A War's Impossible Mission

[MikeF]

Cavguy says:

I hope the Article 32 hearing takes what has been demanded of these men in the past into consideration. This is why those guys can't be left in combat outposts for such long periods - they stress out. Units must enforce "off the line" time to recalibrate or incidents like this happen.

Unfortunately, sending the boys "off the line" back to the FOB for rest and relaxation is often more frustrating and stressful than it is worth. This is not Vietnam. They are not going back to a "rest" area where they can have a couple of beers and decompress. I'll try to summarize how my soldiers described their refits. Eventually, most requested not to go on refits b/c it wasn't worth the hassle.

1. Scrounge FOB for parts, equipment, and ammunition.
2. Get yelled at by a CSM for having a dirty uniform.
3. Guard platoon's equipment.
4. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a PT reflective belt in chow line.
5. Wait in line for an hour to use phone.
6. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a haircut.
7. Return to Patrol Base.

As funny as these observations are, they are sad as well.

Just another day in the life of a grunt I suppose.

Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.

v/r

Mike

[reed11b]

Cavguy says:



Unfortunately, sending the boys "off the line" back to the FOB for rest and relaxation is often more frustrating and stressful than it is worth. This is not Vietnam. They are not going back to a "rest" area where they can have a couple of beers and decompress. I'll try to summarize how my soldiers described their refits. Eventually, most requested not to go on refits b/c it wasn't worth the hassle.

1. Scrounge FOB for parts, equipment, and ammunition.
2. Get yelled at by a CSM for having a dirty uniform.
3. Guard platoon's equipment.
4. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a PT reflective belt in chow line.
5. Wait in line for an hour to use phone.
6. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a haircut.
7. Return to Patrol Base.

As funny as these observations are, they are sad as well.

Just another day in the life of a grunt I suppose.

Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.

v/r

Mike

One Year. As for tour frequency that is more difficult to calculate, but my observations (which are obviously the opposites of the DOD's) lead me to believe that tour length has greater impact then tour frequency. Too bad the Army does not see it that way, but I have always said that Army Mental Health knowledge and Army policy have a huge gap that needs to be closed.
Reed

[Ken White]

One Year. As for tour frequency that is more difficult to calculate, but my observations (which are obviously the opposites of the DOD's) lead me to believe that tour length has greater impact then tour frequency. Too bad the Army does not see it that way, but I have always said that Army Mental Health knowledge and Army policy have a huge gap that needs to be closed.

We can do one of two things; go pre-WW II British and US Army professional with old sweat PFCs having 15-20 years of service and who deploy until the job is done or keep roughly our current enlistment policies and go to six month tours. The year tour is bad * -- we proved that in Korea and we proved it again in Viet Nam.

Slow learners -- or no sense of history or continuity, that's us...

* Which makes the 15 month tour worse...

NOTE: While longer tours would make for greater continuity of effort, the lack of that -- and we do have that lack in spades right now -- is a leadership problem that is repairable . Quite high level leadership...

[Cavguy]

Most the below are simply leadership issues. My BCT took a different approach: see below

1. Scrounge FOB for parts, equipment, and ammunition.

Your S4, HHC CO, BMO, and BN XO failed you here. Period. I can say that after being an S4 in OIF 1 when we had real theater wide parts shortages, and my BN never lacked for anything essential that was humanly attainable through legal means or available for purchase on the economy. There is a way with a motivated and competent staff, which begins with the XO crushing nuts if they don't do it. The staff may bitch, but the bottom line is the staff supports the commander and the line.

2. Get yelled at by a CSM for having a dirty uniform.

Fixable by BN CO andyour CSM. That's what green tabs are for. I also never hesitated to tell another unit's NCO to get lost if giving my guys grief, and underwrote my NCO's and LT's to do the same. (within reason) Also fixable by you if it's another unit's CSM. What are they going to do - send you to a COP?

3. Guard platoon's equipment.

??? I guess I am puzzled why this is an issue.

4. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a PT reflective belt in chow line.

Leadership issue. But how hard is it to carry a PT belt in your pocket?

