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  1. #681
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default Why??

    The idea behind human terrain teams, or HTTs, is to put a small army of civilian social scientists (ideally anthropologists) and intel-savvy military officers into the field to give brigade commanders a better understanding of local dynamics. The teams are charged with “mapping” social structures, linkages, and priorities, just as a recon team might map physical terrain. By talking to locals the teams might help identify which village elder the commander should deal with or which tribe might be a waste of time; which valley should get a roads project and whether a new road might create a dispute between villages.
    I still don't get this. FACT: This was done, successfully, in Vietnam by SF. No civilians. Is this not the type of mission SF was created for?

    I just hope this is a BS article and has totally got the HTT mission wrong.

    Now, don't get me wrong. The teams are charged with “mapping” social structures, linkages, and priorities, just as a recon team might map physical terrain. By talking to locals the teams might help identify which village elder the commander should deal with or which tribe might be a waste of time - is a very sound military mission, was was routinely done by the British as a matter of course. It's good military common sense. It's called Reconnaissance - and it should be done by soldiers.

    Talking to a village elder and all the other stuff is real time intelligence work. Why does this require anthropologists?
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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Hi Wilf,

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Talking to a village elder and all the other stuff is real time intelligence work. Why does this require anthropologists?
    Shirt answer is that it doesn't require an Anthropologist. The long(er) answer is that you need an Anthropologist in the loop because of potential problems in interpreting the data and, in many cases, even figuring out what questions to ask.

    Wilf, the Brits had a major advantage over the US in having their soldiers do this type of work. A lot of early style ethnography was actually pioneered by serving British military officers, especially in India during the 19th century. But about the only reason that that actually worked well was because of two factors.

    First, the average Brit officer in, say, 1850 or so had a classical education, including Latin and Greek. They were used to dealing with a much longer time horizon than the average US officer, and they also had several other skills that led to an almost automatic comparative attitude (especially multiple languages).

    Second, British colonial officers, or officers in the various company armies, tended to deal with sepoy troops from multiple cultures. Again, that reinforces a comparative perspective when looking at phenomena.

    But both of these are absent with the vast majority of US troops. While I applaud the fact that West Point remains one of the few places where students are required to read the classics, that doesn't mean that it is the same as struggling through Caesar's Gallic Wars, in Latin, at age 10, or reading Arrian at the same age.

    Put simply, British officers had the cultural capital that enabled them to take a long time horizon and have a large historical database to draw on, while most US troops don't. And that time horizon and historical / comparative database are the base requirements for Anthropologists.
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  3. #683
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post

    Wilf, the Brits had a major advantage over the US in having their soldiers do this type of work. A lot of early style ethnography was actually pioneered by serving British military officers, especially in India during the 19th century. But about the only reason that that actually worked well was because of two factors.
    Marc mate, I agree with you on one level, but..

    British Officers were doing this well into the 1970's both in the Arabian Peninsular and to some extent, Ulster.

    Charting tribal, social, family and even ethnic associations are all Standard practice in Small War Intelligence work. It is something that the US has done before. - Vietnam, Indian War, etc etc. - and it is not something of recent invention, or insight.

    What is more, why is the US aiming to develop this skills set, with the aim of deploying no civilians?
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    Council Member Van's Avatar
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    Wilf,
    The cynical answer is that employing soldiers for this mission doesn't create lucrative, long term contracts.

    A more pragmatic answer is the classic "Solutions: good, fast, cheap; pick one" (Normally pick two, but with issues of this magnitude....) We chose fast. I would argue the good solution (neither fast nor cheap) is to pick bright soldiers at the end of boot camp but before AIT and tell them that they have a unique opportunity to go to college for a full ride scholorship, and fast track to warrent rank as Athropology specialists. The cheap solution (relatively and neither fast nor as good) would be a six to nine month, intensive course in ethnographic reconnaissance and language school.

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    Council Member max161's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    This should be a case study in CGSC (or for LTG Caldwell) of piss poor PAO operations.

