A War's Impossible Mission

[Cavguy]

It really needs some education. What is the Sergeants Major Academy doing to those guys? What are they doing? Things must have changed, I served as a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime and in combat and I sure had other things to worry about. In both states of conflict.

I'm not going to address that stupid reflective belt which is and should be trashed worldwide but certainly restricted to CONUS at a minimum...

Ken,

A slight majority of CSM's I have endured have "taking care of soldiers" back-assward in my view. They think their role is to enforce discipline. Rather than focus on the important things, they equate discipline to "enforcing the standard", usually evidenced by unusual concern with police call, uniform quality, haircuts, speed limits.

I have rarely seen them concerned with weapons maintenance, vehicle maintenance (other than making sure chalk blocks and drip pans were down), soldier food quality, supply availability, or things that really matter to combat survival.

I have had some MAJOR exceptions to this. But somewhere between E-7 and E-9 many lose perspective of their role in the unit, and go through motions rather than helping with what really matters.

I think the Parameters article from 15 years ago arguing for the abolition of the CSM (not SGM) rank above BN level had some merit. The higher level the CSM the more they focus on BS, typically.

I'm not sure whether the tedium and long term pressure of COIN operations are worse than MCO. My sensing is that each affects different people in different ways; some can tolerate one and not the other, some tolerate neither and some can tolerate both fairly well. There are studies which posit 200 days of combat is the determinant but that's a median and I think it's still a very individual thing.

Ken, I think it's the constant exposure to danger (in and out of the line), not the intensity, that creates the combat stress. Multiply x2 to x10 for those in leadership positions. One can only handle the weight so long, that is why I advocate regular rotation to rear areas, which is something learned in WWII and I read about as well in Korea. And yes, each individual is different. It is also directly related to unit morale and perception of winning/progress. It is worst when it appears you are taking casualties for no gain.

[Ken White]

...They think their role is to enforce discipline. Rather than focus on the important things, they equate discipline to "enforcing the standard", usually evidenced by unusual concern with police call, uniform quality, haircuts, speed limits.

Know the type, they've been around for Centuries. Most can be retrained, those that cannot should not be retained. My poetry contribution for the day -- but a serious comment.

I have rarely seen them concerned with weapons maintenance, vehicle maintenance (other than making sure chalk blocks and drip pans were down), soldier food quality, supply availability, or things that really matter to combat survival.

Back in my day, I believe the split was about 75:25 combat and training focus versus sham indicator focus. Based on what I hear from those now serving, it seems the ratio has reversed. That is not good. The CSM ought to be the supreme tactical guru and trainer for the Troops in the Bn/Sqn.

I think the Parameters article from 15 years ago arguing for the abolition of the CSM (not SGM) rank above BN level had some merit. The higher level the CSM the more they focus on BS, typically.

Having been a Bde CSM, I agree. Anything above Battalion is not good because the guy doesn't really have a job or a job description, he does pretty much what he wants and most (not all) Bde Cdrs will allow him to do that.

Whatever is done, the current system is not, IMO very good -- either for the individuals or the units and thus the Army.

I think it's the constant exposure to danger (in and out of the line), not the intensity, that creates the combat stress. Multiply x2 to x10 for those in leadership positions. One can only handle the weight so long, that is why I advocate regular rotation to rear areas, which is something learned in WWII and I read about as well in Korea. And yes, each individual is different. It is also directly related to unit morale and perception of winning/progress. It is worst when it appears you are taking casualties for no gain.

Totally correct IMO. I'll also echo your comment that prevention and treatment are leadership problems -- and they are problems -- but good leaders handle it and produce good units that avoid some of the situations discussed in this thread. Unfortunately, there are some great people who have awesome capabilities in many areas who just aren't good leaders but the system makes no allowances for that...

[carl]

When we arrived at COB Speicher in September 2007 we were told there was only one place to have keys made and they only made keys one day a week. It was an annoyance to us but only a slight one. I remember thinking of how maddening it must have been to soldiers who came onto the base and needed a key made on the other six days of the week. Life could have been made so much easier for them with just a little effort, as has been commented upon.

I have read the books describing these things happening in past wars and I am not naive enough to think the millennium has come but it was a great disappointment to see it firsthand.

[MikeF]

Carl said:

When we arrived at COB Speicher in September 2007 we were told there was only one place to have keys made and they only made keys one day a week. It was an annoyance to us but only a slight one. I remember thinking of how maddening it must have been to soldiers who came onto the base and needed a key made on the other six days of the week. Life could have been made so much easier for them with just a little effort, as has been commented upon.

As we digress, I'm still trying to understand this....


