I was typing this when Bob's World replied. His second paragraph is another way of looking at my next two paragraphs:

I'd submit that the Army isn't just a hammer, nor is it the top-of-the-line Leatherman pocket tool that has everything from a can opener to magnifying glass.

In this, I'd say that the Army is one of those multi-tools we had when we were growing up that had about 8 functions but did about three of them really well. In the end, you never used about 5 of the functions because you ran the risk of breaking the damned thing. Army units, particularly those at the tactical level, are the same. Cavalrymen being diplomats detracts from their abilities as scouts. Not saying they can't, just saying they won't be as effective. SF Soldiers have some fantastic capablilities and talents - However, I wouldn't want their leadership to determine the best way for 1st Cavalry Division to employ 2 tank companies in the defense. Not saying they aren't capable of providing that leadership, just saying there are other functions their particular piece is better suited to provide.

There has to be a balance struck somewhere. Today's junior combat leader (squad leader, section leader, PL, PSG) should be able to conduct all of their basic battle drills, competently demonstrate proficiency in core METL tasks, actions on contact, and reporting, and basic troop leading procedures.

They also need a familiarity with TTPs in COIN, though these TTPs need to find a baseline in the core competencies mentioned above. It's been said and quoted multiple times in this thread; It depends on how you train. This is the #1 big issue on my mind at this point.

The new Army capstone training manual, FM 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations, should not have been published. Training for METL is training for METL is training for METL. We need to, as an Army, get back to the 8 step training model, training schedules, and methods of training that our Soldiers will understand.

FM 7-0, published early this month, opens up with a giant glass of Kool Aid describing the environments, conditions, and preconditions that wars and battles are to be fought in the future, quite possibly under the flawed premise that they are right. There are plenty of smart people on this board who work at CAC, but can someone tell me where the hell you all hide the Crystal Ball at Leavenworth?

This manual offers no fresh ideas, but rather codifies an incorrect training methodology that pays lip service to the old method and mirrors what we've been forced to do as an Army in the last 7 years due to a mission cycle that finds the Army deploying, deployed, or recovering from operations abroad every 12-18 months. Just because we've been forced to train in this method due to poor planning doesn't mean it's the right way to train.

I'm reminded of an AAR at JRCT in 2002, as my sapper platoon just completed a route reconnaissance where one of our vehicles was destroyed by a mine. The platoon OC, a cantankerous Staff Sergeant who had a 10th Mountain Division combat patch from Somalia, making him one of the only OCs we had with combat experience. This guy was EF Hutton - when he talked, people listened. At the conclusion of this lane, he sat everyone down and told us that he was going to give us a quote to think about but wouldn't tell us who said it until the last day of the exercise. The quote was "Don't let the fact that everyone is doing it wrong prevent you from doing it right." It gave us all pause and resolved the platoon into determining better practices.

Our junior leaders have lost the art of how to train their Soldiers because those of us who have trained properly in the past have not trained them to conduct proper training management in the present. This is OUR failure as an Army and as Leaders. Platoons don't come up with training plans or schedules anymore. The vast majority of what a unit trains on before they leave for theater is directed by FORSCOM Training Guidance crammed down their throats that forces BDE and BN commanders to pick and choose which tasks they're going to blow off in the pre-deployment training cycle.

Training isn't forecasted in terms of long range, short range, and near term anymore. Though tucked into the back fo chapter 4 in the new 7-0 it talks about these three terms, what it should have said is that tactical units at the BDE and below are in reaction mode within the 8 week mark and are so used to jumping through their asses on a week to week basis before deployment that any work done to forecast training out beyond three weeks is futile since it's going to change.

Sure, there are large Easter Eggs that can be thrown on the largest of echelons' schedule (block leave after deployment, gunnery, CTC/MRE rotation, rail-load, block leave before deployment, and LAD), but the day to day operations, "Hey YOU" mission planning cycle, and micromanagement from echelons above BN due to the increased "strength" in BDE and DIV staffs have created environments of hate and discontent of the staff officers and NCOs appointed over the small units; Staffs whose mere existance, in the minds of the tactical units, stifles progress at the tactical level. This has become such an accepted part of Army life that FM 7-0 actually speaks to it in chapter 4:

[Paragraph] 4-12. Modular formations are more agile, expeditionary, and versatile than previous Army organizations. However, modular organizations require a higher degree of training and operational synchronization at the brigade level.
Operational synchronization, for those keeping track at home, is the new joint definition of micromanagement.

Training meetings at the company level used to be able to take what is happening 8 weeks out and walk back to T-1 and T week to lock in and conduct final coordinating instructions. This doesn't happen anymore. Training meetings at the company level are now wargaming sessions that determine the method of crisis management to be emplyed over the next week to ensure the mission gets accomplished despite the changes imposed from on high.

Indeed, it depends on how we train. The question is, does anyone remember how to train properly?

PS - The quote was from that 1976 porn classic, The Opening of Misty Beethoven. You'll have to rent it to find out the context (or PM Stan).