    WTF, let's send the major reporter out with a 1LT and a stressed out guard unit. Good idea.

    *sigh*
    I would not necessarily blame the PAO in this case unless he recommended approval this embed with the LT. Where was the chain of command? Whose chain of command is this LT and his HTT in? What message was the chain of command to whom this LT belongs trying to send? I think we all read what message was received? There are a lot of issues in this article. What was that HUMINT team all about? In the hard copy edition the guy was all kitted out and wearing BDUs so either it was not a recent photo or the guy was not Army (which might explain why he did not know that the Army has THTs tactical HUMINT teams which I do not think go around snatching villagers out of bed at night). And talk about sensational journalism: Did Steve Fondacaro really give an interview for 9 hours and after 7 hours got up, walked into a door, broke his jaw, and then continued to talk for 2 more hours? Just a few thoughts.
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Van View Post
    I would argue the good solution (neither fast nor cheap) is to pick bright soldiers at the end of boot camp but before AIT and tell them that they have a unique opportunity to go to college for a full ride scholorship, and fast track to warrent rank as Athropology specialists.
    OK, but does the task require a fully trained anthropologist? Really? This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity designed to aid on the defeating of insurgents. Why have Anthropologists?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Van's Avatar
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    OK, but does the task require a fully trained anthropologist? Really? This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity designed to aid on the defeating of insurgents. Why have Anthropologists?
    Come on now,Wilf. In the Small War application, this is a subset of intelligence. Cultural norms, taboos, perceived interests, values, moralities, etc, all that Anthro stuff, shapes the commanders' options. But you're well aware of this already. Given the way you word your objection, maybe the ethnographic reconnaissance/language school is a better course of action. We don't need fully trained and qualified Special Forces operators to develop the commander's picture of the human terrain, nor do we need people with graduate degrees in anthropology, but it is a specialized discipline that we haven't developed a structured doctrine for yet.

    This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity...
    On reflection, are you sure you want to stand by this position? What is the difference between a PSYOP and a marketing campaign? Both are activities designed and executed to modify the behavior of a target audience. Developing ethnograpic intelligence or anthropology; the difference is who is using it, and for what rather than the actual functions of the personnel conducting the work.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Van View Post
    We don't need fully trained and qualified Special Forces operators to develop the commander's picture of the human terrain, nor do we need people with graduate degrees in anthropology, but it is a specialized discipline that we haven't developed a structured doctrine for yet.
    Concur, so I see this as being a function of HUMINT. Human as in the most precise meaning of HUMAN. Its about gathering information to inform a commanders decisions, so it's intelligence.
    Dare I say "Human intelligence preparation of the battlefield." Seems like common sense to me, - which is what IPB should have been, but never was!

    What is the difference between a PSYOP and a marketing campaign? Both are activities designed and executed to modify the behavior of a target audience.
    Well I suspect we might disagree here. I see PSYOPS as being usefully limited to being things that break to enemies will to continue, or to dissuaded folks from doing something that is against your interest.
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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    OK, but does the task require a fully trained anthropologist? Really? This is not a exercise on Anthropology. It's a military activity designed to aid on the defeating of insurgents. Why have Anthropologists?
    Wilf, I think its fair to say in theory that anthropologists who have spent a dozen full-time years of graduate and post-graduate work on (say) kinship relations or local customary law, who have been through considerable training in research methodology, and who may have spent considerable time living and working among local populations, might know a thing or two about how local social dynamics work out on the ground that others aren't likely to pick up.

    On the other hand, I agree with you that this is, in essence, an intel function. It is neither appropriate nor useful for the HTS to pretend its just a set of neutral social scientists who happened to have arms/armed escorts.

