This would be a funny article if

[Ken White]

it weren't so sad... LINK.

Excerpts:

"The military is as concerned about the mission of additional troops as it is about the size of the force and is looking for Obama to resolve critical internal debates, including the relative merits of conducting conventional combat vs. targeted guerrilla war. With limited resources, should the military concentrate on eliminating a Taliban presence -- a task for which most think the United States and its allies will never have enough troops -- or on securing large population areas?"
. . .

"...The Army is already spending $1.1 billion to provide facilities for additional troops in Afghanistan and plans to start an additional $1.3 billion in construction next year. But it remains unclear what kinds of forces, with what assignments, will be sent..." (emphasis added / kw)

Well, one thing I've learned from watching the system for many years is that if the Armed Forces do not resolve internal debates, the Politicians will do that for them -- almost always to the disadvantage of said Forces...

I've also observed that generally if money is spent, that dictates what will occur. New construction just aches to be filled -- whether there's a purpose in the fill or not...

The final clause from the article:

"There is a deep-seated belief among Obama advisers that no matter how many pre-inauguration diplomatic, military and intelligence briefings they receive, they will not have a full picture of the depth of the problems in Afghanistan or the options for fixing them until Obama reaches the Oval Office."

Given the first two quotes, the conclusion of the Obama advisers, while regrettable, is understandable.

It would also appear that that the supposedly monolithic DoD and / or Army cannot provide a full picture to the Obama crew because they apparently do not have one themselves. I don't think that's funny but it is sad...

[Danny]

Ken,

Interesting find. We've had our run-ins, and I am not trying to pick any fights over my view of what we should do in Afghanistan v. yours. That is well rehearsed ground, and I would just as soon stay on good terms.

But I will point out one thing, and it is the phrase "securing large population areas." I haven't heard it expressed so succinctly and directly before because I would have thought there would have been a general reluctance to say exactly those words.

Why? Securing large population areas, i.e., limiting their work to large urban areas while leaving the rural areas relatively untouched, is exactly what the Russians did. That was their great failure. It's also exactly what we're doing (with rare exceptions where the COP is being implemented by Army, and also Marines in Helmand Province). Highway 1 is Taliban country no more than 30 minutes outside of Kabul in three directions.

Sadly, securing Kabul and surrounding area is also one major mission of the upcoming 30,000 troops.

At any rate, again, not trying to pick fights, just pointing out something that struck me about the words you cite. I'm glad that at least they are honest with what they see as their strategic intention, where you or I consider it right or wrong.

Best, HPS

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Danny

But I will point out one thing, and it is the phrase "securing large population areas."...
Why? Securing large population areas, i.e., limiting their work to large urban areas while leaving the rural areas relatively untouched, is exactly what the Russians did. That was their great failure...

Too true...

I'm glad that at least they are honest with what they see as their strategic intention, where you or I consider it right or wrong.

Hmm. Maybe. I don't think they really have defined a strategic intention to date and the article would appear to corroborate that. We'll see over the next few months, I guess.

In any event, I sure hope that OIF 6 Redux is not the intent...

[jmm99]

we are not going to see a JFK-LBJ Redux - 60K of troops, building bases, urban vs rural emphasis issues, lack of a strategy - and "buying time" to develop one. And many more items on the checklist, in more confusing times today than then. Sorry to be a pessimist.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Danny

Why? Securing large population areas, i.e., limiting their work to large urban areas while leaving the rural areas relatively untouched,

How did you connect large populations areas with large urban areas? That is not a given, especially as it is a context free statement.

I absolutely understand your concern, but I can't see how it disqualifies rural areas from attention.

[Schmedlap]

One technique that I thought worked well for solving internal debates was for the person in charge to make a decision.

[wm]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

One technique that I thought worked well for solving internal debates was for the person in charge to make a decision.

(Speaking in his best Shaolin Monk voice)
Oh Grasshopper, you have confused being in charge with being a leader.

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by jmm99

we are not going to see a JFK-LBJ Redux - 60K of troops, building bases, urban vs rural emphasis issues, lack of a strategy - and "buying time" to develop one. And many more items on the checklist, in more confusing times today than then. Sorry to be a pessimist.