5. Wait in line for an hour to use phone.

On our FOB the guys in COPs were issued special passes through the 1SG giving "head of line" priviliges at all MWR facilities supported by the BCT CO.

6. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a haircut.

Leadership issue again.

Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.

v/r

Mike

Agreed. Grossman writes extensively on psychological issues related to combat. Hackworth talks a lot about burnout (his and others) in 'About Face'. That is why I ruthlessly enforced my guys getting 48h break every 2 weeks in the COP. They didn't have the option of not going back. Even with the FOB BS the separation from the stress of being killed was key. The few times I was told they were messed with it was dealt with forcefully by either myself, the BN CO, and sometimes the BCT CO. Fortunately, our CSM's were relatively common sense. And there was no question inside of the Dukes that the guys in the COPs had priority.

More importantly though is the leadership attitude you describe. Maybe I was lucky over two tours to have very sensible leadership who shared the hardships with the men and ruthlessly forced the staff and logistics personnel to support the line. The interesting thing was that none of the loggies resented that - they embraced it. It was a point of pride that the line was taken care of. That's why 2-37 AR never wanted for anything essential in two tours. If someone in the line needed it, they got it. But the mindset comes from the 6's. If they're not standing up for their guys - we have major problems. It's leadership, stupid.

Niel

[Ken White]

"Down time in the rear" was ever thus -- Korea and Viet Nam had the same syndromes. Korea was tolerable, Viet Nam was far worse and your description sounds like Viet Nam x 1.5...

One BIG difference is that the problems in those earlier wars were unlikely to be senior NCOs but more likely to be Officers of other than combat arms or even more often, MPs. Thus, it seems we have a major change of who the uncomprehending are -- and they are that, uncomprehending, not necessarily ill intentioned -- and that is very worrisome.

It really needs some education. What is the Sergeants Major Academy doing to those guys? What are they doing? Things must have changed, I served as a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime and in combat and I sure had other things to worry about. In both states of conflict.

I'm not going to address that stupid reflective belt which is and should be trashed worldwide but certainly restricted to CONUS at a minimum...

To your secondary point -- may be your primary but to me it's secondary. Not to denigrate it or lessen the evil or pain of it but simply in view of the inevitability of it. It cannot, I believe, be prevented; it goes with the job:

Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.

It's been studied and there are no conclusive results to my knowledge. My observation is that it is very much an individual thing; some people can take a lot of stress, others less. Everyone has a breaking point and there's no way to tell what action or event will trigger that point in an individual -- though leaders can and should see the signs of an impending problem if they know and watch their people. That means the Squad Leader has to let the Platoon leader know because no one can know 40 people well enough to spot that if one is doing one's other jobs; that, in turn, means the PSG or Plt Ldr have to train and require their subordinates -- which they're supposed to be doing in any event.

I'm not sure whether the tedium and long term pressure of COIN operations are worse than MCO. My sensing is that each affects different people in different ways; some can tolerate one and not the other, some tolerate neither and some can tolerate both fairly well. There are studies which posit 200 days of combat is the determinant but that's a median and I think it's still a very individual thing.

Having said all that, re: the original issue in the linked Article, seems to me the wrong folks are the recipients of the Article 32, from the WaPo article:

"Over the past year, Hill's company made at least 10 such requests, although none were approved, according to 1st Lt. Larry Kay, Hill's executive officer. Kay, who is also facing charges related to the incident, added that other U.S. companies' detainees are routinely accepted by battalion and blames the repeated denials on friction between Hill and his battalion command."

The Captain erred, so did his 1SG but (1) I don't see a 'federal case' here and (2) who's investigating the Battalion for not accepting the detainees? More questions than answers at this point, perhaps more information will come out.

More importantly, when the Australians were in Viet Nam, they wisely threw up a 20' berm around their base camps and they did NOT use local contract labor. Seemed smart to me and I spent a couple of years in Viet Nam railing about the stupidity -- it is that -- of using local employees on combat bases to 'boost the local economy.' Stupid. Abysmally stupid.

[Cavguy]

It really needs some education. What is the Sergeants Major Academy doing to those guys? What are they doing? Things must have changed, I served as a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime and in combat and I sure had other things to worry about. In both states of conflict.

