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Thread: NATO to "Merge" Public Affairs, Info Ops, Psy Ops Offices in AFG?

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  1. #1
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    Interesting thread. Reed, I think most of the criticisms of the article were accurate - Black PSYOP is not deceptive information, but deception of source. Military Deception is part of our toolkit, but from what I understand that's a battlefield thing (my insurgent brothers, I've heard those helicopters have been flying all night, we better keep our heads down).

    I am personally a bit skeptical with the merging of IO and PSYOP, and its closer relationship with PA. But I've been biased by my instructors as SWCS. the PSYOP community, from what I've been told, rejected an offer to put IO under PSYOP, so PSYOP wound up being put under IO. I've heard rumor that this is going to change soon.

    We're taught that the only limit PSYOP has is our creativity, so I can sympathize when PSYOPers feel like there's so much more that can be done.

  2. #2
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    RAND, 30 April 2012: U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001-2010
    The U.S. Marine Corps, which has long recognized the importance of influencing the civilian population in a counterinsurgency environment, requested an evaluation of the effectiveness of the PSYOP element of U.S. military information operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010 based on how well messages and themes were tailored to target audiences. This monograph responds to that request. It summarizes the diverse PSYOP initiatives undertaken, evaluates their effectiveness, identifies strengths and weaknesses, and describes the way forward, including making certain specific recommendations for improvements. Special attention is paid to how well PSYOP initiatives were tailored to target audiences, primarily the Pashtuns who are the dominant population in the conflictive areas and the main support of the Taliban insurgency. It contains reports of specific operations that were successful in achieving objectives, as well as examples of operations that did not resonate with target audiences and even some that had counterproductive effects. The biggest PSYOP successes were in face-to-face communication and the emphasis on meetings with jirgas (local councils of elders), key-leader engagements, and establishing individual relationships with members of the Afghan media. In addition, the concept of every infantryman as a PSYOP officer proved very effective. The most notable shortcoming was the inability to sufficiently counter the Taliban propaganda campaign against U.S. and coalition forces on the theme of civilian casualties, both domestically and internationally...

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