    Moreover, while I can see the benefits above in theory (and, after all, the existing intel community already has people in it with social science specializations for precisely that reason), it is not at all clear to me that:

    • the mere fact of graduate training in the social sciences makes you an effective HTSer (indeed, I would think only a relatively small proportion of scholars would do the job well).
    • the current recruitment system is recruiting the right kind of people (although I'm sure there are some excellent HTSers). In fairness, people with meaningful expertise in the current geographic areas of interest aren't that common, and post 9/11 there is huge competing demand for them in the academic and (other) government agency job market.
    • the system benefits from all the hoopla and high profile that surrounds it, some of which seems to be self-inflicted.
    • the system couldn't have been better designed as an add-on to existing capacities (albeit with some effort made to assure that it offers a distinctive and valuable analytical product).
    • whatever the value of specialists (and I'm one), we shouldn't underestimate the overwhelming value of common sense and empathy (not necessarily sympathy, but the ability to put yourself in someone else's shoes) in undertaking analysis. Given the choice between a PhD without those, and a smart analyst or operator with them, I would take the latter in most circumstances.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Wilf, I think its fair to say in theory that anthropologists who have spent a dozen full-time years of graduate and post-graduate work on (say) kinship relations or local customary law, who have been through considerable training in research methodology, and who may have spent considerable time living and working among local populations, might know a thing or two about how local social dynamics work out on the ground that others aren't likely to pick up.
    ...but where would that not be true? Does the LAPD gang unit use Anthropologists in LA to understand the dynamics of local gangs in relation to immigrant communities? Maybe it should, but that does not make the case for having civilian scientist acting as part of your formation ISTAR capability. On that I think we are agreed.
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    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Some good food for thought that has been rumbling around in my backbrain for a while now.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Marc mate, I agree with you on one level, but..

    British Officers were doing this well into the 1970's both in the Arabian Peninsular and to some extent, Ulster.
    Agreed, although I suspect that some of that happened as a result of regimental tradition (it's a guess, but....).

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Charting tribal, social, family and even ethnic associations are all Standard practice in Small War Intelligence work. It is something that the US has done before. - Vietnam, Indian War, etc etc. - and it is not something of recent invention, or insight.
    Again, I agree. I'd take it back further to the Lewis & Clark expedition and the ethnographic questionnaires they were required to complete on their journey (something not usually taught in Anthro courses, along with the minor fact that Albert Gallatin, who was one of the founding fathers of the American Ethnological Society, was involved in creating those questionnaires ).

    I'm still trying to think this through but, at the moment, I am inclined to make the following observations:


    • The British had a tradition of Officers being "Gentlemen" which carried with it certain assumptions about types of education, attitude, etc. (along with the ability to buy your commission ).
    • One of these assumption, the "classical education", actually mirrors a lot of the reading in the old Roman system of PME (I've got an excruciating paper on it if anyone wants to read it).
    • A lot of this reading is in the tradition of thought from Hecateus of Miletus, through Herodotus, Lucian and Tacitus; i.e. the same roots as a lot of cultural Anthropology.
    • In addition to being the ground for modern Anthropology (I know some will disagree with me, but I can certainly back that assertion up), the same tradition produced what we can broadly called "military ethnographies" such as Tacitus' Germania and Brittania, Arrian's work, and Chapter XI of the Strategikon of Maurice. They also gave rise to Jeffersonian "ethnography" (i.e. "ethnography" as for both scholarly inetrest and political-military intelligence).

    So, when you say "it is not something of recent invention", I'm smiling ! It goes back a lot farther than most people want to talk about.

    Anyway, that last observation leads me to think about your and Rex's point

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    On the other hand, I agree with you [Wilf] that this is, in essence, an intel function. It is neither appropriate nor useful for the HTS to pretend its just a set of neutral social scientists who happened to have arms/armed escorts.
    You know, I think I'm going to have to partially disagree, more as a matter of trying to clarify things (in my mind) than anything else. My concern is that ethnographic knowledge may and at times is an intel function, but that that is not the sum total of it.

