U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions
U.S. Special Operations
Personal Opinions
by Colonel John M. Collins, Small Wars Journal
U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions (Full PDF Article)
Many true believers throughout USSOCOM have memorized SOF Truths, here are the first four of five bullets that I conceived and Congressman Earl Hutto signed in the Foreword to U.S. and Soviet Special Operations on 28 April 1987:
- Humans are more important than hardware
- Their quality is more important than quantities
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced
- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur
When General Stiner sent me on a Cook’s tour of his subordinate commands in 1993 the first stop was Fort Bragg, where USASOC commander Lieutenant General Wayne Downing proudly concluded his formal presentation with a slide that displayed SOF Truths. He did a double take when I told him “they’re wonderful,” then said, “I wrote ‘em.”
If asked to start over from scratch, I would add one word to the fourth bullet so it would read “Competent SOF cannot be created RAPIDLY after emergencies occur.” Otherwise, I believe they are still solid as bricks, but wish that whoever enshrined the first four had retained Number 5, which says “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.” That oversight was a serious mistake in my opinion, because its omission encourages unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored employers and perpetuates a counterproductive “us versus everybody else” attitude by excessively gung ho members of the SOF community.
I don't believe that I have ever had the pleasure of meeting John, but next time you are down at USSOCOM I will gladly buy you beer for as long as you'd care to entertain my endless questions.
This piece is spot on, and entertaining to read as well. Thanks.
To lend my own reinforcing fires to this, the top issue that will be coming out of Tampa as we roll into QDR is the need for the development of SOF enablers.
Thanks John.
COL Robert C. Jones
Second the motion. Oh, also...
hopefully by that you mean this most important point from Colonel Collins (he's older'n I am so he gets a title...Originally Posted by Bob's World
):
"Number 5, which says “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.”
Exactly. In fact, i'll see what I can do about getting number 5 added back on.
Last edited by Bob's World; 12-14-2008 at 12:06 PM.
Your timing is impeccable, Bob. You seem to be the first poster after our ~17 hours of downtime. Glad to see the Council is resilient. Now for the Journal side of things....
Some Thoughts About Enablers
Special Forces Groups now have support battalions as part of their organization. This is a substantial improvement in logistic capability for SF. There are drawbacks, though, especially with the manning and organization of these units. For instance, there are no Special Forces Officers/NCOs on that Battalion's staff, which is a mistake, done more to make the CSS community happy for the additional personnel slots than anything else. As a result, I have seen a lack of knowledge and experience on the staff's part in sustaining Special Operations Forces/missions. This may be remedied over time, as junior CSS Officer/NCOs serve in multiple roles at different ranks in the support battalion, and the unit matures.
This next comment is anecdotal, but sure to be controversial: Are the 03/04 CSS personnel that HRC identifies to go to SF Support Battalions the log branches' "best and brightest"? Recent experiences with these guys suggest this may not be the case, especially when compared to their counterparts throughout the Army. It will be interesting to hear see what other people write in here on this subject. Cheers.
Bob W.
Acreofindependence.com
Bob,
Good comments but I would like to put a different spin on things. First, the problem with filling CSS positions is that the Army is short all of these enabling MOS. As an example in an SF Bn there are 150 soldiers in 51 different non-SF MOSs. In many of these MOSs the Army is only 75-80% strength throughout the entire Army and they are faced with the ARFORGEN system preparing the BCTs for rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan (and of course SF in theater is getting enabling support from many of these BCTs on a area support basis).
Second, I would offer that wanting the "best and the brightest" to go to SF/SOF is counterproductive and turns people against us as people think we believe we are entitled to the "best and brightest." I would submit that we are not "entitled" to the best and the brightest but what we really want are the RIGHT soldiers to fill these SOF enabler positions. We need a capable competent soldier who can work in a non-standard even unconventional environment who can support Special Operations. We do not necessarily need officers who are destined for flag rank in their branch and to think we should be getting them (e.g., the best and the brightest) puts us at odds with the Army to fill all their requirements. As you well know no one element is going to win these wars in Afghanistan. It takes a whole of government and whole of military effort (the right forces and organizations) to help our Afghan and Iraqi partners win their counterinsurgencies and to secure their nations (because we cannot do it for them in the end - we can only be the external support to their efforts in the fight for legitimacy among their people).