I'm not going to address that stupid reflective belt which is and should be trashed worldwide but certainly restricted to CONUS at a minimum...

Ken,

A slight majority of CSM's I have endured have "taking care of soldiers" back-assward in my view. They think their role is to enforce discipline. Rather than focus on the important things, they equate discipline to "enforcing the standard", usually evidenced by unusual concern with police call, uniform quality, haircuts, speed limits.

I have rarely seen them concerned with weapons maintenance, vehicle maintenance (other than making sure chalk blocks and drip pans were down), soldier food quality, supply availability, or things that really matter to combat survival.

I have had some MAJOR exceptions to this. But somewhere between E-7 and E-9 many lose perspective of their role in the unit, and go through motions rather than helping with what really matters.

I think the Parameters article from 15 years ago arguing for the abolition of the CSM (not SGM) rank above BN level had some merit. The higher level the CSM the more they focus on BS, typically.

I'm not sure whether the tedium and long term pressure of COIN operations are worse than MCO. My sensing is that each affects different people in different ways; some can tolerate one and not the other, some tolerate neither and some can tolerate both fairly well. There are studies which posit 200 days of combat is the determinant but that's a median and I think it's still a very individual thing.

Ken, I think it's the constant exposure to danger (in and out of the line), not the intensity, that creates the combat stress. Multiply x2 to x10 for those in leadership positions. One can only handle the weight so long, that is why I advocate regular rotation to rear areas, which is something learned in WWII and I read about as well in Korea. And yes, each individual is different. It is also directly related to unit morale and perception of winning/progress. It is worst when it appears you are taking casualties for no gain.

[Ken White]

...They think their role is to enforce discipline. Rather than focus on the important things, they equate discipline to "enforcing the standard", usually evidenced by unusual concern with police call, uniform quality, haircuts, speed limits.

Know the type, they've been around for Centuries. Most can be retrained, those that cannot should not be retained. My poetry contribution for the day -- but a serious comment.

I have rarely seen them concerned with weapons maintenance, vehicle maintenance (other than making sure chalk blocks and drip pans were down), soldier food quality, supply availability, or things that really matter to combat survival.

Back in my day, I believe the split was about 75:25 combat and training focus versus sham indicator focus. Based on what I hear from those now serving, it seems the ratio has reversed. That is not good. The CSM ought to be the supreme tactical guru and trainer for the Troops in the Bn/Sqn.

I think the Parameters article from 15 years ago arguing for the abolition of the CSM (not SGM) rank above BN level had some merit. The higher level the CSM the more they focus on BS, typically.

Having been a Bde CSM, I agree. Anything above Battalion is not good because the guy doesn't really have a job or a job description, he does pretty much what he wants and most (not all) Bde Cdrs will allow him to do that.

Whatever is done, the current system is not, IMO very good -- either for the individuals or the units and thus the Army.

I think it's the constant exposure to danger (in and out of the line), not the intensity, that creates the combat stress. Multiply x2 to x10 for those in leadership positions. One can only handle the weight so long, that is why I advocate regular rotation to rear areas, which is something learned in WWII and I read about as well in Korea. And yes, each individual is different. It is also directly related to unit morale and perception of winning/progress. It is worst when it appears you are taking casualties for no gain.

Totally correct IMO. I'll also echo your comment that prevention and treatment are leadership problems -- and they are problems -- but good leaders handle it and produce good units that avoid some of the situations discussed in this thread. Unfortunately, there are some great people who have awesome capabilities in many areas who just aren't good leaders but the system makes no allowances for that...

[carl]

When we arrived at COB Speicher in September 2007 we were told there was only one place to have keys made and they only made keys one day a week. It was an annoyance to us but only a slight one. I remember thinking of how maddening it must have been to soldiers who came onto the base and needed a key made on the other six days of the week. Life could have been made so much easier for them with just a little effort, as has been commented upon.

I have read the books describing these things happening in past wars and I am not naive enough to think the millennium has come but it was a great disappointment to see it firsthand.

