states that the Supreme Court (and inferior courts by extension) shall have "...jurisdiction both as to law and fact..."* but I have a real problem when judges decide fact and are simply wrong about the facts (as in Clinton v. Jones - or was it the other way around?). I'm afraid that I don't have a better solution in this case but I certainly hope that the judges will recognize that the facts don't really support any interpretation of who is supporting whom.

Law of Land Warfare, I understand, is a set of treaties, conventions, and customs. It is also my understanding that treaties to which the US is a party are US law on a par with any other Federal statute (although SCOTUS tossed a curve ball on that in addressing the death penalty case for a Mexican national). Still, the element of custom in the "Law of Land Warfare" is a sort of common law function. And, yes, common law is judge made - but restrained by both precedent and those very customs. But why am I telling you this? you know it better than I do. Still, it seems useful to me to suggest that if we catch a pirate or two, we ought to try them aboard ship, convict them, and hang 'em from the nearest yardarm according to the ancient sea laws/customs against piracy. In a somewhat analogous fashion, it seems to me that we have jurisdiction over the Blackwater contractors and can try them for violations of the several treaties, conventions, and customary laws - either that or as illegal combattants, or both.

Regarding who should draft laws: personally, I think it ought to be the legislators with the help of hired Napoleon's corporals to make sure the draft laws are understood to mean what the dafters intended.

My point regarding Sen Sessions, however, was that his comments on his intent are less than sufficient guidance. As you point out, plain text comes first, then legislative history. But legislative history is usually recorded in the mark-up of the bill and later in the statements of the members of the committee that reported it out. Whether Sessions was the sponsor (sole or as amember of a group) is less relevant than the collective intent of the members of the reporting committee. Again, we should always remember that legislation is nearly always a compromise among the members of a committee.

Cheers

JohnT

*as John Marshall quoted Art III in Marbury where he arrogated to the court a power that James Madison said would have caused him to reject his own Constitution!