The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[max161]

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

I hate to sound cliche but when GEN Schoomaker was CDR USSOCOM (or CINCSOC back in the day!!) he always admonished that we "train for certainty and educate for uncertainty." The certainty is you have to be able to shoot, move, and communicate in any situation. We need to train and maintain proficiency in all our combat skills (both for US operations in MCO and to be able to impart those skills to friends, partners, and allies when necessary). But operations in an Irregular Warfare environment will always be uncertain and require creative problem solving. So we do not need to focus on training for IW. We need to educate for the possibilities we may face but also realize that we cannot identify every possible threat or complex situation. The "irony" is that I think if we really look critically at our military, particulalry our ground forces (Army and Marines) I think we will find many Officers and NCOs who have had sufficient education and were very adept at problem solving in complex operational environments and have done so since we began operaitons in 2001. They were able to do this because they were tactically and technically proficient, they possessed initiative and sufficient lattitude from their chain of command, and they were mentally agile and creative to solve or assist in solving complex problems. I think we find many of these Officers and NCOs at the Brigade and Regimental level and below. What is always the difficult part is developing and orchestrating an integrated and synchroniched operational campaign that supports strategic aims. Training occurs best in our units. Our PME for officers and NCOs needs to focus more on education and less on training.

[Ken White]

Bayonet Brant said:

"...I wonder if at least some of the 'muscle memory' that's ben referred to above is less about the difference between COIN/HIC and as much, or more, about risk aversion."

That, too. I 'd say in about equal measures across the board, varying in percent of each between individual commanders.

RTK said:

"Basics and fundamentals don't change. Their application may, but basic battle drills, action drills, contact drills and reports are the exact same. Dealing with other people in other cultures and our own in the way they should be treated as equals and peers and not in the "I'm-American. I'm- wicked-way-smarter-than-you" methodology we've been known to use
doesn't have to be a battalion training event."

Couldn't have said it better m'self...

CavGuy said:

"I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

Having run an instructional branch charged with training OBC and AOAC students at the Armor School for five years and having come up with some fairly innovative -- and effective -- training at the time only to see it go back to below humdrum in a matter of months after I left and being broadly familiar with the Infantry versions over the years, I can believe that your experience was all training and little education. Mostly poor training and not nearly enough of it at that.

That's why I continually beat the drum about the fact that our initial entry training does not prepare people for service in a professional army. We are still training people as if they were destined for a rapidly mobilizing wartime force. It's stupid. I know that both the OBC and CCC curricula are undergoing changes -- good ones -- but we haven't gone far enough. We're doing better than we used to but we can do even better.

CavGuy later added:

"Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's. I feel they should have an understanding of the principles

I strongly agree but would suggest you better do that for the NCOs as well or you'll suffer later.

I'd also suggest that education has to start for both officers and the enlisted folks at entry. Most everyone who comes in the Army will operate in jobs at least one and often two ranks higher than that actually held BEFORE they go to the level of school to 'equip' them for the higher position. Our PME has never adapted to that fact. At Knox, in the 70s, almost all Captains had commanded and been on a staff before they came to the advanced course. We had one ANCOC course where every single student had already been a Platoon Sergeant...

Gian said:

"...now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved."

True and the risk has to be accepted for now but given the effort to turn the overly massive bureaucracy that is TRADOC it is time to start setting in place revised POIs for all training and education, IET through the War College that truly, at lower levels thoroughly inculcates the basics of the profession and at upper levels encourages calculated risk taking, decentralization and independent thought.

We are not going to restore our ability to trust subordinates until we do that and no armed force can operate effectively without trust.

ADDED: And what Max161 said; train the basics on entry, educate the leaders...

[Surferbeetle]

Cherry picked from the White House Web site on Defense (got the link from SWJ - thanks!)

President Obama and Vice President Biden will invest in a 21st century military to maintain our conventional advantage while increasing our capacity to defeat the threats of tomorrow. They will ensure our troops have the training, equipment and support that they need when they are deployed.

Invest in a 21st Century Military

* Rebuild the Military for 21st Century Tasks: Obama and Biden believe that we must build up our special operations forces, civil affairs, information operations, and other units and capabilities that remain in chronic short supply; invest in foreign language training, cultural awareness, and human intelligence and other needed counterinsurgency and stabilization skill sets; and create a more robust capacity to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces, so that local allies are better prepared to confront mutual threats.

