Thanks, thats sort of direction I needed to get it to click - thanks!
Thanks, thats sort of direction I needed to get it to click - thanks!
One question
What is the turn around time for idea to implementation? We all know we are losing the information war here, so how do we streamline the process? Sorry two questions.
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
I think the War of Ideas is going to take more than just some ideas at this point, its going to take a national level coordination office, something we had during times of conflict during the 20th c., but has been loudly rejected and lambasted in the 21st (by the media and turf warring bureaucrats)
Q1: From good idea to products in hand of the indig should only take the design and production time, in my mind - if and only if the messages are known and the answer to #2 is true.Originally Posted by ODB
Q2: Trusting your subordinates to do the right thing for the overall mission.
I agree there needs to be a national message, but not necessarily another bureaucratic organization that "coordinates" and, thus, anchors progress.
What if the local message needs to counter the national level message for progress in the local area? How many loopholes would you have to jump through then?
If commander's intent is understood, why can it not be vetted locally (BDE/BN and below)? Wouldn't COL Maxwell or COL Gentile like the opportunity to design their IO messages as they see fit?
Example is better than precept.
RTK, tactical PSYOP supports the battlefield commander, and its useful, but its not going to win the War of Ideas. In the 20th c. we created no less than 6 national level central Strategic PSYOP offices, and dismantled them when the time came, the last one met in 1987. Its been proven this works - the Cold War was a War of Ideas as well, and it was through the aggressive use of Influence Operations, mostly outside of the military, that put the first chinks in the Soviet armor, via Poland. Every War College assessment I've read of our failure in the War of Ideas has concluded that we need a strategic centralized office, as well as ever academic discussion I've come across.
IO is larger than you. It's larger than PSYOP. My point is what the 98% of the force that doesn't have a TPD connected to it.
The young specialist rifleman does more PSYOP/CA/IO on a day to day basis than most PSYOP or CA teams do in a week. While the bureaucratic powers that be try to figure out the perfect way, the Soldiers and Marines on the ground are figuring out their own way that works in their AO regardless of a centralized strategy.
That's reality, regardless of studies, papers, or discussion.
Example is better than precept.
Of course IO is larger than me and larger than PSYOP, no one ever said it wasnt, its also larger than the entire DoD, and frankly, larger than America.
The notion that the average hard power rifleman does more to win the War of Ideas than anyone else is unsupported, and not contended in the links you provided. We are in an ideological struggle with Islamist militantism, and riflemen are not going to solve that conflict. Everyone from Bush, to Rice, to Petraeus has acknowledged this. We're talking about the War of Ideas here, not the ground operations that rely on IO, Influence Ops (more than Info Ops) to achieve their military goals.
The fact is that a national level organization worked in the past, and current experts unanimously support the notion, but have been unable ot generate the political will to create it. The OSI was shut down not because it was useless, but because it created too much popular opposition to be effective.
What is discussed on the SWJ bboard hardly trumps the ongoing and dedicated efforts at RAND, USAWC, and academic instutitons all across the Western world.
Cragin, Kim and Gerwehr, Scott. Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005
Gough, Susan L. “The Evolution of Strategic Influence” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2003
Schleifer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies. Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic, 2006.
Ward, Brad M. “Strategic Influence Operations – the Information Connection” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2003
Phares, Walid. The War of Ideas: Jihad Against Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Radvanyi, Janos. Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long Term Strategic Planning. New York: Praeger, 1990
Rosnau, William. “Waging the 'War of Ideas'” RAND Reprint, 2006
You can read the RAND stuff here:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf (accessed December 2nd, 2008)
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG184.pdf
As you can see, the issue that you took exception to (a centralized organization), is universally accepted. Now if you can provide examples of social science research contradicting this conclusion, I would be very interested in reading them. I'm always open to being proven wrong.
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