Okay off my soap box for now.
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
Speaking of soap boxes...
I had a dream...
That we (pick one):
a. Improved Army SOF and Army (-) interface, knowledge and cooperation by eliminating the Branch and rotating people from various branches through the system as it was not all that long ago...
b. Destroyed Army SOF and damaged Army (-) interface, knowledge and cooperation by eliminating the Branch and rotating people from various branches through the system as it was not all that long ago...
Note that said options really apply only to Officers, not to Warrants or NCOs.
Just to open the aperture on this discussion a little, when we talk about "SOF enablers," logistics is just one small, but important aspect. We also are not talking about adding more forces to SOF, so much as creating more effective mechanisms and structures to allow the conventional force support SOF led operations.
What is really being put on the table is a true paradigm shift, that depending on the situation could put any of a wide range of combinations of CBT, CS, and/or CSS capabilities under the C2 of the SOF commander allowing a much smaller SOF force to cover a much larger mission. This could mean an ODA with a combined arms company of infantry, engineers, CA, MPs, Log, and artillery attached perhaps; or a BCT supporting a JSOTF; allowing one to retain SOF focus while expanding the size of the JOA considerably and not needing to commit an additional BN or Group of SF; or (hold your breath), maybe even thinking about picking an SF general to have overall control for the planned expansion of operations in Afghanistan. After all, as COL Gentile often notes, just working harder with more guys isn't the answer, but working smarter as well.
Afterall, every SF officer was once an infantryman, artilleryman, etc from across the conventional force. Given the nature of the operations we are currently in, I personally find it hard to rationalize only considering generals who earned their stars commanding conventional forces in overall command. One step at a time though.
Great speech
The "us versus everybody else" comment really hit home. This is our primary national security challenge in my opinion, because it limits our ability to effectively apply our elements of national power. It is a problem throughout the government, not just within Defense. It will require a substantial culture change to fix it, and the change have forced upon legacy organizations by the right leaders.Number 5, which says “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.” That oversight was a serious mistake in my opinion, because its omission encourages unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored employers and perpetuates a counterproductive “us versus everybody else” attitude by excessively gung ho members of the SOF community.
The quote above gets at many of the debates we have within our SOF community. What exactly are special operations? I could post the DoD definition here, but it wouldn't be overly helpful. However, I think most would agree that our first SOF organization (organized, equipped, trained, and employed to conduct these missions) was the OSS, then followed by the CIA and in DoD the formation of Special Forces.Given their guidance and endless hours probing masterpieces by Special Ops groundbreakers like Mao Zedung, David Galula, and Sir Robert Thompson, I produced four surveys that publicized Special Operations Forces (SOF) favorably on Capitol Hill and beyond, when virtually every command, control, planning, and force posture problem reflected misunderstandings.
When Mr Collins focuses on Mao, Galula and Thompson as special operations ground breakers, it seems he is implying that special operations was originally special warfare, or psychological warfare (different from psychological operations, but psychological operations play a key role)., and this was the special operations capability that JFK envisioned we needed to expand to counter Soviet infiltration and subversion globally.
The shift from psywar to DA/CT started in the 70s, especially after Israel's successful raid on Entebee. It was a capability that we didn't have, at least to the level it needed to be based on the changing threat environment. Developing a CT/DA capability was essential, what we did wrong is neglect our FID/UW capability while pursuing the CT/DA capability.