[Ken White]

that it was carried forward to the WH Web site. I have no quarrel with any of that provided it is done sensibly and as truly needed based on a thorough assessment, is not done automatically mostly as a counterpoint to the predecessor and does not get in the way of full spectrum capability. We need to and can do all those things without going overboard.

I doubt he'll pay much more attention to me than Bush did but I can hope they'll do right instead of just doing something...

[marct]

I find it intriguing that "training" is often listed as a component of PME; it shouldn't be.

Sam is quite correct in his critique of the differences but, while he says that it isn't a discussion of semantics, it is really. "Semantics" is the science of meaning (or the study of meaning) and that is exactly what this entire training vs. education debate is about, and it is also one of the reasons why people are talking past each other.

[Ken White]

Nor, I know, did you say I was...

However, to clarify...

My goal is better training -- particularly upon entry -- which will give people a thorough grounding in the basics of performance required to survive and to be successful in combat. That training must include a smattering of education because the new career includes subject matter never before acquired or even in many case encountered or considered.

Follow on PME should be mostly education -- but the application of that education in practical exercises at the educational institution constitutes some training as well. Too many years of practical effort have pretty well proven that even purely cognitive skills can be embedded with three practical repetitions of application.

Aside from institutional training and education, continued self-education is required and in the conduct of day to day business and in field exercises, all previous training and education should be put into practice in what the Armed Forces usually call 'training.' As is sometimes said "Everything is training is everything."

Thus the conmingling.

[Surferbeetle]

Most of what I have seen the Army do is training not education. Training is task oriented while education is concept oriented. There is often a misunderstanding in expectations between the two paradigms. The result is also often the criticism heaped upon academia that what is taught isn't immediately relevant. That is because the educational model creates flexibility to changing environments and adaptability. You educate a student on operating systems not Windows XP. They can then figure out any operating system.

There are a lot more things that could be said but in general the arguments will be around; 1) There isn't enough time in the training cycle (applying the wrong model from the onset); 2) Soldiers aren't that smart (even though they are getting older and more educated, wrong again); 3) We have to train for the fight we have today (again same wrong model as evidence against being prepared); 4) There is no way to integrate that kind of training with the current staff (presupposing the failure based on the inadequacy to develop staff will always fail, but how did we get armor?); 5) Various other similar rebuttals following the same pattern.

The fact is it would be a success, it would work, it has worked in previous conflicts, and as the national education system abandoned liberal arts and social sciences, so did the military drive towards a vocational model that now is seen as a restriction on mission capability.

Put succinctly the abject failure to reform military training to an educational model from a vocational model is a direct and substantial impact on national security capability.

Sam,

Do you have any case studies which discuss costs in terms of time and money for the two models that you would be willing to provide links for?

The NYT has an interesting opinion piece by Dr. Stanley Fish who ruminates about some of your points.

In previous columns and in a recent book I have argued that higher education, properly understood, is distinguished by the absence of a direct and designed relationship between its activities and measurable effects in the world.

This is a very old idea that has received periodic re-formulations. Here is a statement by the philosopher Michael Oakeshott that may stand as a representative example: “There is an important difference between learning which is concerned with the degree of understanding necessary to practice a skill, and learning which is expressly focused upon an enterprise of understanding and explaining.”

So, how do I build a training or education system to keep my charges alive, make as many of the opposition as needed die for their system, and separate/protect/stabilize and perhaps improve the lives of the innocents caught in the middle of the conflicts that we are in? Do you have any case studies of successful systems to share?

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Do you have any case studies which discuss costs in terms of time and money for the two models that you would be willing to provide links for?

While I am painfully aware that your parameters have been used by the Army (the other services do so as well but not to as great an extent) for years to justify marginal training that produces a barely acceptable product -- enlisted and officer -- who is sent to a unit which, quality of unit dependent may or may not better prepare him or her for the job. The good folks will also better educate and train themselves (both are required) while the lesser people will not exert the effort to do so (but will continue to be tolerated instead of being encouraged to seek another career). I think two points are in order:

- Individuals and units should not have to do that to the extent they now do.

