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  1. #33
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default More thoughts.

    Quote Originally Posted by AmericanPride View Post
    ...If a unit's mission is received from higher, why is it necessary that the unit's intent (to achieve that mission) be developed exclusively by the commander? As I previously said -- I have no experience with staff, so I'm probing for underlying purposes, assumptions, etc in how the system functions.
    The unit's mission is received; how it executes that mission is determined by the unit (or should be -- it usually is). The Commander is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do -- ergo, the Commander prescribes HIS (or HER) intent. He may let the staff provide him an or some idea(s) or even written intents to assist those staff types in preparing to command at his level -- but in the actual order or plan, the Commander's intent should be just that. Occasionally a weak commander will allow a strong S3 to develop it but that's just wrong. See also RTK above.
    Do you think technology (for example, electronic OERs) could mitigate the problem of seperation? What other practical problems do you think exist with the idea?
    No, not really -- we could do away with OERs IMO but HRC sort of needs them due to DOPMA. You cannot truly rate someone unless you interface with them frequently and personally. Lacking that, hearsay and rumor start to dictate what is written. Also and again see RTK.
    Why is an adversarial approach in a military setting seldom helpful and overrated? I understand the concern with 'unity of command'. Does separating a commander from the planning process undermine his ability to execute missions?
    Because it takes up too much time and a staff is not a debating society. Blunt but that's reality. Separating the commander from the planning process isn't going to happen; recall "all the unit does or fails to do..." The commander really is the principal planner at Bn/Sqn level and that makes sense, in theory, he is the most experienced person there. That is also generally true at Bde level.
    I haven't seen MDMP at 'combat speed'. Can you give me an idea of what drawbacks you think it has to warrant abandoning it? What do you think is a better alternative? I just finished up another essay (for the same Van Deman program) regarding the differences in instinctual and procedural thinking and decision-making.
    The MDMP should be taught at BNCOC and at OBC. It is an orderly way to develop COA and recommendations. I susepct in the process of OBC you'll see the problem. At mid or higher level combat speeds (either of which can occur occasionally or even frequently in LIC), time to go through all the steps just is not usually available. Thus some steps must be omitted. Which steps? Which steps do you omit due to time constraints? The usual answer is to try to omit none because people slavishly do what they've been taught. Guess what happens?

    The Division takes time to do all the steps because the big staffs, a two button boss and inertia exist. This means they will be late in getting their order to the Bdes. The Bde will try to accomplish most of the steps but will eliminate some steps (Cdr or S3 dependent; IOW a crap shoot on what doesn't get considered...) and thus will get their order to the Bns/Sqns REALLY late -- those guys will not have time to do most if any of the steps and thus, the trickle down effect robs the old tip of the spear of anywhere near adequate planning and preparation time, the poor Companies or Troops will not even approach adequate time to develop and issue the order. Here's an article I ran across some time ago that makes a good case -- but I believe even their solution takes too much time. LINK. MDMP has its adherents and detractors, it works and is all encompassing -- but even the Army realizes it is a lengthy process and not necessarily always applicable and provides some shortcuts (or used to in 101-5, probably still does in 5.0).

    Obviously there are exceptions and I'm overstating to make a point -- but it can often be that bad. Even more fortunately, there are a few truly competent and intuitive Commanders out there who can skip unneeded step and eliminate COAs rapidly to concentrate on what should be done. There aren't enough out there but there are some. The formulaic and the mathematically inclined types are reluctant to eliminate any steps in the MDMP and thus they get out-thought by the instinctive types. Like Ron, I'd be interested in seeing your paper on the differences between instinctual and procedural thinking...
    Do you think that's a consequence of Army culture?
    Wm can answer but my thought is that it's a function of what personality type is drawn to military service and will stay with it. Most of us, even the non-type As like me, react to challenges (real or perceived... ) and operate on the 'do something even if it's wrong' principle. There's no question the culture reinforces those attitudes thus you get a lot of the condition wm laid out and that, I think, is a big cause of my 90 days into staffitis problem for many.

    I do think our staffs are way to large and this exacerbates the problem as more people are poured into the frustrating bucket. Bertrand Russell contended that 20% of the people did 80% of the work in the world. After watching staffs at all levels from Bn to 4-star Hq for a good many years, I'm absolutely certain those figures are about right applied to US military staffs. Colonel / Dr. Jim Storr who Wilf recommend above posits that 40% of the folks on a typical British staff contribute little or nothing -- I'd agree with that also for most US staffs.

    ADDED: Saw your response to RTK; several items there I'd like to answer but I'll wait for RTK. I will provide one thing you may wish to consider.

    You mention more powerful staffs. Personally, I think that's a bad idea based on experience. If you look at US staffs, you'll discover that pre-WW II, Bn staff officers were LTs; Regt or Bde staff officers were Majors and Div had LTCs -- deliberately done so that a staff officer would not outrank the next subordinate commander. That worked quite well and lasted pretty much through WW II. Post WW II and Korea it changed due to less time in grade required for promotion and thus, inadequate experience for the staff types. CPTs were allotted to Bns. By the time of Viet Nam, only two years service to Captain meant that the S3 was upgraded to MAJ at Bn, LTC at Bde. My belief is that the quality of staffs deteriorated as they garnered more rank and power -- and grew in size (Parkinson's Law applies as do Augustine's Laws V and XXX). I think that's another of those be careful; what you want, you may get it things...
    Last edited by Ken White; 01-08-2009 at 05:44 AM. Reason: Addendum

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