DA prospered for a number of reasons, some of them were very good reasons. The fact that DA prospered is not a negative, we have the best DA force in the world, a capability we didn't have when we attempted to rescue the hostages in 1980. It is a capability we needed then, a capability we need today, and a capability we will need tomorrow.Direct action in fact has prospered since 1986, because every USSOCOM commander thus far has climbed the DA ladder, mostly within the Joint Special Operations Command.
The negative comes from the aspect that organizations chase money, and if DA is what draws the money, then all organizations tend to migrate that way. Other critical capabilities like FID/COIN/UW are neglected and not developed. Those who are supposed to maintain expertise in them, drift to missions like DA and SR to stay relevant to their payroll masters. SOCOM did great work, what they accomplished in 20 years was nothing short of a miracle, but it was a myoptic and single focused effort.
I think this statement is a bit over simplified, as there are numerous variables that influence how a force is employed. Sometimes those who are most at fault are actually in the force that is being improperly applied. I think much of the problems we see today was due to poor planning during the initial days of this conflict, and that resulted in less than ideal use of some SOF elements. Over time these methods of employment became the new norm, and we all know how hard is it to break out of a norm. Now we have SF NCOs and officers who have seen nothing else, so our next generation of SF leaders may continue to pull SF into DA/SR/CT fold. Like everything else SF does, they'll do it well, but who is going to do COIN/UW well? When we wonder how we got to stupid, we don't have to look too far back in our history to see where we turned left when we should of turned right. There is no single person to blame, there may not even be a group of people to blame, the decisions made at the time were based on numerous variables that existed at that time. The challenge now is to break the current mold and get back on the right path. Mr. Collin's statement below sums it up nicely.I wonder why any commander would waste area oriented, foreign language qualified, high cost, low density UW and FID specialists on direct action missions except in emergencies.
Bottom up strategy sounds good, but rarely works. We need a top down strategy, that is executed bottom up. Tell the guys what you want, and they'll get it done.When superiors don’t know what to do it’s hard for subordinates to know how to do it, but they must do the best they can with the hands they’re dealt.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 12-14-2008 at 06:54 PM.
Bob, I'm not so sure it is a
paradigm shift so much as a reinventing of the wheel. Back in the late 60s SF organized one or two Spaecial Action Forces (SAF) built around an SF Group, with engineers, MPs, CA, PSYOP and others. 8 SAF in Latin America was a prototype. Anyway, it was a good idea then - it migrated to being called a FID Augmentation Force (FIDAF) in the 1990 FM 100-20 LIC manual - and it is still a good idea.
Agree with your other points even more.
Cheers
JohnT
I agree Bill and would add a thought
True and well said. I also agree with the rest and would suggest that thisGood question -- REALLY good question..."... Now we have SF NCOs and officers who have seen nothing else (than a lot of DA), so our next generation of SF leaders may continue to pull SF into DA/SR/CT fold. Like everything else SF does, they'll do it well, but who is going to do COIN/UW well?
Having had a great deal of fun (well, more often than not...) doing both missions in various environments with varied opposition, I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.
Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...
And those kinds of impacts can have inadvertent and bad strategic effects...
I was witness to some brilliant SF guys during OIF I, who basically collected up a bunch of underused NG assets and used them as "force multipliers". They had to train them a bit, but I think they got good use from them.
On CSS; in my experience, as a Combat Arms guy who spent a year in the desert with them, they don't HAVE a "brightest and best". The CSS officer development in the US Army is so broken that even the "best" were bloody awful.
I think a tour with SF would help fix that "broken-ness".
Perfection is a goal, not reality
This has been a debate in our community for as long as I have been a part of it (only since 1979), and of course there is the argument that if you can do UW you can do everything, which an argument that quickly falls apart when seriously examined.I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.
There are several challenges in trying to produce an ideal FID force, and we seem to simply gloss over them, or come up with recommendations that probably will be less than helpful on the tip of the spear.