- Is time/money the proper arbiter or should the arbiters be competence and proficiency to better enable the future survival of self and subordinates to insure successful mission accomplishment (as opposed to a flawed job that has excessive costs in many terms).

I'm quite conversant with the time/cost aspect having managed an Army multi-million buck budget for a number of years and thus learning how the system really works (not!). I also know that our use of those two inhibitors is a smokescreen. We continue to tolerate poor training because we are unwilling -- not unable; unwilling -- to spend what is required and to take the time needed not because we can't afford either, we can -- but simply because we've never done it that way and change is difficult. Every objection Sam lists has been used by many to me over the years -- and, as Sam says, everyone is hogwash.

[Surferbeetle]

While I am painfully aware that your parameters have been used by the Army (the other services do so as well but not to as great an extent) for years to justify marginal training that produces a barely acceptable product -- enlisted and officer -- who is sent to a unit which, quality of unit dependent may or may not better prepare him or her for the job.

Ken,

Just because I too have also been subjected to marginal training does not mean that I advocate it my friend. Like it or not however, time and money are measuring sticks, and what I am seriously seeking is a better example of how to do things which addresses these parameters.

The good folks will also better educate and train themselves (both are required) while the lesser people will not exert the effort to do so (but will continue to be tolerated instead of being encouraged to seek another career). I think two points are in order:

- Individuals and units should not have to do that to the extent they now do.

- Is time/money the proper arbiter or should the arbiters be competence and proficiency to better enable the future survival of self and subordinates to insure successful mission accomplishment (as opposed to a flawed job that has excessive costs in many terms).

I'm quite conversant with the time/cost aspect having managed an Army multi-million buck budget for a number of years and thus learning how the system really works (not!). I also know that our use of those two inhibitors is a smokescreen. We continue to tolerate poor training because we are unwilling -- not unable; unwilling -- to spend what is required and to take the time needed not because we can't afford either, we can -- but simply because we've never done it that way and change is difficult. Every objection Sam lists has been used by many to me over the years -- and, as Sam says, everyone is hogwash.

An analogous discussion would be on engineering specifications: performance based versus prescriptive. For military and engineering situations education & experience of the people one works with dictates what route I choose and/or advocate.

My personal vote is always for quality (leaning towards the performance based end of things) education & training...I have spent my money & time on three degrees; and over twenty years of my training time on military themes.

Perhaps we are not so far apart as you may think (internet nuances and all that...) I am seriously looking for a better way to do things.

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Just because I too have also been subjected to marginal training does not mean that I advocate it my friend. Like it or not however, time and money are measuring sticks, and what I am seriously seeking is a better example of how to do things which includes these parameters.

I'm also painfully aware they are real measuring sticks -- the issue is what priority are they accorded in determining the balance of Needed training vs. cost vs. time available.

My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

So. I hear you and know those are considerations -- they just need to be placed in the proper perspective. They have gained credence at current levels not because they are correct but simply because of bureaucratic inertia and acceptance of almost good enough instead of truly good enough training and education in all too many cases.

If that were not true, this thread would not exist.

...I am seriously looking for a better way to do things.

So am I, so are we all -- and I suggest we will not find such a way by approaching the problem over the same routes we have always used.

[Surferbeetle]

My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

America and its military are tough enough to get it done, it's just gonna hurt...

It's difficult for me to articulate in this short space how rapidly informational vehicles change; from transistor radios and wall mounted telephones to ipods & cellphones in just a flash.

The upheaval apparant in newspapers & on campus with regards to the digital divide will also hit the Army soon...the requirements and failures that GWOT has made apparent to us all guarantees it. A 24/ lifestyle, the internet, video games, google earth, wiki's, SWJ-style learning & interaction are just some of the educational & training vehicles that will/do help us to improve both content and availability of education and training to all of our forces.

Those of us who have suffered and lived through the BS and nastiness that results from lack of planning/training/etc. (and there are many...) will continue to speak out and push for change for the better. We have as examples those who are even older and who have lived through even more who still continue to push for change (dont we ).

[Ken White]

America and its military are tough enough to get it done, it's just gonna hurt...

Yep.

