All I can say is that if they choose to rollback that role and the successes that have come with it
They get to live with the result Literally)
All I can say is that if they choose to rollback that role and the successes that have come with it
They get to live with the result Literally)
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Just out of curiosity, what is the forum's opinion on General Hayden? My only impression of him comes from the few public appearances that I have seen him make - particularly when he was on Meet the Press with Russert. Aside from looking like a nerd - not a bad quality for an intel guy, imo - he came off as a guy who has brains down to his ankles.
Does he have a future in intelligence whatnot after this administration? Should he?
Things are a bit more clear now. The President-elect said today, speaking about his intelligence nominations:
Tom,I think what you'll also see is a team that is committed to breaking with the past practices and concerns that have tarnished the image of the agencies, both intelligence agencies as well as US foreign policy
I agree with most your comment, especially the last line that Rex highlighted, but I don't think CIA's role has ever been focused on tactical intelligence and DIA only marginally so. On Kuwait, I think it's fair to point out that the CIA and DIA warning community accurately forecast the Iraqi invasion in and were largely ignored by the policy and most of the rest of the intelligence community. The sad reality of the intelligence business is that no one has a perfect track record.
John,
You're quite right that everyone does "all source" analysis, but the collection agencies like NSA and NGA have their institutional biases. For example, one would rarely (if ever - I can't recall every reading one) see NSA do any analysis that did not have a SIGINT component and most bread-and-butter products were heavily SIGINT based. Same with NGA (the agency with the every-changing name) and imagery.
Agree about ORCON. I hated that. I spent a lot of time in one job trying to get ORCON products to the people that needed them. It was a complete PITA.
The Panetta nomination reminded of another outsider CIA director - John McCone under President Kennedy - who played a key role in the Cuban missile crisis.
You're right on the institutional base thing and even more so about NSA. When I was reading them, their "Finished Product" looked more like condensed raw data than analysis of any kind. That said, CIA, DIA, and my shop (Army Current Intel by whatever name) all did real all source analysis with varying degrees of effectiveness. In my 2 years active there the order of quality was CIA, us, and DIA. In 7 years of returning as a Reservisteach agency was in the lead at one time or another. Later, in Strat MID(S), our regional analysis for GIPD and CIPD was better than anything CIA or DIA ever did.
Regarding Hayden: He seems like a competent professional. My only qualm is that he came out of NSA and had no background in HUMINT or real analysis.
Finally, saw Gary Berntsen plugging his new book on intel on TV last night. His pitch/take on Panetta was exactly what one would expect from a guy who came out of the CIA paramilitary ops and clandestine collection parts of DO. Represents some of the best and some of the worst aspects of CIA. See Jawbreaker for the best.
One last item, can't I get any bites on my last post about the apparent denigration of DNI?
Cheers
JohnT
I thought I answered that before you even asked the questionback at post 34. Maybe the idea is to put Blair in the position, give him nothing to do and expect he will resign after seeing that he is a title without authority (isn't that sort of what the reason was for his leaving PACOM?). That gives the new team time to come up with a "better" person for the position--maybe Panetta, maybe a "player to be named later" as they say in the big time pro sports trades. BTW, what about Leon in CIA as a counterweight/buffer/supporter (I'm not sure which) to Hillary at State, running INR ?
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Actually the CIA and DIA both tried to do so in DS and Storm. The CIA in its Mil Capablities wing and DIA first via regional SMEs who had no tactical ground whatsoever.Tom,
I agree with most your comment, especially the last line that Rex highlighted, but I don't think CIA's role has ever been focused on tactical intelligence and DIA only marginally so. On Kuwait, I think it's fair to point out that the CIA and DIA warning community accurately forecast the Iraqi invasion in and were largely ignored by the policy and most of the rest of the intelligence community. The sad reality of the intelligence business is that no one has a perfect track record.
