The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy

[Entropy]

IIRC, during the battle of Gettysburg, the Iron Brigade was still fighting after suffering over 50% casualties.

[Bob's World]

As I recall from reading Gen Balck's post-war interviews about operations on the Eastern front as an LT; a typical German Panzer BN was often reduced to about 7 tanks, BC in his tank, Two Co CDRS in theirs, each with two plt ldrs in theirs; and they would go up against TOE Russian BNs and fare quite well due to the high level of experience of those surviving crews. (All a result of Hitler always wanting to send more units, and not reinforce the units already in theater). Though Stalin was right that "quantity has a quality all of its own," just attriting the other guys numbers in no way ensures success.

[reed11b]

All these examples are fine, but do they examplify typical combat situations? A large number of the members of this forum have real world time being shot at, and lets ask ourselves honestly if, in our own experiances, the enemy usually fights to the last man with no concern over there own safty or caring for there own casualties. Hammer Fuchs all you want, but he has a point. We do learn a great deal of bad habits in training, if training has not evolved a great deal since I left the infantry in '05.
Reed

[Entropy]

You have a point Reed and one can easily come up with examples where units "broke" after taking minimal or no casualties.

[Ken White]

That sounds a lot like they read Mao too much.

at that time probably weren't even too sure who Mao was...

You'll be pleased to know it was done simply because it was deemed to be unpredictable AND unexpected. Worked, too...

Reed11b says:

All these examples are fine, but do they examplify typical combat situations?

Yep

A large number of the members of this forum have real world time being shot at, and lets ask ourselves honestly if, in our own experiances, the enemy usually fights to the last man with no concern over there own safty or caring for there own casualties. Hammer Fuchs all you want, but he has a point.

No body said that we or the enemy did that; people merely pointed out some examples of the fact that, in combat, there are never any certainties and one is best advised not to make tactical decisions based on what oneself would do -- the other guy may have a different rule book. No more than that; no one is hammering Fuchs.

We do learn a great deal of bad habits in training, if training has not evolved a great deal since I left the infantry in '05.

My perception was that in this thread we all pretty much agreed on that score???

[Ken White]

You have a point Reed and one can easily come up with examples where units "broke" after taking minimal or no casualties.

No certainties is the point, I think...

Many like to use laws of probability or percentages in calculating what course of action to take. That works in many things. It's just been my observation that in combat, all rules applied have to be carefully watched to diligently avoid dogmatic use and thereby getting a big surprise.

[reed11b]

Ken,
My gripe is that OPFOR tends to have almost no C&C aspect, making our training focused on "killing" all the bad guys or at best, securing the most tactical position in the limited training range. We do not train to fight against how the enemy plans or adjust to a thinking enemy. The exception is in the national training centers, but tactical planning is not just a brigade or even battalion level skill. Our small unit tactics reflect this focus on killing the bad guy and helps to perpetuate the focus on technology. I believe this was also Fuch's point.
Reed

[Ken White]

My gripe is that OPFOR tends to have almost no C&C aspect, making our training focused on "killing" all the bad guys or at best, securing the most tactical position in the limited training range.

but those weren't the issues in my day. The issues then were that training was too brief (i.e. unrealistic in that it typically lasted only three days or so), there wasn't enough of it and we didn't have even the realisim that MILES and other simulations and enhancements now offer. We DID train people on what to do and we did test them and fire the incompetents; something that I think is not really done today

We do not train to fight against how the enemy plans or adjust to a thinking enemy.

If that's true -- and in my day it did happen occasionally -- then it is not a training problem, it's a leadership problem that is reflected in poor training. Not trying to pass the buck -- I'm trying to place the responsibility where it belongs.[quote]The exception is in the national training centers...[quote]Having observed though not participated and having listened to a number who have participated, I'll grant those centers some plaudits -- but they also teach some bad habits and the OpFor there has a stacked deck. They also seem to offer the only testing today that can result in a really poor commander getting relieved but they do not really test and affect the lower echelons as you point out. That's a major shortfall. [quote]...but tactical planning is not just a brigade or even battalion level skill.[quote]I agree and can't speak for today but used to be that it got as much emphasis in training as it needed. If that's changed, it needs to be fixed.

Our small unit tactics reflect this focus on killing the bad guy and helps to perpetuate the focus on technology.

I'm not sure I see the connection between killing the enemy and perpetuating a focus on technology.

I believe this was also Fuch's point.

He makes a valid point as he usually does; I'm just not that sure that what he says in this case is universally applicable. Units vary, commanders vary, training varies -- and that's okay because combat varies. That's because people vary. A great deal. Since people are involved, there is never going to be a perfect solution, never going to be perfect training -- and there are never going to be any ironclad rules...

