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  1. #26
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    I've been in one of those lucky situations where resources were piled on. In 2002 the Army was going to do everything it could to insure that if the SBCT failed as a concept, it would not be because of training. As one of the two IOT&E companies A/1-24 (of 1/25th) was given resources and risk beyond.

    I learned a good lesson early on: proficiency at any level begins with being proficient in the basics. As such we shot 10 X as much as we had a right to by STRAC standards. We were encouraged - just keep shooting we'll get you more. There were few on Lewis who had a higher priority, and when there was a conflict Range Control gave our BN some alternatives. When I (we) went too far and screwed something up - it happened - both the BN CDR and the BDE CDR backed me up, and gave us an opportunity to grow. It paid off, during the IOT&E up at Knox in the Summer of 2003 (OPFOR was mostly 10th Mountain folks) we did very well - the platform was simply that a platform from which to get more mileage out of the skills we'd built. Most of the IOT&E called for squad and section level actions across Knox - and as such time spent doing battle drills at various levels was time well spent. Sometime we'd get a FRAGO and have to reassemble for platoon and company missions on the fly - the technology helped some there, but it was always the soldiers and leaders who had built valid expectations of what they were capable of through tough, realistic training. It was the basic soldier and leader skills upon which higher individual and collective competencies were founded.

    I bring this up because if the military is sent in to do something, generally there is a good reason associated with it that has to do with the conditions. These conditions likely mean that there is either a requirement for those associated skill sets based on the enemy, or based on the friendly requirements (which is also based on an enemy, just one that may not be operating directly against you yet.) While some exceptions may be found, I think this is a pretty good rule of thumb.

    I don't know if Ken has said it on this thread yet, but it comes down to his claim that resourced correctly, with the acceptance of risk, we can do better, and we can be multi-purpose. The wild card is wartime OPTEMPO. It means that the available time to train has to be scrutinized better. There is certainly risk associated with it, but there may be some training models out there we could look at for MTO&E units which would reduce the amount of friction we have.

    I think its going to take some real money and emphasis put toward training, and that has further reaching impacts than just the types of CQB/CQM and bigger MOUT facilities available to a post. I'm pretty sure it would require a major infusion of effort into our defense logistics - more CL V production, a bottomless STRAC (I shot our whole BDE's worth of its old .50 CAL allotment in one day for part of crew and leader qualification). Vehicles and other pieces of equipment need to be FMC all the time - rather than burning up time hot seating vehicles or waiting around at the ranges. More ranges need to be upgraded and the range control staff modified and upgraded so that the days that a unit wants to shoot, it can do so with minimal effort and pain - in fact, when something else drops off the plate, and the unit finds some free time, it should be able to go down and shoot, drive, or communicate with minimal problems. Our training aids (the old TAS-Cs) need to be reinvigorated with better stuff and better incorporated with our force on force, LFX and other training. With all our talk, we still spend precious time "waiting to train", we put the fault back on the soldier and the leader, and cry - "hip pocket", but I think this is just an excuse that makes substandard resourcing go down better. Now BG Bob Brown (currently in MND-N) understood how precious time is as the CDR of 1/25th, as did the various BN CDRs of 1-24th and the BDE's other leaders.

    I believe that if we made those core technical skills at the individual and collective level easier to train, and more productive, we'd find there was more time available to send people to school, do distance learning and train on important non-combat skills such as culture (language, histories, etc.) or how to apply those skills in other ways such as advising foreign forces. I think we'd generally develop people in ways beyond what we thought possible while retaining those skills which keep them alive, and make the enemy consider his future actions after he has come into contact with well trained U.S. units.

    Like I mentioned earlier we had 2/75th down the road from 1/25th (1/25th is now in Alaska). As such we often got guys from in the BN who were either tired of the OPTEMPO, looking for other opportunities, or had been released because they had failed to measure up. Even those in the last category were often very good soldiers, its just that the 75th gets to pick and choose, so why should it tolerate anything less than the standards it lays out - anything less would be unfair to its other soldiers who'd met the standards. I bring up the 75th because they have a superb training support system to accommodate their OPTEMPO. Admittedly they have some incredible talent, but without the training resources they have to accommodate their OPTEMPO would they reach their potential? Would they be as good?

    Obviously the Multi-Purpose Force's roles and requirements are different from the 75th, just as they are from SF and other branches of the military, but what if we took the same resourcing strategy and applied it to the MPF? What if we resourced them to the things we know they are being required to do, and for more than just good enough? This means everything from bullets to barracks and to at some point relatively comparable bonuses - it means range time for units on demand (and where every squad leader can go out and run up to a fire team LFX). It means vehicles that run at FMC, quick turn around on weapons, quick replacement of CL IX. It means increased decentralization and acceptance of risk. It means not having to screw with buying uniforms, and researching, developing and getting better equipment faster. It means having a steady state support staff to free up folks for training, education and deployments (this should be largely GS folks of various ranks - not many contractors, and very few SES types - they need to work for the maneuver CDRs).

    Make no mistake, what I'm saying is take the resource methodology we normally associate with specialized forces, and apply it to the MPF - just toward its roles and missions.

    I had the fortune of seeing some of the most incredible NCOs and junior officers develop before my eyes. I saw PV2s step up and carry the weight of a fire team leader. If anything I think this has increased now. In some real ways they point the direction to the Army I believe we need, just on an institutional scale, and one that is backed at home as well as on deployment. I think given that we would get all the things we want and them some. I also think we'd get more in return than from the Wall Street Bailout $$ - I don't think we'd see golden parachutes buying swank penthouse apartments in NYC.

    I used to think we had to sacrifice something somewhere else - I now think that is BS. The money is there, its a question of our national priorities (just as is our willingness to create an economy that is stable, or responsible energy at home, or a host of other things). Regardless of if incoming administration prefers it or not, I think our commitments will grow if anything. Like energy policy, or education, physical health (not health care - but national fitness) -which by the way are also all linked to military preparedness and potential, we are talking about things which atrophy much faster than they grow - so if we really want to have the right tools available, better to start now, and have a comprehensive effort at it.

    Well, like Bill I've got my New Year's rant over with

    Happy New Year SWJ,

    Best, Rob

    Added - its out there on electrons - by then COL Bob Brown wrote several pieces on smart adaptive training - in Mil Review I believe.
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 01-01-2009 at 09:23 PM.

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