I gotta agree.

[charlyjsp]

I was struck by one of the many question/statements in the article:

"Can the new president do what his predecessor could not and impose order and a shared strategy on the 41 nations and countless international and nongovernmental organizations operating in Afghanistan?"

The implication seems to be that (1) the US/Obama Admin should impose a particular strategy on all other states in ISAF, UNAMA etc. as well as NGOs and (2) that one of the failures of the current admin was to not "impose order" on those unruly other states & NGOs. Does the author realize how absurd this sounds?

If the above is a perspective in any way shared by Obama and his people, then there's nothing but disappointment ahead for them. However, based on comments made by a number of U.S. gov't and military representatives that visited Helsinki last summer, I am expecting a genuine appreciation for the need to develop a new shared strategy, not dictate one. That Obama-Petraeus would be the 'first authors' is probably acceptable by most states in ISAF.

I'm guessing any such strategy would have to publicly accept considerably less lofty goals than those I get to hear almost every time I hear a politician speak. For many of the European states that have domestically sold ISAF as a democracy-rule of law-human rights promotion project, learning to accept and publicly sell lower new goals (not a base for terrorist organizations, does not contribute to instability in Pakistan) will be tough. Let's see what happens in Strassbourg and Kehl.

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

Thanks for the link. In addition to the all important facilities cost estimate that you referenced, I also keyed in on these two portions of the article:

The parameters of a new strategy are unlikely to emerge before early April, when Afghanistan and Pakistan will top the agenda at a NATO summit in France. By presenting its NATO allies with a comprehensive plan and demonstrating the leadership to implement it, Obama hopes to capitalize on his overwhelming popularity in Europe with requests for increased military and financial contributions.

"What they've got to say is 'Okay, if you love Obama, show us how much,' " said another retired senior military officer.

On the civilian and economic development front, Obama officials have been noncommittal about a $2.5 billion supplemental spending plan for 2009 that the State Department hopes the new administration will quickly submit to Congress for approval.

Next I went and took a look at the weather in Afghanistan.

From the Washington Post article alone (and I would suggest that we need some more sources) it would seem that we have concretely committed to funding facilities for troops, DOS does not appear to be getting the funds they asked for, and we will be going for the regional solution which involves those who live nearby rather than a unilateral solution.

Involving others takes more time up front but my experience is that getting a consensus can result in the benefits of unity of command and sufficient mass which allow for a more lasting solution. Time will tell...

Ran across this datapoint on the state of our national checkbook from today's WSJ which reminds me of the saying that incoming fire has the right of way.

Stocks tumbled as more losses and upheaval in the banking sector and dire trade and retail data hinted at an economy at risk of a deflationary spiral.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average, which was already on a five-day losing streak coming into Wednesday's action, recently shed another 261 points, trading 3.1% lower, at 8187.24, hurt by declines in alll 30 of its components. The blue-chip measure has fallen about 830 points since the start of its recent losing streak and is about 630 points from its late-November low set as Wall Street's lending mechanisms froze up.

Regards,

Steve

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by charlyjsp

...The implication seems to be that (1) the US/Obama Admin should impose a particular strategy on all other states in ISAF, UNAMA etc. as well as NGOs and (2) that one of the failures of the current admin was to not "impose order" on those unruly other states & NGOs. Does the author realize how absurd this sounds?

Apparently not...

...I am expecting a genuine appreciation for the need to develop a new shared strategy, not dictate one. That Obama-Petraeus would be the 'first authors' is probably acceptable by most states in ISAF.

We can hope.

...Let's see what happens in Strassbourg and Kehl.

Yep. Too early to tell and the US governmental system and its four, six and / or eight year transitions do tend to greatly complicate matters of strategery...

Noting that the enduring institutions have been aware of that scheduled turmoil at the top for a long, long time yet do not seem to adapt to it...

The Schmedlap and wm exchange above also resonates -- though I've noticed that having six almost co-equal leaders does seem to complicate the process a bit.

[J Wolfsberger]

"... securing large population areas." My first reaction to reading this was: Look how well it worked for us in Viet Nam.

I need to read and digest the article, but I'm with Ken - this is sad, and a bit scary.