[Fuchs]

I recall an Armor or Infantry magazine article (few years ago at most) that
covered the problem as well.
The author criticized the 'no surrender' attitude and the resulting focus on firepower/ammo consumption and wrong structure of logistical support resulting from such training experiences (too much ammo, not enough fuel basically).


MILES-based training can also mislead on NLOS weapon effects.
Grenade weapons, penetration of walls and such is not properly reflected in MILES/AGDUS simulation aids. You cannot shoot through a wall with MILES, even if you have a .50BMG rifle.
40mmx46 and 40mmx53 cannot be represented (realistically) as well (as far as I know).

Finally, armies tend to train against whom they intend to fight - and often and up fighting a very different power.

We've seen many advances in military training since the early 80's, but should keep in mind that it's still very imperfect and misleading.


@Ken: Don't read too much into my use of the word "rule". I should/could have written "rule of thumb" or similar.

[reed11b]

We DID train people on what to do and we did test them and fire the incompetents; something that I think is not really done today If that's true -- and in my day it did happen occasionally -- then it is not a training problem, it's a leadership problem that is reflected in poor training.

but tactical planning is not just a brigade or even battalion level skill.

I agree and can't speak for today but used to be that it got as much emphasis in training as it needed. ...

My experiance is that we "train" alot at the small unit level, but that the training consists of drills, drills, more drills, and then some more drills. Drills are great and all, but they do not teach thinking, planning or intiative and that is what is lacking in our small unit training in my eyes. Since all planning, thinking and intiative is reserved for Battalion and higher echelons (Maybe Company level) then technology is needed to micro-manage the lower echelons and seems to be substituted for planning at the small unit level. Of course my military background is with the 1/501st Abn. in the mid 90's when it was part of the defunct 6th I.D. and therefore had a very limited training budget and the 41st BCT National Guard, which is limited by the fact that it is the national guard, so perhaps if I had been in the 82nd my view would be differnt.
Reed

[Ken White]

My experiance is that we "train" alot at the small unit level, but that the training consists of drills, drills, more drills, and then some more drills.

the very flawed Task, Condition and Standard Training process the Army bought off on in the early 70s over the objections of many. We had a decent professional Army training approach that was sort of out of synch with the draftee army of the post WW II Army. When the Draft was ended, the Army didn't realize it had a perfectly good system that could easily adapt and instead looked for a 'new, modern' training process 'using current educational technology' that would be suitable for a 'professional army' and -- due to the fact that the selecting authorities were Generals who remembered WW II -- adopted a process that was sold by a bunch of civilian D.Eds who couldn't spell army that is great for a mobilizing and rapidly expanding Army but really not at all appropriate for a professional Army. The really terrible thing was that those civilian Education Specialists tested a bunch of recruits -- the tail end of McNamara's project 100,000 social experiment and found a 5th grade reading level -- so they structured all the training at that level. Sad. IOW, as often occurs, the Army got it backwards.

Drills are great and all, but they do not teach thinking, planning or intiative and that is what is lacking in our small unit training in my eyes.

If that's true and I'm sure it is, that is a really bad flaw. Hopefully, the switch to Outcome Based Training will fix that.

Since all planning, thinking and intiative is reserved for Battalion and higher echelons (Maybe Company level) then technology is needed to micro-manage the lower echelons and seems to be substituted for planning at the small unit level.

That's a residual function of the system. In the eyes of too many, Peons who think will just get you in trouble so you don't teach them to think and you don't treat them as if they can. That really need to change. Good units don't allow that-- unfortunately by any definition, mathematically, half the units in the Army are not good units. Everyone also forgets that too often...

Of course my military background is with the 1/501st Abn. in the mid 90's when it was part of the defunct 6th I.D. and therefore had a very limited training budget and the 41st BCT National Guard, which is limited by the fact that it is the national guard, so perhaps if I had been in the 82nd my view would be differnt.

