I'm not going to fool anyone, I have been involved in the COIN debate with other SWJ members for a few months. I don't know if my apparent flip flopping on whether I support or oppose Gian's views are due to some underlying medical issue, or if I'm just not sure what the debate is really about.

Posted by Ken,

* Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.
I have agreed with Ken on this point several times, and I'm not sure why we feel obligated to support one position or the other? The argument seems to be dividing us unnecessarily, if you support COIN you're in the Moose Party and if you support conventional war you're in the Bear Party. Fortunately, our situation isn't that complex. We're American fighting men and women who took an oath to defend our Constitution against "all enemies" foreign and domestic. Many of our potential foes present a conventional military threat, while many of our foes present an irregular combatant threat. There is no debate, we "must" be prepared to fight and win against both. How we prepare is arguable, and in Gian's defense I don't think he ever argued that we ignore COIN or the irregular threat.

I found much to agree with Looking Glass's post, and unfortunately the truth frequently hurts. There is a big difference between really getting and doing it and paying lip service to it; it being COIN.

Once an operatonal mold is set, it is hard to break out of it. I remember one of the dumbest statments I heard from a very smart senior officer. Don't worry about it Bill, it's Iraq, so we got it, which was one way of saying we been there before and we're going to do the same thing again when we go back, don't worry about the new intelligence reports. Most leaders are not as courageous and intelligent as GEN Petreaus in my opinion, and his leadership has been courageous and decisive, and I think his surge strategy (or right sizing) was instrumental in reducing the violence in Iraq. By no means was the surge the sole factor, but I don't believe all the other contributing factors would have made much of an impact without the surge. The argument is academic at this point because we'll never really know what would have happened if we didn't surge, but still I would like to hear Gian's arguments on why he believes the surge wasn't effective in reducing the violence?

Now I'm going to flip flop (I'll see the doc tomorrow) and support one of Gian's arguments. His point about our COIN doctrine being largely focused on counter-Mao insurgency strategies is accurate, and it is a major shortfall. To be fair it does address other types of insurgencies, but it doesn't address different strategies for dealing with them. In many areas of the world there will not be a large majority of fence sitters in the affected populace just waiting to be won over by either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent. Who they support is sometimes a given, especially in identity based insurgencies/struggles. How do you wage a successful COIN campaign when the populace will not support you (and the HN you're supporting) with our current doctrine? I think the courses of action available (regardless of feasibility) are obvious, even if some of them are not politically correct. But onward to the most important post,

Schmedlap posted,

But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country."
COIN is a reality, we'll have to be proficient at it at all levels and we're not. There is much to fix; and to fix with a great sense of urgency. We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?