Ten Counterinsurgency Commandments from Afghanistan

[Surferbeetle]

His commandments make sense, a lot of sense -- BUT...

1. X - This is the US, our governing and electoral cycle is not conducive to long termism.

2. X - Sounds good. Now, if we can just figure out how to do that in very large, populous but still sparsely populated nation that has no economic viability in the western sense. There is little doubt he's correct but the difficulty of accomplishing that should be cause for considerable concern.

7. Totally true on that one; hopefully we understand that. 'Metrics' are a trap and a waste. Or, more correctly, the way the US Army tends to apply them is not helpful...

10. X - Well said but more difficult to do. The resources will become problematic, patience will run out...

I make it 3 we are doing or can or will do; 3 we can't or likely won't do ; and 4 that we may or may not get right. I do believe that's what the Doctors call a mixed prognosis...

Ken,

Let's hit the tough ones that you rightly highlight.

1. Political half lives are driven by polls and say that Mr. Mill's number one point is certainly problematic one for politicians, US or otherwise.

First, do not confuse short-term tactical imperatives and process with longer-term goals. The difference is between tools (military, media, diplomatic, governance, and development) and the overall objective (political accommodation).

Perhaps the tools exist to meet realistic objectives? Lets look at Proxies and Government Organizations in particular. Proxies (liked the quote about poetry & mountains, don't know about the 'goodness' of the website) seem to be used (I am familiar with Latin America & Iraq and wish our Africa hands would hit the high points on this as well for additional clarity) when the political going gets tough. In terms of Government Organizations, are not the CINC's DOD organizations by which we gain some level of continuity in the administration of policy? DOS also crafts Regional Plans (not necessarily synched with DOD as noted in the Map posted by CAVGUY) which are followed across administrations. We have discussed previously the corrosive effects of politicization on technocratic posts in government. Long term policy can be carried out by professionals and perhaps it's time to get back to that approach...

2. Free markets are a predictive indicator of the interests and efforts of populations. My marketing class professor (Army Vet type) impressed upon me the importance of understanding market segementation in order to be successful in a variety of venues (William Gibson's Pattern Recognition is another interesting read) and you again rightly point out the practical difficulties of Mr. Mill's second point

Second, focus on dealing with constraints to economic growth—not humanitarian assistance or the provision of security—as the essential condition for development. Thus, the military and other allied agencies always have to consider what the basis of growth in particular regions could be—what can be made and sold and how to remove constraints to realizing this. Countering insurgency means separating ordinary people from the warlords, drug lords and insurgents and giving them a viable economic choice.

In addition to noting that we need an integrated plan which takes into account the countries which surround Afghanistan, I am going to take this opportunity to beat my agricultural and road infrastructure drum again. I think that a realistic plan would take into account the existing economy and that a 51-70% solution is good enough. I do understand the concerns about empowering the 'wrong folks' but a sloppy gray (ie not black and white) solution is better than where we stand today. I am looking forward to seeing and thinking about GEN P's solution, it's my observation that he is an unconventional thinker.

7. Metrics! You know where I stand on this one my friend, and it is firmly in the metrics corner. I earn a living in that corner and metrics have practical applications. As an aside here is a FPRI article on risk management and the military that I found interesting (thanks to Westhawk for the link). We need to do a much better job with metrics in the Army, and stop being so stovepiped as well.

Seventh, never confuse numbers with effects. Beware of the body-count trap, the mismatch between aid commitments and expenditure, and especially the difference between numbers of troops and police and those available for operations. The latter example applies notably to the Afghan security forces, which suffer from poor pay, a ghost payroll, and dubious methods of training, personnel recruitment and allegiance. As Robert Cassidy has argued, “There are no magic and inherently quantifiable metrics that we can slap on a PowerPoint matrix … ones that might precisely measure our path to victory in counterinsurgency.”[3]

10. Mr. Mill's last point certainly is a tough one and speaks to the importance of Unity of Command.

Tenth, integrate but calibrate. Learn the lesson offered by officers such as André Beaufre and David Galula—don’t try to do everything at once.[4] The footprint of security presence, along with governance and development activity, should match the resources available. Be prepared to let some areas go while concentrating on those things and places you choose to. A “Clear, Hold, Build and Engage” strategy demands focus of effort and consolidation of gains, without which the insurgent “balloon” will simply distort and not, as intended, deflate.

How do we craft a strategy which motivates enough of the participants to accomplish it? Is it really that far out of the box to think about teaming up with the countries which surround Afghanistan to come up with a 51-70% solution which includes Afghanistan? I am currently moving through the section on The Thirty Years War in my 2nd Edition of Mary Fulbrook's 'A Concise History of Germany' and there are some ugly parallels to our supposedly unipolar world. Many of us in the west may not want to see religion as an issue but our opponents have been able to frame it and sell it as a religious issue. Perhaps it's time to get realistic and see what is possible.

Regards,

Steve