[MikeF]

Carl said:

When we arrived at COB Speicher in September 2007 we were told there was only one place to have keys made and they only made keys one day a week. It was an annoyance to us but only a slight one. I remember thinking of how maddening it must have been to soldiers who came onto the base and needed a key made on the other six days of the week. Life could have been made so much easier for them with just a little effort, as has been commented upon.

As we digress, I'm still trying to understand this....


"Men have sought to make a world from their own conception and to draw from their own minds all the material which they employed, but if, instead of doing so, they had consulted experience and observation, they would have the facts and not opinions to reason about, and might have ultimately arrived at the knowledge of the laws which govern the material world." -Francis Bacon

Bacon also warned to "beware the fallacies into which undisciplined thinkers most easily fall--they are the real distorting prisms of human nature…assuming more order than exists in chaotic nature."

Juxtaposed, Goethe suggest that “no living thing is unitary in nature; every such thing is a plurality. Even the organism which appears to us as an individual exists as a collection of independent entities.”

Maybe I've been in Northern California too long...

As I consider the original article and reflective belts in the FOBs, I'm not sure if it relates, but it seems important...

Given the times and ramifications, I should probably quit studying and go back to soldiering

[jkm_101_fso]

Worried about the safety of their men, Hill and Scott resorted to drastic measures. Though it is unclear exactly who initially planned to detain the Afghans, Hill acknowledges that the ultimate responsibility is his. "I did wrongfully discharge my weapon and I did fail to maintain control of the situation," he said in his statement at the hearing.

According to testimony from a number of witnesses, it was Scott, the first sergeant, who began interrogating the bound detainees. He straddled their chests one at a time as they lay on the ground, pinning their shoulders with his knees and slapping their faces while shouting questions.

"My whole twenty-plus-year career in the military has been about taking care of soldiers," Scott said after the hearing concluded. "I couldn't let these men go just so that they could come back and kill some of my boys. It made no sense."

I'd like to sit here and tell you that I would have done the right thing; but I won't. I didn't walk in these fellas' shoes. They did what they thought they had to. No one died or was hurt. There have been far more egregious offenses in these wars that have gone unpunished.

At worst, slap Hill on the wrist.

We can't afford to lose anymore good officers.

[MikeF]

Cavguy says:

It's leadership, stupid.

Ken says:

What is the Sergeants Major Academy doing to those guys?

Allow me place my last post in context. Throughout my three tours in Iraq, I witnessed excellent leadership from senior leaders (both O and NCO). During the Surge, Brigade and Battalion Commanders lived/visited patrol bases and shared the burden as best as possible with the troops. My squadron commander personally cleared trenches during a ten day extended operation to clear an Al Qaeda training camp. Furthermore, I observed BN and BDE CSMs inspecting patrol bases and demanding that quality of life issues are addressed.

However, on larger FOBs, I observed senior NCOs obsessed with maintaining "good order and discipline" outside the parameters of common sense (i.e. when a soldier conducts three four hour patrols a day, his uniform will appear dirty particularly when he washes his own clothes).

The shortage of parts, equipment, ammunition was simply the product of "Surging" a division (minus) worth of troops into a FOB recently held by a battalion (plus) not a lack of initiative/effort on any S4. The shortage reminded me of the initial occupation of Baghdad after the Thunder Runs. Remote areas like the Diyala River Valley were farther back in priority than Baqubah and Baghdad. Limited resources were focused on survivability of patrol bases (a good thing) as the area was still controlled by Al Qaeda.

The post was meant to demonstrate the graveyard humor of soldiers while trying to explain that there really is no true refit in combat ops not knock the chain-of-command.

That's why they still call it "The Suck."

v/r

Mike

[Cavguy]

The post was meant to demonstrate the graveyard humor of soldiers while trying to explain that there really is no true refit in combat ops not knock the chain-of-command.

That's why they still call it "The Suck."

Understand the context now. But even the BS of the fob is *different* BS than being exposed in sector. Psychologically it is very different, in my opinion, the soldier can let down his guard psychologically for awhile, which helps recenter.

Thing that worried me was guys refusing trips back b/c of it.

Just my .02