As for the warning staffs getting it right, yes and no. The warning staffs got it but then the regional wags said no. As I was both warning and regional I said he was going and agreed with myself making me the winner of a self-inflcited argument
Tom
Ah, before my time really. I didn't see much from them on tactical intel during the latter-half of the 1990's. If there was any, it couldn't have been any good since I don't remember it
John,
One thing that crossed my mind is that Panetta is probably a lot more politically experienced in dealing with internecine executive fights, so that might give him a big advantage should he choose to butt heads with the DNI.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Here's Fred Kaplan's take from Slate. IMO, the one really interesting part of the article is his resurrection of the Flynt Leverett proposal:
Kaplan is much more optimistic than I about the post G-N COCOMs' competence at handling a conflict successfully. He also has a few things just factually wrong as far as I can tell. Still, a matrixed/JTF-like approach to intel might be an interesting alternative for trying to break down the traditional stovepipes.One good proposal was laid out in a 2004 New York Times op-ed by Flynt Leverett, a former CIA analyst now at the New America Foundation. Leverett described the bricklike wall that has long divided the agency's analytical branch and its clandestine branch, making it nearly impossible for either to share information with the other, much less with competing departments such as the FBI.
To maneuver around this wall, Leverett suggested setting up joint intelligence commands for specific "targets." There might be specific commands to provide intelligence on, say, al-Qaida, nuclear proliferation, Middle Eastern stability, and so forth. The national intelligence director would have the power to draw on personnel and resources from all the intelligence agencies to work together within each of those commands—the heads of which would report directly to him.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Thee and me; DS/DS was an aberration so we can say experience to date is not encouraging. I feared creation of overlarge bureaucracies with few saving graces.Usually does...He also has a few things just factually wrong as far as I can tell.Well, it certainly has in the past. Worldwide, in most wars, ad hoc agencies formed just to bypass the stovepipes and bureaucracies and address the current issues with a degree of urgency have generally been quite successful.Still, a matrixed/JTF-like approach to intel might be an interesting alternative for trying to break down the traditional stovepipes.
This is essentially already happening. There are committes of experts from all the relevant agencies that meet and coordinate on a regular basis for all kinds of intelligence problems, especially strategic. My wife has served as her organization's representative on a couple of them dealing with nonproliferation topics. I've heard there are others (not sure if they're ad hoc or not) that work on more tactical problems or specific groups and even individuals. Even the UBL unit in the CIA CT center pre 9/11 might be an example, though perhaps not the best one. I don't know if any of these are formalized, however.To maneuver around this wall, Leverett suggested setting up joint intelligence commands for specific "targets."
Ignatius on Panetta, Blair.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...010602826.htmlA Surprise For Langley
By David Ignatius
On its face, it's a puzzling choice: Barack Obama selects as his spy chief a former congressman with no firsthand experience as an intelligence professional. Is Obama dissing the CIA? Is he further politicizing this badly bruised agency? What signal is he sending by picking Leon Panetta as CIA director?
Here's the message, according to Obama's advisers: Panetta is a Washington heavyweight with the political clout to protect the agency and help it rebuild after a traumatic eight years under George Bush, when it became a kind of national pincushion.
"Leon is not going to preside over the demise of the CIA," explains one member of the Obama transition team. "The CIA needs to have someone who can represent them well."
This argument for Panetta makes sense. Ideally, the next CIA director would have been an experienced professional -- someone like Steve Kappes, the veteran case officer who now serves as deputy director. But the reality is that the professionals now lack the political muscle to fend off the agency's critics and second-guessers. That's the heart of the problem: The agency needs to rebuild political support before it can be depoliticized.
Last edited by Jedburgh; 01-07-2009 at 06:59 PM.
Sir, what the hell are we doing?
As a general response ..... we tend to forget how messy "winning" can be.
I'm not sure that Geo Washington would have been looking for a manager - he was looking for folks who wanted to win.
Year of the Hangman: George Washington's Campaign Against the Iroquois
http://www.amazon.com/Year-Hangman-W.../dp/1594160139
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