1. Credibility: maintaining credibility with your foreign students or counterparts can be a challenge, if you don't have real experience in the subject you're teaching. A SF Soldier who was an infantry platoon Sgt or a Team Leader who commanded an infantry Co prior to coming in SF carries some credibility when we're trying to train and advise an infantry unit. Not everyone in SF has that experience, so we seem to fall back on what we know, which is door kicking skills, which is now a skill set common to all in SF, but not always the most useful skill set in a COIN environment.
2. Language/culture: definitely value added, but only if you have the right language. I have seen to approaches in SF, one is where the entire ODA is focused on the same language, which means the team has a capability in the countries that speak that language. The other is assign different languages to each individual on the team, in hopes that whereever they deploy someone will at least have some language capability. While better than none, what does this really give the force? Let's say we're in Thailand, my medic speaks Thai, everyone speaks a Chinese, Russian, Arabic, Korean, etc. Do I really have a Thai language capability? My medic needs to teach his own classes, take care of medical issues, etc., I can't use him as a full time translator. There is still a benefit, but the traning management challenge is based on a guess (on where we might deploy). Assuming we guessed correctly, and we deploy to assist country X by conducting FID, and my whole team speaks X'ish. That is extremely powerful, at least until it is time to rotate out. How many teams speak X'ish? How do we sustain operations with the appropriate language capabilities? If it is a major operation like OIF or OEF-A then everybody needs to play to sustain the effort, not just those regionally oriented to the area, so the second order effect is the guys from out of the region are losing their regional expertise.
The point is how much effort should we invest in language? How much do we really get in return on our investment with the way we're currently employed? Change the way we're employed, then it is a different matter.
3. The other issues have to do with authorities, leadership, task organization, etc.
Go back to challenge 1, how do you train to be an advisor in a skill set if you haven't done it? It can be done, we do it all the time, but what trainer is better? The one who is an expert in his field, or the one who's knowledge on the topic is text book deep, but he has the right mind set to be a good teacher? To be honest, it can be argued either way, and is highly situation dependent.Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...
Getting back to the larger issue of DA, SR, CT, FID, UW, etc., I think it is much bigger than the individual, a lot of the capability is resident due to the unit's task organization. Obviously the Rangers are much better organized and equipped to conduct large scale DA than SF. SF is task organized to do UW from the ODA to the Group. Rangers are task organized to do DA from the squad to the Bn. And there is more to the unit than its organization that enables a capability, it is the unit's culture, its collective training, it's C4I structure, etc. We need to get over the rice bowl fights and focus on winning the fight. Assigning the right forces to the right mission makes sense to everyone, but in reality it is so hard to do.
Quote from Secretary Gates when he was DCI in 1992
"Unconventional Warfare (UW) … remains uniquely Special Forces'. It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces soldier. Its training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces Training: it has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others." The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed)."
Robert M. Gates, Remarks at the dedication of the OSS Memorial, Langley, VA, 12 June 1992, quoted in The Special Forces History Society's The Special Forces Regimental History Calendar, 1994, (Fort Bragg, NC: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command).
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
Having been around briefly in the very early days of that 40 years
and having watched the effort since then with some care as well as having friends and relatives to this day involved in doing both missions, I respectfully disagree to an extent with what the SecDef said in 1992. I wonder if he still feels the same way today...
I'll say again what I said earlier:
""...nor is there any question the Groups have done (both the DA and FID missions) over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.
Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...""
That's the kind of thing SecDefs, even those who were former Intel Analysts and who are cheerleaders sometimes miss. As Bill Moore said, that's been an argument for longer than he's been in the field, I can assure you it went on hot and heavy in 1960-61 in the Team Rooms and all over the Hill but then as now -- can do and should do are different things.
I know it is not an ideal world and mission demands do their thing. I also know the SecDef is right -- it is an article of faith.
The question remains however; should that be so?
SF can also drive tanks, but should they?
