Military Review

**georgev** · 11-20-2006

Hi!
I would like to inform all members abou the appearance of Military Review November-December.

http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...sh/english.asp

All the best and take care!
Respectfully,
George

**SWJED** · 11-20-2006

Thanks George - I look forward to each new issue of Military Review.

**CSC2005** · 11-26-2006

thanks. George. I reccomend the article on Transforming Army Intelligence. While it is still full of buzzwords, the 900 ton beast that is MI, is slowing starting to realize what the USMC has known for years, that Intel is about knowing your enemy, and knowing how people think and will act, it is not just a collection of computer systems and databases that remained locked behind the green door. Good news for young intel folks, bad news for defense contractors who are staffed by former MI officers who are always looking to sell a systems approach i.e. contractor run hardware/software programs.
_Art

**Ray Levesque** · 11-26-2006

Originally Posted by CSC2005

thanks. George. I reccomend the article on Transforming Army Intelligence. While it is still full of buzzwords, the 900 ton beast that is MI, is slowing starting to realize what the USMC has known for years, that Intel is about knowing your enemy, and knowing how people think and will act, it is not just a collection of computer systems and databases that remained locked behind the green door. Good news for young intel folks, bad news for defense contractors who are staffed by former MI officers who are always looking to sell a systems approach i.e. contractor run hardware/software programs.
_Art

First, up front, I'm an Army intel guy and have been for .... heck, a long time. Second, you can blame the supporters of "transformation" and the RMA, whose efforts were led by the Navy and Air Force -- two services that believe targeting is strategy. Third, the Army was punished, and has been punished repeatedly under Rumsfeld, for saying the RMA techo-babble-solution won't work and the whippings continued before and after the invasion of Iraq. Fourth, the Army mission is different than the USMC mission -- in ADDITION to LIC the Army is supposed to fight the country's conventional wars. Fifth, let's not forget that the Army had the lead in El Salvador and other places in Latin America.

The problem is not with the services...it's with the policy makers who cannot develop a strategy and force structure to deal with the REAL wars of today and the future.

**SWJED** · 11-26-2006

Originally Posted by Ray Levesque

First, up front, I'm an Army intel guy and have been for .... heck, a long time. Second, you can blame the supporters of "transformation" and the RMA, whose efforts were led by the Navy and Air Force -- two services that believe targeting is strategy. Third, the Army was punished, and has been punished repeatedly under Rumsfeld, for saying the RMA techo-babble-solution won't work and the wippings continued before and after the invasion of Iraq. Fourth, the Army mission is different than the USMC mission -- in ADDITION to LIC the Army is supposed to fight the country's conventional wars. Fifth, let's not forget that the Army had the lead in El Salvador and other places in Latin America.

The problem is not with the services...it's with the policy makers who cannot develop a strategy and force structure to deal with the REAL wars of today and the future.

I retired as a Marine Intel and CI type. I was also a Marine Intel GS. I have also spent a lot of time with Army MI types (heck, I am Huachuca trained for both MI and CI) and I agree with your assessment - Marine vs. Army crap. The Army had a lot jammed down its throat under the rubik of 'transformation' (and I will agree with Art that a lot of it was 'contractor-tech' driven). Still, the 'little Army' (the Iron Majors - to include company-grade and SNCO / NCO ranks) 'got it'... Moreover, there are a few things that the Marine Intel community could learn from the Army - nay - quite a bit. JMHO.

**slapout9** · 11-26-2006

Ray, you should run for something. You make some very sharp points about the big picture problems facing the US and about how the Army and USMC fit together but are different. I know where the new COIN manual is, where is the new government foreign policy manual that should be required reading for all those elected officials, it could use a little work too. What is the basic foreign policy of the US?

**CSC2005** · 11-27-2006

Did not mean to create a fake Army vs. USMC debate. I know they are both working side by side at the tactical level in Iraq in Afghanistan. My career has been supporting the USMC, but the top enlisted analysts I have seen have been Army.