Knowing several senior folks from the 6th, I can believe it wasn't the greatest experience. The 82d probably would have been better but even it ain't perfect...
Reed[/QUOTE]

[Uboat509]

I arrived at my first active duty station back around October of '91. The unit was Patriot missile battalion back when Patriot was still the darling of the military owing to its reletive effectivness vs. Scuds. Our battalion commander was one of the biggest micromanagers that I have ever had the misfortune to work for (he would personally review all physical profiles in the battalion wach morning to ensure no one was malingering). He was apparently just another in a long line of micromanagers. One day young PV2 W, was in the orderly room and overheard a group of CPTs talking about why the BCs that they had had in this unit were such micromangers. One of the CPTs had a theory. He noted that because Patriot was heavily automated, the BC could sitin the BN TOC and get the same information that the Battery Commander was getting. Furthermore, he had direct control over individual launchers anywhere in the BN. The temptation to micromanage everything must have been enormous. I often wonder if that is not happening to the Army as a whole. As commanders get more and more information available to them, particularly real-time information, I thnk the temptation to micromanage becomes ever greater. This isn't a new phenomenon, I'm sure Ken had to deal with "the great squad leader in the sky" problem when he was in Vietnam, but I suspect that recent technological advances are exacerbating the problem greatly.

SFC W

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

Couldn't get back to you earlier in the week, so here are my belated answers to your points/questions.

I do not understand the second question; and what is being measured?

My take is that Dr. Kennedy is trying to describe the economic situation, which is similar to an armed conflict in that there are many participants with varying intents and capabilities, which result in a large stew of randomness. My point was both numbers/technology and words are needed to both characterize and influence such a situation at a specific moment in time.

Been working my way through holiday cookies, forgive the allusion. If a ‘measuring chocolate chip cookie’ is made of words and numbers, most folks will argue about the proper proportions of the ingredients but most will agree both are needed in order to have a ‘measuring chocolate chip cookie’.

If you're in the thick of things on the ground, I'd bet there's no problem having your chain of command trust you...

So far so good…

That second phrase is where we've gone wrong. You should not have to share your understanding with the resource providers; it is not their job to second guess you to death (literally) it is their job to support you with the resources you require. It is your chain of command's job to insure you ask for what is needed and to fire you if you ask for excess; since we know you'd never do that, you should get what you ask for. It is also their job to fight any resource battles.

Let me work on additional clarity here (my bad), with the understanding that ‘the internet does not do nuance well’. In terms of what the US Army’s logistical system is set up for, I agree with your statement. Requesting X rounds of ammo described by NSN # Y is not the issue. A CA-bubba/COIN oriented soldier runs into problems when requests are relayed that do not meet the MCO paradigm. Examples would be X tons of seeds, Y tons of fertilizer, Z lf of irrigation pipe, etc. What I am suggesting is that for COIN work we need to think about teaching standard methods to our forces to request from the Host Nation Government or requisition/purchase needed COIN resources. We are certainly getting better at it, but we still have a long way to go.

The Bean counters have taken over the institution and everyone is okay with that? Weird.

For large projects, which involve a democratic society’s resources, beancounters are key team members, and need to be listened to. Consider our taxpayer dollars and what has happened to them with TARP…I digress.

I am currently working my way through Against the Gods, The Remarkable Story of Risk by Peter L. Bernstein, which chronicles some of the things we are discussing here, and it’s a good read as well. So to sum it up, I am seriously taking COL McMaster’s article under advisement and attempting to square it with my weltanschauung; but my preferred ‘measuring chocolate chip cookie’ is still heavy on the numbers side.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Thanks for the response.

My take is that Dr. Kennedy is trying to describe the economic situation, which is similar to an armed conflict in that there are many participants with varying intents and capabilities, which result in a large stew of randomness. My point was both numbers/technology and words are needed to both characterize and influence such a situation at a specific moment in time.

With my usual caveat of be very careful, with respect to armed conflict, in regard to what is measured and how that is done -- and reported...

Now I have to go and get some cookies. Thanks...

...Examples would be X tons of seeds, Y tons of fertilizer, Z lf of irrigation pipe, etc. What I am suggesting is that for COIN work we need to think about teaching standard methods to our forces to request from the Host Nation Government or requisition/purchase needed COIN resources. We are certainly getting better at it, but we still have a long way to go.

Done that as well, long ago on a galaxy...

We'd been in the two countries (where I did that on occasion) for many years and USAID -- a provider of much of the Cl X -- was in business then and was good. I can understand that without both those factors in place, service would be poor.

For large projects, which involve a democratic society’s resources, beancounters are key team members, and need to be listened to. Consider our taxpayer dollars and what has happened to them with TARP…I digress.

I agree. Listened to. "Listened to..." is not the same thing as final decision authority. Entirely too many allow them that de facto prerogative. Even as they camouflage their pernicious influence behind, 'programmatic guidance' and 'program and budget advisory councils,' the deliberately opaque Federal budgeting system which Congress refuses to change to preclude transparancy and such other charades.

I'd also suggest that TARP and Auto Company bailouts are a beautiful example of why the bean counters should not be allowed near a decision. Ever...