Obstacles to a Whole of Government Approach: DoD versus State AOR's

[Schmedlap]

When I would ride the subway in DC, in uniform, I was a magnet for random schmoes who, based upon their 3 years of service as an enlisted man 2 or 3 decades earlier, fancied themselves sufficiently versed in national security strategy to give me their opinions and a) thought that I would actually care and b) seemed to think that I was in a position to make changes that they recommended. If I were to critique the specific borders chosen by DoD or State, I would feel like I am turning into "that guy." But on the general issue of whether two organizations should stovepipe their organizations or create overlap, I think overlap makes more sense. If you get DoD and State with the same AORs, then you increase the tendency for them to view things in terms of their AORs with less regard to the big picture. More troubling, you increase the tendency for them to think alike. When they overlap, you can create a climate in which State is telling DoD, "your Afghan-Pakistani border games are complicating our India-Pakistan initiatives" while DoD tells State, "your India-Pakistan initiative is very quaint, but we've got a war to deal with here on the Afghan-Pakistani border and it is intricately linked to our conflicts elsewhere in CENTCOM."

At risk of becoming that guy on the subway, I think it makes a whole lot of sense for State and DoD to have different AORs in the India-Pakistan region, first off, for the reasons stated above (stovepiping versus overlap to spur different thinking and bigger picture perspectives). Second, barring some event of world historical significance, we're not going to be conducting major combat operations in India. We are already conducting routine air strikes in Pakistan, I would not be surprised if we routinely conduct special operations in Pakistan, and this is directly related to activities occuring elsewhere in CENTCOM. On the other hand, the diplomacy issues on the subcontinent have much more to do with Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan and much less to do with Iran or the Arab world.

Full disclosure: my degree is in biology and I never served at an echelon above battalion (but now I'm gloating!).

[John T. Fishel]

I did serve most of my career in various echelons above reality and, while I disagree with your conclusion, you make a very good, logical case not to rationalize regions. As I suggested above, (read between the lines) any effort at organization/reorganization has its advantages and pitfalls. IMO the advantages of "rationalization of regions" outweigh the pitfalls but in the long run, it won't make too much difference.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

The thread that just started up on the loss of another Pakistan Valley as a possible result of redistribution of forces to the Pak/Indian border also highlights the challenges between GCC boundaries.

Best, Rob

[Ed "Otto" Pernotto]

As someone who has had to interact up and down the chain as well as across the interagency, it's much more complicated than DOD vs State in determining which country is in which planning and coordinating function. To my memory, the Joint Staff, OSD, DIA, CIA and State all have different names for their country desk collections, i.e. Central Asia/South Asia, or Near East Asia, or something else. At first, it was confounding because if you had to coordinate something, you had to figure out which office to call.

I see both sides of the coin, by allowing flexibility, differing agencies can task organize as they see fit, I mean US AID or State has valid reasons why they are organized just as within the DOD. I also see the reasoning for whole of government "let's all row the same direction" methodology. This would have to be a push down from the NSC or National Security Advisor to change.
Cheers
Otto

[Schmedlap]

I'm also reminded of my experiences in OIF III when we had a company AOR that bisected the city from east to west. One company had the north, the other company had the south. Our AOR boundaries were not published on the internet, but the insurgents were able to quickly figure out where the boundary between us was and figure out that it was a great place to operate because when something went down on the boundary, we had to coordinate between companies to ensure there was no fratricide or other unforunateness. In response to this, we would occasionally shift the boundaries north and south to mix it up a bit. Once the MOI Commandos in our city became a more capable force, we tried to focus their attention on the boundaries between us. It seemed easier to have a third force overlapping our AORs and to keep tabs on them.

I think a similar arrangement could be imagined on the India-Pakistan border. CENTCOM and PACOM suddenly need to coordinate their response. State seems well positioned to help coordinate. Likewise if something goes down on the Iran-Afghanistan border - two State organizations need to coordinate, but CENTCOM is well positioned to help. In light of Otto's comment, obviously this is a simplified analogy.

[Marauder Doc]

To me the biggest concern with having different boundaries has to do with much needed integration and coordination at the inter-agency level. No matter how the map is divided up, each region should have a:

• Director of Regional Foreign Policy

Who is supported by:

1. Unified Combatant Commander (from DoD)
2. Deputy Director of Regional Aid and Development (from USAID)
3. Deputy Director of Regional Affairs (from State)

Everybody looks at the same map, works with the same people, out of the same office. Major NGOs and regional powers are invited to send liasons to the Regional Commands. Maybe they don't get a seat at the briefing table all the time, but if the PACOM commander wants to coordinate Tsunami relief efforts with PLAN, they should be able to do that because they already have a working relationship.

[wm]

Unless these new regions' boundaries correspond to one of the already existing set of regional boundaries, I submit it will result in the same "seams" problem, just pushed to a different, higher level. If the new seams correspond to some other organization's boundaries, then I do not see the value of creating another "chief" to manage that region. It might just be better to add new responsibilities for coordination/C2 to the person already in charge of the described region (or enforce exisiting responsibilites more stringently).

The substructure described below is a matrixed organization of a most complex kind. How does one manage the priorities and reporting processes of these deputy directors. Since they will supervise regions that overlap more than one of the regions under the purview of a Director of Regional Foreign Policy (DRFP), I suspect they will have responsibilities to support more than one DRFP at a time. Who sets/deconflicts those priorities?

To me the biggest concern with having different boundaries has to do with much needed integration and coordination at the inter-agency level. No matter how the map is divided up, each region should have a:

• Director of Regional Foreign Policy

Who is supported by:

1. Unified Combatant Commander (from DoD)
2. Deputy Director of Regional Aid and Development (from USAID)
3. Deputy Director of Regional Affairs (from State)

Everybody looks at the same map, works with the same people, out of the same office. Major NGOs and regional powers are invited to send liasons to the Regional Commands. Maybe they don't get a seat at the briefing table all the time, but if the PACOM commander wants to coordinate Tsunami relief efforts with PLAN, they should be able to do that because they already have a working relationship.