...We have as examples those who are even older and who have lived through even more who still continue to push for change (dont we ).

Yeth, I do hope tho...

(Spake by old Dude, no teef...)

[reed11b]

My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

BINGO! It also explains partly why the retention rate for 4 year initial contracts is higher then 2 year initial contracts (though I imagine that those that do 2 year contracts are less devoted to begin with). I would dump those two year contracts if I could. I think it also explains why we micro-manage (believe me, one clueless private on your fire-team will test even the most laid back sergeant) and why we do not train in manner that encourages initiative and thinking. How many disillusioned soldiers quit after one or two enlistments because they tired of being treated like children. There is a low ratio of prior service E-5 and below on this board, so this may not be the best sounding board for that info, but my personal experience working with vets suggest the number is higher then it should be.
Reed

[Ken White]

...How many disillusioned soldiers quit after one or two enlistments because they tired of being treated like children. There is a low ratio of prior service E-5 and below on this board, so this may not be the best sounding board for that info, but my personal experience working with vets suggest the number is higher then it should be.

One can also ask how many disillusioned LTs and CPTs depart...

Poor education and training works its evil from the bottom to the top. You and I talked about the bottom but as you go up, it's sort of telling that the pet song of several AOAC Classes back in my day was "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights." That may have changed and I really hope it has -- but I don't think I want to bet on it just yet.

Some would be amazed at the number of Officers I've met from long ago to recently who went or are going out of their way to avoid Leavenworth or the Pebntagon -- or the number of MSGs I have known and know that have tried or are trying to figure out how to avoid the USASMA. Many will say bad things about those kinds of folks. Possibly correctly -- but I suggest that those attitudes are indicative of a problem. The system forces in one way or another all those things as stepping stones and everyone knows that. Yet, some, a few to be sure, still try to 'escape.'

Been my observation that if you do it right, people fight to be included...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

a trip to Leavenworth's dusty, musty archives to search for Major Gentile's thesis:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

Also of interest:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awc...s/mcmullen.pdf

Although this gem: “Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan” is proving a tougher nut to crack.

[selil]

Surferbeetle,

Though it looks like your original question has been OBE, I'll do my best to give some insights.

First, there is a substantial body of literature around educational techniques with many different vectors and metrics for creating understanding. For example you can read about the socratic method, and the deeper seated learning that occurs with that versus simplistic lecture. The example though shows that even with the educational system there are better ways of doing things too.

So as to creating expertise on a cost/time/output type I'm afraid it isn't their are higher or lower costs just differences. As was alluded to by ken in "wasted days, and wasted nights" the primary costs are found in the "TIME" not in the delivery. As such you change the delivery and expectations mechanisms and perhaps some of the patterns being taught. You want a LIC/HIC type soldier to see those patterns and be able to respond and function correctly as rapidly as training.

Since what we're talking about is revolutionary to us now we need a model. We can look back in time and see when older, more educated people were entering into the service and perhaps make comparisons. We can look at todays educated cadre and compare them to non-educated cadre. Looking through ERIC (educational research database) I did not find any examples. That may be due the human subjects shield that is in place for military, but I was actually a little surprised nobody has done a similar type of study.

My basis for the primary elements of my argument though are grounded in the work by Bloom (1954) and others. My favorites?

Instructional design (second edition), Smith & Ragan
Beyond constructivism, Lesh & Doerr
The nature of expertise, Chi, Glaser, & Farr
Knowing what students know: The science and design of educational assessment, NRC
How people learn: Brain, mind, experience, and school, NRC

There is a large body of punditry that points out many of the issues with higher education such as "ProfScam" by Charles Sykes. Another example of a contrary opinion (sort of) is "Excellence without a soul" by Harry Lewis. I always try and look at both sides of an equation and in this case I am fairly convinced.

The United States military education system is broken at the most basic level. I'm not talking about the academies, the universities or colleges. I am talking about where the rubber hits the road and the reason it is broken is all of what I said before.

Sorry that may be a weaker argument than you might expect but what we're talking about is not easy, is not soft, and requires a substantial amount of reading. The study of the problem with money though is simply not the mark you need to consider. It is a wash and the system could be changed bottom up (to middle where I think it flips) in a matter of a few years. The results won't happen today, we are talking generational change, just like the way we got here.

