are more for outlining overarching responsibilities together with specific organizational arrangements and authorities) 9.b. does require all the service components are trained in IW.

[Entropy]

Link.

The Pentagon this week approved a major policy directive that elevates the military's mission of "irregular warfare" -- the increasingly prevalent campaigns to battle insurgents and terrorists, often with foreign partners and sometimes clandestinely -- to an equal footing with traditional combat.

The directive, signed by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England on Monday, requires the Pentagon to step up its capabilities across the board to fight unconventionally, such as by working with foreign security forces, surrogates and indigenous resistance movements to shore up fragile states, extend the reach of U.S. forces into denied areas or battle hostile regimes.

The policy, a result of more than a year of debate in the defense establishment, is part of a broader overhaul of the U.S. military's role as the threat of large-scale combat against other nations' armies has waned and new dangers have arisen from shadowy non-state actors, such as terrorists that target civilian populations.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

to finally formally recognize the prevalent mission that the Army and Marines have been performing for the last couple hundred years...

[Sabre]

They're bone ignorant and don't know what to look for.

The elements you quote above are all worthwhile and I don't see business as usual in them. As a long time Grunt, I understand the value of Infantry -- I also understand that there are always only going to be so many Infantrymen, thus there will never be 'enough' of them and that force multipliers like IRS assets are beneficial to those four Grunts.

There is no question in my mind that we have significant need for ability to reach into denied areas; we have neglected that since a need was shown in 1979. More aviation assets are needed to reduce road exposure of convoys.

Bad article by the WaPo (not much new there...); good paper by DoD, I think.

I should have clarified what I meant by "not enough infantry" - I mean that, as a percentage of the total force, there aren't enough. I see numbers assigned to headquarters staffs increasing dramatically, and Intel slots increasing dramatically, and given that there is an "inelasticity of demand" for support troops (mechanics, truckers, medical,etc), it is the combat MOS's that end up with fewer personnel, one way or the other. Sure, ISR has value. But do we really *need* one Intel MOS soldier for every Infantryman?
Some of the ISR technology that we have now is great, but to just randomly throw more bodies and money at "Intelligence" isn't the right answer.
(Heh, Perhaps instead Intel branch could be re-cast, something like the Engineers, who always remind folks that their secondary mission is to "fight as Infantry".)

Nonetheless, a "force multiplier" applied to zero force is...

To be picky, I could crunch some numbers, but I am reasonably certain that even a massive increase in aviation assets wouldn't be enough to prevent the need for resupply with ground vehicles - trying to move all materiel and personnel by air is prohibitively expensive. (The only thing that would do the trick would be to cut back on the amount of resupply that you need, perhaps by using far fewer folks to accomplish a mission...)

[Ken White]

I should have clarified what I meant by "not enough infantry" - I mean that, as a percentage of the total force, there aren't enough. I see numbers assigned to headquarters staffs increasing dramatically, and Intel slots increasing dramatically, and given that there is an "inelasticity of demand" for support troops (mechanics, truckers, medical,etc), it is the combat MOS's that end up with fewer personnel, one way or the other. Sure, ISR has value. But do we really *need* one Intel MOS soldier for every Infantryman?

and I'm sure they're worse now than ever. As far as a percentage of total force, in addition to staffs and intel increases, I'd be willing to bet that there are many 11Bs buried in out of the way and esoteric jobs all over the world.

I doubt there's one intel person per grunt but I do understand your point. What we don't know is how that ISR plus up will work.

To be picky, I could crunch some numbers, but I am reasonably certain that even a massive increase in aviation assets wouldn't be enough to prevent the need for resupply with ground vehicles - trying to move all materiel and personnel by air is prohibitively expensive.

Didn't mean to imply that. POL other than in small doses isn't going to be air delivered -- still, more aircraft will mean less total ground exposure. If the force in Afghanistan stays light Infantry, we proved in Viet Nam you resupply at an 85% plus level by air.

(The only thing that would do the trick would be to cut back on the amount of resupply that you need, perhaps by using far fewer folks to accomplish a mission...)

Not the only thing but definitely a plus on several counts.

My major point was that the article was not terribly informative and it missed the point that the Infantry is a part of the General Purpose Force (the bulk of the army by far) and is not a part of the IW force which the paper and Vickers were addressing. That's why the infantry increases such as 4/1 and 4/4 -- both new light inf Bdes in heavy Divs -- plus the others weren't mentioned.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Roger, unit saturation has been utilised. COL McMaster perfected it for OIF at Tal Afar, much to our Army's chagrin. Pentagon was in no mood to be told that the best COA would be the 1000 man per square kilometer terror supression tactic.

I for one supported the Colonel, who would go on to be passed over for promotion to BG despite being one of the most qualified Colonel's in our Army. His planning was strategically sound, politically sensitive & historically congruent.

I appreciate the multi-faceted questions brought to bear here. Many of the solutions are only impractical due to force projection limitations and manning requirements.

[Ken White]

"...Many of the solutions are only impractical due to force projection limitations and manning requirements...

is the answer to this:

...Pentagon was in no mood to be told that the best COA would be the 1000 man per square kilometer terror supression tactic.

Yes, McMaster got passed over; however, he later was selected so all's well that ends well as someone said.

All of which leads to my no more than idly curious question; what is your point?

[Cavguy]

I for one supported the Colonel, who would go on to be passed over for promotion to BG despite being one of the most qualified Colonel's in our Army. His planning was strategically sound, politically sensitive & historically congruent.

You do know that he is now a BG?

[Bullmoose Bailey]

You do know that he is now a BG?

And Roger......

The General was passed over twice before his star rose & I'm thankful for the good leadesrhip of the board that sat under GEN Petraeus & added this living legend to their constellation.