Being capable of doing UW means you "should" be capable of executing, coordinating, training, and advising a resistance movement on a wide range of activities ranging from guerrilla tactics (harassment, raids, ambushes, which are not DA) and a host of other activities. At the leadership level, it means the leaders understand what psychological and political warfare is, and how to manage its complexities. That same education and mindset should also enable them to develop well thought out and functional FID/COIN campaign plans, if they could only be put in charge. UW is by far the most complex SOF mission, which means it requires the most training, which in turn means minimizing the distractions (like chasing other missions). It does not mean that SF is ideally organized, trained, or equipped to conduct SR, CT, or CWMD. They can have done all the above, but SF in its normal organizational mode was not the right force to attempt a hostage rescue in Iran in 1980, to do so SF would have had to conduct significant reorganization and training so they could conduct that operation at the skill level required. In effect they would morph into something else that might look like the Rangers. Any unit, even conventional units, can be tasked to do anything, that doesn't mean they should be.
SF used to do Gabreil demonstrations, which demonstrated a wide range of capabilities to various audiences. Admittedly hostage rescue demonstrations are exciting, especially to those to don't understand special warfare, so had it to the new Gab demonstration.I’ve been invited to view a hostage rescue operation after supper tonight. Army Special Forces troops are well trained and equipped in such regards, but I wonder why any commander would waste area oriented, foreign language qualified, high cost, low density UW and FID specialists on direct action missions except in emergencies.
Maybe when the argument is over with the reality will be that SF does need to focus on DA/CT based on way we conduct war, and the way DoD prioritizes funding, so in the end, maybe the focus on DA isn't wrong? However, our SECDEF is trying to change that mindset in DoD with the focus on IW, which doesn't mean DA/SR/CT etc. are not important, they are more important, but the other skills, legacy SF skills are the grease which will enable them to work in our new security environment. The debate will continue, and the meantime our Soldiers will do the best they can downrange based on the guidance given to them. If there are any problems, they are not on the tip of the spear.
I would volunteer for that mission in a heart beat!! Jobs I am good at ,in a unit structure I would like, more deployments for shorter durations, nirvana. Salivating just thinking about it. If you make that happen, I will be back active in a heartbeat! I wonder if other soldiers feel as strongly as I do?
Reed
Last edited by reed11b; 12-15-2008 at 04:25 AM.
Just so that I'm clear on this
So are you saying we do need GPF that are reasonably good at all types of warfare in tandem with SF that are very very good at one or the other type and who can help to lead said GPF through whichever one they end up with?
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Basically, yes.
However, a couple of minor tweaks on that...
These are just my opinions and they're sorta like armpits, everyone has a couple but these weren't arrived at in a vacuum or in a flash of light. Took 45 years for this to gel.
We need GPF trained primarily for MCO (Heavy Bdes) and for FID, etc (LtInf). I'm agnostic on the Strykers. The training tasks are too different for one unit to be total spectrum trained. Bdes should be specialized and train for their specialty for the near future. That specialization needs to be reassessed at every QDR (and left alone between them to avoid jerking units around).
We need SF that do the UW and SFA missions AND we need DA SOF elms, not SF for the DA stuff (we also need separate strat recon but that's another ball of wax...). Again, the training tasks are too different for BEST proficiency in either if a unit tries to do both. I've seen too many beanie wearers killed because they were doing something they weren't totally proficient at. They will give it their all, no question but it is not smart.
The issue of who works for who (GPF for SOF or SOF for GPF) should be totally mission based and the parochial BS should go. We must fix the unity of command problem in the US armed forces...
I'd personally go for an Inf Bn working for an A Team or a B Team working for a Rifle Co but that's probably a step too far for most.
I'll also tack on to something that appeared up-thread. Not only are there some SOF Generals out there -- real SOF, not Ranger Regt graduates -- but they are some sharp cookies and their integrity quotient seems to be ahead of the conventional Generals nowadays. That's not a plea to put them in command of Division (I don't even agree with Artillery types getting Div cmd or Mech guys getting Lt Inf and vice versa) but it does suggest they can certainly command TFs that mix SF, DA elms and GPF.
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