[Gian P Gentile]

I hate to sound cliche but when GEN Schoomaker was CDR USSOCOM (or CINCSOC back in the day!!) he always admonished that we "train for certainty and educate for uncertainty." The certainty is you have to be able to shoot, move, and communicate in any situation. We need to train and maintain proficiency in all our combat skills (both for US operations in MCO and to be able to impart those skills to friends, partners, and allies when necessary). But operations in an Irregular Warfare environment will always be uncertain and require creative problem solving. So we do not need to focus on training for IW. We need to educate for the possibilities we may face but also realize that we cannot identify every possible threat or complex situation. The "irony" is that I think if we really look critically at our military, particulalry our ground forces (Army and Marines) I think we will find many Officers and NCOs who have had sufficient education and were very adept at problem solving in complex operational environments and have done so since we began operaitons in 2001. They were able to do this because they were tactically and technically proficient, they possessed initiative and sufficient lattitude from their chain of command, and they were mentally agile and creative to solve or assist in solving complex problems. I think we find many of these Officers and NCOs at the Brigade and Regimental level and below. What is always the difficult part is developing and orchestrating an integrated and synchroniched operational campaign that supports strategic aims. Training occurs best in our units. Our PME for officers and NCOs needs to focus more on education and less on training.

Dave:

Supremely stated!! Couldnt agree more.

gian

[Gian P Gentile]

a trip to Leavenworth's dusty, musty archives to search for Major Gentile's thesis:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

Also of interest:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awc...s/mcmullen.pdf

Although this gem: “Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan” is proving a tougher nut to crack.

UAM, thanks for the shout-out. Oh to be a major again, alas those days are long gone. The essay of mine that you provide a link to was a SAMS monograph that parts of it actually became an additional chapter to my dissertation that New York Univerisity Press published into a book in 2001 titled "How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo."

Not as big of a seller to be sure as that book about eating soup with a utensil. In fact the darn thing never even went into paperback. Oh well, I guess one book is better than none.

gian

[patmc]

CPTs are still trying to avoid the CCC. I was trying to deploy again, but HRC found me and sent me a RFO. In my old unit, only 1 commander has attended CCC, and 2 of my buddies are on 2nd commands before CCC. The FACCC specifically, has a real bad reputation with junior officers. FA as a branch has had retention problems, and after a near 90% MiTT assignment class, FACCC was struggling to fill classes. Literature says this has been fixed, but little birds tell me otherwise. The curriculum has switched several times the last couple years, and is still having an identity problem.

Personally, I wanted to deploy instead of MICCC, but now that I am here, I am really enjoying myself. They've changed the curriculum, and yes there is still HIC IPB and MDMP, but they've added better targetting, COIN, and MiTT for those lucky few (RUMINT: we get assignments next week). There is probably still room for improvement, especially with adding Security Manager instruction (this is 90% of the actual S2 job unfortunately), but overall I'm impressed with the instruction. My buddy that just graduated MCCC (combined Armor and Infantry) had nothing but good things about the course too. Its getting better, but not fixed.

One can also ask how many disillusioned LTs and CPTs depart...

Poor education and training works its evil from the bottom to the top. You and I talked about the bottom but as you go up, it's sort of telling that the pet song of several AOAC Classes back in my day was "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights." That may have changed and I really hope it has -- but I don't think I want to bet on it just yet.

[Ken White]

I finally got a look at most of the basic / OSUT POI and there are a lot of great things going on -- still too short but progress is there. I get mixed reviews on OBC and generally positive stuff on changes to the CA CCC. If we can keep Outcome Based Training integration going all over that Army, that'll help. It's harder for the instructors but that's okay; it does take more time but that's needed in any event -- and it costs no more.

I think most everyone realizes that we cannot go back to pre 2001, it just takes time to shift the bureaucracy and get the nay sayers (who, like the rich, are always with us...) on board. Training is better than ever IMO -- but still needs work...

Speaking as a one time Bn and Bde Intel Sgt, put that young MSG on all the security Manager stuff so you can do the S2 gig properly. He'll get it done and still have time to help with the other (while hating me for suggesting that to you ).