"Men have sought to make a world from their own conception and to draw from their own minds all the material which they employed, but if, instead of doing so, they had consulted experience and observation, they would have the facts and not opinions to reason about, and might have ultimately arrived at the knowledge of the laws which govern the material world." -Francis Bacon

Bacon also warned to "beware the fallacies into which undisciplined thinkers most easily fall--they are the real distorting prisms of human nature…assuming more order than exists in chaotic nature."

Juxtaposed, Goethe suggest that “no living thing is unitary in nature; every such thing is a plurality. Even the organism which appears to us as an individual exists as a collection of independent entities.”

Maybe I've been in Northern California too long...

As I consider the original article and reflective belts in the FOBs, I'm not sure if it relates, but it seems important...

Given the times and ramifications, I should probably quit studying and go back to soldiering

[jkm_101_fso]

Worried about the safety of their men, Hill and Scott resorted to drastic measures. Though it is unclear exactly who initially planned to detain the Afghans, Hill acknowledges that the ultimate responsibility is his. "I did wrongfully discharge my weapon and I did fail to maintain control of the situation," he said in his statement at the hearing.

According to testimony from a number of witnesses, it was Scott, the first sergeant, who began interrogating the bound detainees. He straddled their chests one at a time as they lay on the ground, pinning their shoulders with his knees and slapping their faces while shouting questions.

"My whole twenty-plus-year career in the military has been about taking care of soldiers," Scott said after the hearing concluded. "I couldn't let these men go just so that they could come back and kill some of my boys. It made no sense."

I'd like to sit here and tell you that I would have done the right thing; but I won't. I didn't walk in these fellas' shoes. They did what they thought they had to. No one died or was hurt. There have been far more egregious offenses in these wars that have gone unpunished.

At worst, slap Hill on the wrist.

We can't afford to lose anymore good officers.

[MikeF]

Word....It is what it is....

Initially, I questioned posting this thread in the wake of an ongoing investigation, but since command allowed free access to reporters, I garnered this story was up for free debate....

FSO states:

I'd like to sit here and tell you that I would have done the right thing; but I won't. I didn't walk in these fellas' shoes. They did what they thought they had to. No one died or was hurt. There have been far more egregious offenses in these wars that have gone unpunished.

In spite of articles professing junior officers to be exceptional leaders, all of us in actual contact have fought through similar predicaments as Roger Hill...

Hopefully, decision makers above the 03 and O4 level are monitoring our thoughts to resolve how to keep their company commanders and first sergeants out of this dilemma.

In my own words as I try to explain and unravel the thoughts in my head...

The Arab world is a wonderful, mystical land of multiple paradoxes competing and contrasting directly with traditional western rational thought, norms, and values. This land that provided the world with Hammurabi’s law, algebra, and three religions coexists in the same land that introduced honor killings, suicide bombers, and assassins. This cradle of civilization ebbs and flows in persistent conflict with modernity while defying western utopian dreams of perpetual peace. This land contradicts and conforms in a beauty unresolved leaving most unfamiliar unnerved striving to determine some rhyme and reason to it all.

This land is in competing thought with the ethical black and white values of West Point....

I'd ask that you'd give it some thought with Arab notions of balanced opposition prior to passing judgement.

As I reread, I'm still considering....

As I reconsider, I'd recommend any board must represent the minimum of valor...In Hill's case, I'd recommend everyone on his jury have a minimum of Bronze Star w/ valor...


I'd consider that due process...

v/r

mike

[Meinertzhagen]

Our fundamental failure to make any significant progress in over 7 years towards an even marginally functioning legal system in Afghanistan is the root cause of these men's actions. It is extraordinarily difficult to incarcerate captured individuals regardless of the evidence against them. The process is even more difficult than described in the article. Last time I saw the statistics, we hold over 23,000 prisoners in Iraq compared to only about 600 in Afghanistan despite a similar population and having been there for years longer. If not one of the very few placed in U.S. custody, 90% are released and the rest go to the humanitarian disaster that is the Afghan prison system. In prison, there is little opportunity for due process with Afghan courts incapable of processing the volume of cases required. Once imprisoned, many of the worst offenders, politically connected financiers and warlords, are often quickly released due to political pressure from various factions in the government. Worse, there are no efforts to reform, “retrain” or otherwise reduce recidivism or a return to the insurgency.

This has several effects. It taints the type of operation utilized to achieve desired effects on personalities. Since an individual of interest, once captured is likely only to spend a short stay in prison if at all, direct action operations are more likely to “kill” oriented. Inevitably, second and third order effects mount, civilian casualties result and intelligence is lost. In addition, a number of individuals with significant histories of insurgent activities and mountains of evidence are left to operate in plain sight. What’s left are prisons filled with low-level insurgents languishing with little hope of release, angry families, and the worst offenders free to fight another day. While no excuse for their action, I have little doubt that CPT Hill and his unit saw this first hand and decided that action was only possible at their level.