    One of the things that came clear to me when I was writing that horrid paper last year on ethnographic knowledge in the Romano-Byzantine military tradition was that there was a point at which the knowledge became dangerous to the State (e.g. it made revolts too easy amongst other things). This led me to thinking about the functional type of ethnographic knowledge that was operationally useful for the military which, in a really round about way, brings me back to a lot of the questions Rex notes about the HTS.

    Do you need someone with a graduate degree in Anthropology (or the social science) to produce operationally relevant, working ethnographic knowledge (that was the term I used in the paper)? Nope. Heck, that type of material can be pretty much produced by almost anyone who has some training and the right mind set.

    Where something like the HTS, at least in theory, plays an appropriate role would be in situations where you are going into the realm of politics and de facto cultural engineering. If you have military commanders doing this, which we do at the moment, then they will need that level of ethnographic knowledge.

    The potential problem, at least as I am perceiving it right now, is that there seems to be a real disconnect with actually integrating ethnographic knowledge of any type (outside of the "don't eat with your left hand" level). Anyway, I'm still mulling all this over and waiting for the light bulb to go off....

    PS. Steve wanted to be a masochist and read the paper, so here is the link to it (pdf, ~250k).
    Last edited by marct; 01-25-2009 at 06:58 PM.
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Does the LAPD gang unit use Anthropologists in LA to understand the dynamics of local gangs in relation to immigrant communities?
    I would be very surprised if the LAPD doesn't sometimes use consultant anthropologists/criminologists/sociologists, actually. The RCMP, CSIS, and the DoJ certainly does here.

    The difference with domestic LE, however, is that the consultant base is on location all the time as a matter of course, doing much of the kind of research you might be interested in, and can be given short-term contracts. In war zones you would have to go about securing that resource in a different way.

    Moreover, the LAPD will be dealing with LA gangs until the end of time (and then some, if all the post-apocalyptic science fiction movies that I so love are anything to go by).

    Militaries, on the other hand, need to be able to develop area- or issue-specific surge analysis capacities to meet current operational needs, which may be very different a few years down the line. I can see this coming from contracted social scientists where in-house uniformed capacities are unable to meet this (in which case, you're exactly right--it wouldn't be part of your "regular" formation ISTAR capability).

    This is all separate from how well the current HTS system is actually doing this at the moment, an issue on which I really don't have enough information to judge, but do have some concerns.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I think that's all quite correct.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Militaries, on the other hand, need to be able to develop area- or issue-specific surge analysis capacities to meet current operational needs, which may be very different a few years down the line. I can see this coming from contracted social scientists where in-house uniformed capacities are unable to meet this (in which case, you're exactly right--it wouldn't be part of your "regular" formation ISTAR capability).

    This is all separate from how well the current HTS system is actually doing this at the moment, an issue on which I really don't have enough information to judge, but do have some concerns.
    You, Sir, are a master of understatement -- I have major concerns about it even though I acknowledge the need in the paragraph above. My perception is that the downsizing and shoving under the bus of the Foreign Area Officer program by the Army was a terrible mistake...

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    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
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    Very interesting discussion: There are three things that haven't been mentioned so far, that I think are germane to the issue.

    First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units. I'm glad they're special, but they do nothing for me, in terms of ethnographic information.

    Second, I believe one of the primary purposes of HTS, is to re-engage the academic soft sciences into the military. And while we're at it, I am sick and tired of hearing about how Anthropology is drama-queening all the attention. It's not just about them. Frankly, I'd pick a military vet with a poli sci degree over an Anthro PhD every day of the week. Whether the HTS, or whatever it morphs into is too late for this particular war is immaterial. This is prototyping for future conflict, and as such has merit.

    Third, I see nowhere in the regular Army where the kind of skill-set necessary for ethnography or creative problem solving are truly encouraged. The Army would find a way to pick out those "special soldiers" after basic to put them through school to be ethnographers, and at the end of those years of development, would be considered just another warm body for SDO, and whatever #### detail they could dream up. And in the process, that sharp person would become just another acculturated and compliant soldier.

    A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.

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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Some really good points, 120....

