If you concur with MAJ Edmond's thoughts and observations, then I think this article seriously challenges our ability to produce strategic corporals. I still advocate continuing the education process on cultural awareness etc., but like many training programs the military implements, if it doesn't translate clearly in A, B, then C baby steps according to some task, condition, and standard evaluation methodology, then we're not very good at teaching it. Transformation means more than new technology and battle formations, but transforming the way we develop our soldiers.

The bottom line is we're an Army of occupation in the eyes of the Iraqi people, and civil military projects and the like are not going to change that perception. It is highly unlikely we will be able to cultivate the cultural awareness and skills in our conventional military ranks to the extent that they'll be effective in this type of fight.

We have the best hammer in the world, but you can't use the hammer as paint brush. Our strategy needs to fits to our tools or means available. While many think our conventional forces should be living among the Iraqi people (and in many cases they are), so they can secure the population 24/7, vice launching patrols from U.S. base camps, the risk with that course of action is that we'll simply piss off the Iraqi people even more with PFC Smith and SGT Rock taking their frustrations out on the Iraqi people, because they can't distinguish between the good and the bad or the neutral.