If they were recalled for that reason, why were they used in other mine awareness campaigns 5 years later in Latin America, that's the question I'm trying to get at. All PSYOP material is supposed to have MoE's attached to them, as I mentioned its a pet peeve of mine that we can't figure out what works and what doesnt based on hard data.
Different command and different command decision. Think of who was in charge and making decisions in Bosnia in 1996 (NATO). The 1996 version was 10 pages long. They were given out in orphanages, hospitals, and refugee camps - children with very little in life who were looking for hope and heroes.Originally Posted by Voodoun
Now think of who was in charge in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras (SOCOM) in 1998. The 1998 version in Spanish was 32 pages long with more explanation and was given out by UNICEF, the government, the Ministry of Education, and SF Soldiers. It was a little smarter program.
Look into the PSYOPS archives for AARs of both operations. Go on CALL's JRTC cell and see if you can ask an RFI (the website walks you through it) and they should be able to help.
Last edited by RTK; 01-22-2009 at 12:24 PM.
Example is better than precept.
Thanks, thats sort of direction I needed to get it to click - thanks!
One question
What is the turn around time for idea to implementation? We all know we are losing the information war here, so how do we streamline the process? Sorry two questions.
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
I think the War of Ideas is going to take more than just some ideas at this point, its going to take a national level coordination office, something we had during times of conflict during the 20th c., but has been loudly rejected and lambasted in the 21st (by the media and turf warring bureaucrats)
Q1: From good idea to products in hand of the indig should only take the design and production time, in my mind - if and only if the messages are known and the answer to #2 is true.
Q2: Trusting your subordinates to do the right thing for the overall mission.
I agree there needs to be a national message, but not necessarily another bureaucratic organization that "coordinates" and, thus, anchors progress.
What if the local message needs to counter the national level message for progress in the local area? How many loopholes would you have to jump through then?
If commander's intent is understood, why can it not be vetted locally (BDE/BN and below)? Wouldn't COL Maxwell or COL Gentile like the opportunity to design their IO messages as they see fit?
Example is better than precept.
RTK, tactical PSYOP supports the battlefield commander, and its useful, but its not going to win the War of Ideas. In the 20th c. we created no less than 6 national level central Strategic PSYOP offices, and dismantled them when the time came, the last one met in 1987. Its been proven this works - the Cold War was a War of Ideas as well, and it was through the aggressive use of Influence Operations, mostly outside of the military, that put the first chinks in the Soviet armor, via Poland. Every War College assessment I've read of our failure in the War of Ideas has concluded that we need a strategic centralized office, as well as ever academic discussion I've come across.
IO is larger than you. It's larger than PSYOP. My point is what the 98% of the force that doesn't have a TPD connected to it.
The young specialist rifleman does more PSYOP/CA/IO on a day to day basis than most PSYOP or CA teams do in a week. While the bureaucratic powers that be try to figure out the perfect way, the Soldiers and Marines on the ground are figuring out their own way that works in their AO regardless of a centralized strategy.
That's reality, regardless of studies, papers, or discussion.
Example is better than precept.
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