My bigger point was the "hardware/systems" approach to the GWOT intel. All of the intel guys who are actually fighting the war keep saying "no more systems, no more stovepipe database, no more software to learn" But the beltway keep on going. Below is a list of talks from an upcoming beltway intel conference sponsored by the usual suspects (BAE, SAIC, GD, Lock-Mart, etc)

2nd Annual Intelligence Analysis & Processing
http://www.idga.org/cgi-bin/template...21&event=11195

Accuracy To Analysis Through Technology
Future intelligence technology requirements
Current Intelligence technology overview (problems)

Sensor Technology: The Intelligence Edge
Current Intelligence Systems
The future of intelligence technology

Global Analysis Technology
New technology initiatives
Challenges inherent in intelligence technology

Intelligence Analysis Challenges For Early Warning
Intelligence data management
Systemization of intelligence data for quick response

Disruptive Technology For Intelligence Analysis
A comprehensive look at the latest disruptive technology for Analysis
Challenges in developing new technology
Future needs

See where I am going? God bless technology and intel (ultra, overhead imagery, sigint), but it is creative thinking and deep analysis that will help us win the long war. Of course there is little contractor money in these areas. They all want to sell you a magic box they will do it all. (mostly with the next upgrade, which will cost twice as much)

I agree that the USMC has much to learn from Army intel. USMC intel has really only come into its own over the past 15-20 years. The Army Warrant Officer Analyst program is something I think the USMC should adopt tomorrow; the USMC currently lacks a band of senior analysts who are able to crack the hard issues within its enlisted corps. There are many sharp intel officers, but staff and leadership duties prevent them from deep analysis in operational units. Most of the analysis is left to hard working/dedicated, but very inexperienced corporals and below.

**slapout9** · 11-27-2006

CSC2005 If you ever get the chance watch "Ace in the Hole" on the History channel. It has been on many times but it is about how a US Army major got so fed up with all the tech stuff and started analyzing how to find Saddam using paper and pencil techniques I learned years ago in LE. It gives a lot of credence to you suggestions but it doesn't seem to be having much effect on the military. If it doesn't cost a lot of money and have gadgets it must not be any good. Oh well some day maybe we will learn.

**Bill Moore** · 11-27-2006

It isn't just the intell folks getting these beltway bandit toys shoved down their throats, there are plenty of programs on the Ops side also. Computer programs seem to work very well for logistics (the science part of the military), but are far from idea when it comes to operational and intelligence analysis.

This is a serious flaw in our system, where politicians push for funding for projects based on jobs in their districts or pay offs from lobbyists instead of real needs. Unfortunately the second order effect is we're stuck with a tool that our seniors (who are not skilled in the area to begin with) are enamored with and want us to use.

Ike warned us many years ago, but it was probably too late to stop the military industrial complex from becoming a huge political lobby by that time. Money talks and in return we get BS.

**Ray Levesque** · 11-27-2006

Originally Posted by CSC2005

***snip***

My bigger point was the "hardware/systems" approach to the GWOT intel. All of the intel guys who are actually fighting the war keep saying "no more systems, no more stovepipe database, no more software to learn" But the beltway keep on going. Below is a list of talks from an upcoming beltway intel conference sponsored by the usual suspects (BAE, SAIC, GD, Lock-Mart, etc)

See where I am going? God bless technology and intel (ultra, overhead imagery, sigint), but it is creative thinking and deep analysis that will help us win the long war. Of course there is little contractor money in these areas. They all want to sell you a magic box they will do it all. (mostly with the next upgrade, which will cost twice as much)

***snip***

I definitely agree....I believe there's a tendency to focus on the technology at all levels -- it's sexy, it's quantifiable, and it's an easy sell politically because of its economic impact on companies and the regions in which they're located. Not that I'm anti-tech -- I spent approximately six years as a systems integration manager and systems manager -- tech has a role.

I believe Intelligence is the ultimate "content provider" and it's all about information flow, access, analysis. Frankly, leaving aside the fact that tech creates its own "fog of war," the so-called tech-based RMA has the potential to benefit the intelligence field significantly.

HOWEVER, the problem I have is that tech is often sold, by venders and tech supporters of all stripes, as THE solution to our problems. But the reality is that at the end of the day the biggest problems with intelligence are process- and policy-based, a lack of manpower, a lack of training and experience, and a lack of the ability to think critically. But these issues are expensive in terms of manpower, like anything else in LIC/OOTW/whatever, and people-related issues are not sexy.

**MASON** · 12-08-2006

Combat surgery has the same issue. Unit equipment and pt tracking hardware and soft ware are marketable and in the face of policy makers continually. The ubiquitouse use of individual augmentee systems and fast short rotations (poor retention of operational experience and little time to effect change if desired) are hindering system adaptions to changing missions and conditions. To compound it they keep changing the basic unit configurations and command structures to accomodate advancement in the staff corps involved.