    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units. I'm glad they're special, but they do nothing for me, in terms of ethnographic information.
    Well, I have no idea if they are doing something like this, but I would be very surprised if they weren't. That said, if it doesn't get out to the regular Army units, it's irrelevant. Just out of interest, let me toss out two hypotheticals. If SF is doing something similar, would you be in favour (hypothetically) in having their material distributed? Second, if they aren't doing something like this, do you think they would be a good place to lodge such a program IFF the material was distributed properly?

    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    Second, I believe one of the primary purposes of HTS, is to re-engage the academic soft sciences into the military. And while we're at it, I am sick and tired of hearing about how Anthropology is drama-queening all the attention. It's not just about them. Frankly, I'd pick a military vet with a poli sci degree over an Anthro PhD every day of the week. Whether the HTS, or whatever it morphs into is too late for this particular war is immaterial. This is prototyping for future conflict, and as such has merit.
    Several good observations here...

    1. Yes, re-engaging with the social sciences and, especially, the qualitative side was part of the purpose.

    2. But it's FUN!!!!!! (writes he in a whiny tone of voice)

    NB: This picture is purely for illustrative purposes and is NOT meant to be a representation of any Anthropologist living, dead, or somewhere in between.

    3. I can see why you would prefer a PoliSci person with a military background and how they could certainly be useful. Personally, I think it's more a combination of attitude and skill set rather than any particular degree per se.

    4. You're quite correct that it is protyping, whether for future conflicts or for current ones in the future. That said, and given the often infuriating constraints on getting programs through and deployed, I would like to see a lot of thought going into the exact roles of such teams.

    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    Third, I see nowhere in the regular Army where the kind of skill-set necessary for ethnography or creative problem solving are truly encouraged. The Army would find a way to pick out those "special soldiers" after basic to put them through school to be ethnographers, and at the end of those years of development, would be considered just another warm body for SDO, and whatever #### detail they could dream up. And in the process, that sharp person would become just another acculturated and compliant soldier.
    Probably true . The history of the FAO program would certainly indicate some type of marginalization would happen.

    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.
    Ummm, are you sure you want to do that ? Much as I would love to see some politicians preaching the values of solidarity and socialism in the Swat Valley, I suspect that they would be even more useless that ...., sheesh, anyone I can think of!
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units...
    They don't keep it to themselves -- with some dumbass exceptions; most will willingly share -- an equal or greater problem is that some dumbass regular army units don't listen.
    ...And in the process, that sharp person would become just another acculturated and compliant soldier.
    Not everyone's all that compliant. I spent 45 years in it fighting compliance almost all that time. I know a lot of guys who wouldn't succumb. You've been around the system a while -- are you compliant?
    A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.
    We did that in Viet Nam, it was called CORDS and it worked. Worked very well, in fact. DoD didn't like that, the Generals didn't like that and Congress didn't like that. DoD didn't because their money was being spent by USAID. The Generals didn't because COIN is tedious, messy, dirty, lengthy and not predominately a military effort, it messed up the tidy Army in many ways. Congress didn't like it because it was expensive and required too much clout be given the Executive branch. Practicality and effectiveness were not items of concern.

    So we decided not to do that. Until we had to do that and everyone had forgotten how. That's with a State Department and and Army with some continuity in charge -- and now you want to put politicians who roll over at two, four and six year intervals in charge...

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    First, everyone mentions SF, and why they aren't doing this. Frankly, for all I know, SF IS doing this, but if you are in a regular army unit, you will never ever find out, as SF keeps all this wonderful information to themselves. Which is why SF CANNOT be allowed "in the loop" for developing ethnographic information for regular Army units. I'm glad they're special, but they do nothing for me, in terms of ethnographic information.
    So what you are saying is that SF is not fit for purpose and the Army lacks the command authority to fix the problem? This is a mission that USSF have done and have done successfully.

    • Second, I believe one of the primary purposes of HTS, is to re-engage the academic soft sciences into the military.
    • This is prototyping for future conflict, and as such has merit.
    Why do you want academic soft sciences in the field? Didn't need them before. Their engagement gets them money, so I guess they're happy.

    How do you know what has merit in future conflict? What you do know, is discernible from past conflict. HTTs did not figure in any of the previous COIN conflicts. From all I have read, I see HTTs being a targeting and information gathering asset. Ethnography is information and it is put to military use, which should, when required, mean the use of lethal force.
    That is not something civilians should be doing.

    A lot of these issues could be solved by putting the DoD out of the counterinsurgency business. If you accept that counterinsurgency is a political problem, then put politicians in charge of it.
    Well all war is a political problem and politicians are in charge of it. That's pure Clausewitz. Any Army that sees COIN as a distinct and separate form of warfare is guilty of gross stupidity. COIN is warfare. Normal Warfare practices apply, and are adapted accordingly.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    They don't keep it to themselves -- with some dumbass exceptions; most will willingly share -- an equal or greater problem is that some dumbass regular army units don't listen.
    I get the dumbass regular army thing; however, I only get info from SF guys over beer, once they realize that you're "okay". That is a two-edged blade.

    Not everyone's all that compliant. I spent 45 years in it fighting compliance almost all that time. I know a lot of guys who wouldn't succumb. You've been around the system a while -- are you compliant?
    I'm also irrelevant. I see a trend with an inverse relationship between compliancy and relevancy. But that is just basic large group dynamics, the more I think about it.

    We did that in Viet Nam, it was called CORDS and it worked. Worked very well, in fact. DoD didn't like that, the Generals didn't like that and Congress didn't like that. DoD didn't because their money was being spent by USAID. The Generals didn't because COIN is tedious, messy, dirty, lengthy and not predominately a military effort, it messed up the tidy Army in many ways. Congress didn't like it because it was expensive and required too much clout be given the Executive branch. Practicality and effectiveness were not items of concern.

    So we decided not to do that. Until we had to do that and everyone had forgotten how. That's with a State Department and and Army with some continuity in charge -- and now you want to put politicians who roll over at two, four and six year intervals in charge...
    That is the rub, isn't it?

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Why do you want academic soft sciences in the field? Didn't need them before. Their engagement gets them money, so I guess they're happy.
    But prior to 1969 or so, academic soft sciences WERE major contributors to military efforts. Pigeon-guided bombs, anyone?

    How do you know what has merit in future conflict? What you do know, is discernible from past conflict. HTTs did not figure in any of the previous COIN conflicts. From all I have read, I see HTTs being a targeting and information gathering asset. Ethnography is information and it is put to military use, which should, when required, mean the use of lethal force.
    That is not something civilians should be doing.
    We embed civilian journalists in military units, don't we? And I think it is short-sighted to view HTTs as targeting assets. Where intel weenies decide which doors to kick down, HTTs should be advising commanders on why they shouldn't kick down the door in the first place.

    The military commander is pre-loaded to go after that weapons cache; maybe we need someone who is politically astute to explain to the military types that one military cache will not win or lose the war. But kicking down doors MAY lose it. And, frankly, HTTs become more of a POLAD than anything else, pushed down to the lower levels.

    HTTs are also useful in teaching lower level soldiers on what to look for, beyond the "don't stare at their women and don't shake with the left hand" thing.

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    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    We embed civilian journalists in military units, don't we? And I think it is short-sighted to view HTTs as targeting assets. Where intel weenies decide which doors to kick down, HTTs should be advising commanders on why they shouldn't kick down the door in the first place.
    Journalists are tourists. No one pretends they contribute anything.
    To kick or not kick is not really the problem. That comes down to good behaviour, and common sense.

    ... but HTTs are working for the military. That means that have to have some military utility. They must be useful. The military has a defined mission and that is what the HTTs have to support. The military is not there to enable the HTTs to gather information of Ethnographic interest.
    Surely their job is to furnish information in support of the mission? Isn't that an S2 function?

    Is it a civil affairs function?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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