Farsighted academics

[jmm99]

The present Grundgesetz is here. Its Wiki article is here, and describes its background:

The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (German: Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) is the constitution[1] of Germany. It was formally approved on May 8, 1949 and, with the signature of the Allies, came into effect on May 23, 1949 as the de facto constitution of West Germany.

The German word Grundgesetz may be translated as either Basic Law or Fundamental Law. The term Verfassung (constitution) was not used, as the drafters regarded the Grundgesetz as a provisional document, to be replaced by the constitution of a future united Germany. This was not possible in the context of the Cold War and the communist orientation of the Soviet occupation zone, which later in 1949 proclaimed itself the German Democratic Republic, dividing Germany into two states.

Forty years later, in 1990, Germany finally reunified when the GDR peacefully joined the West German Federal Republic of Germany. After reunification, the Basic Law remained in force, having proved itself as a stable foundation for the thriving democracy in West Germany that had emerged from the ruins of World War II. Some changes were made to the law in 1990, mostly pertaining to reunification, such as to the preamble. Additional major amendments to and modifications of the Basic Law were made in 1994, 2002 and 2006.

and adds:

The idea for the creation of the Basic Law came originally from the three western occupying powers. In view of the Nazi usurpation of Germany's prewar Weimar Constitution, they made their approval of the creation of a new German state conditional on:

a complete rejection of the ideology that the German people are a master race (German: Herrenrasse) — superior to others, born to be leaders, and entitled to commit genocide, or barbaric treatment of those not belonging to it;

an unequivocal commitment to the inviolability and inalienability of human rights.

Unfortunately, Wiki cites no source for the interplay between the 3 Allied Powers and the soon to be revived German state.

Shades of "The Third Man" - yes, I know that was Vienna, but the post-WWII - pre-Cold War interval was a complicated interlude - and "Young Frankenstein" - coming back to haunt us.

[Surferbeetle]

Shades of "The Third Man" - yes, I know that was Vienna, but the post-WWII - pre-Cold War interval was a complicated interlude - and "Young Frankenstein" - coming back to haunt us.

Young Frankenstein...a true classic!

While wandering around the internet I stumbled across The National Interest website (I make no claims about this website one way or the other - but find that some of the articles on Germany and Russia, in particular, intelligently provide some background and points/counterpoints to consider on our topic)

Ich Bin Ein Berliner?
by Donald K. Bandler and A. Wess Mitchel

Even if the new administration makes progress on all of these fronts, it is unlikely to be able to restore U.S.-German cooperation to its previous levels anytime soon. For the first time in more than a generation, seismic geopolitical shifts—a restive Russia, a stalling EU and an over-stretched America—have begun to change, perhaps fundamentally, the way America’s German ally looks at itself and its role on the wider transatlantic stage. Eventually, President Obama should be prepared to confront these challenges head-on and engage Berlin in a comprehensive discussion about the fundamentals of the relationship. For now, it will be enough to get the two talking and acting constructively again

Unfortunately I can no longer provide a working link to the articles on Russia at this website which I was able to read yesterday; Dimitri K. Simes as well as Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes had articles available. Suffice to say they intelligently challenge my view of Russia.

[Schmedlap]

The latest issue also has a good article by "evil neocon" Richard Perle, discussing the debate surrounding why we went into Iraq. I'm pretty sure it's available to non-subscribers.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20486

So if it was not a neocon master plan, how did we end up invading Iraq? What were the considerations that led Bush to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime by force? What was the role of neoconservatives in his decision to go to war in Iraq? Many people believe they know the answer to these questions because so much has been written, with seeming authority, by so many commentators. Could 50 million blogs be wrong?

[jmm99]

got this right (IMO):

(article linked by Schmedlap)
The seminal error was, in my view, the failure to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis immediately after Saddam’s regime collapsed. History does not allow instant replays so we will never know whether that policy could have averted the disastrous insurgency—carried out by Saddam loyalists and foreign jihadists—sustained by terror, the incitement of confessional and ethnic divisions, and outside assistance. Had Iraq been enabled to stand up an interim government pending free elections to be held in, say, eighteen months, we might well have escaped the invidious role of an occupier. In blundering from liberation to occupation, we opened the way to nearly five years of suffering that only now, with the progress of the “surge,” is finally subsiding.

Perle, however, follows this up with the argument that Iraqi governance ought to have been turned over to the "DoD Iraqi Exile Group" - Ahmad Chalabi and others. There are many negative takes on Chalabi (including the agency's burn notice of many years standing).

One is found in Operation Hotel California, which is here - read the sans serif typeface portion by Sam Faddis & chose to ignore or read the rest by his co-author. Faddis tells quite a bit about the runup to Gulf II (OIF I) - AQ WMD production in Kurdistan, WMD intelligence from Iraq, incompetent Iraqi exiles, etc.

Sam Faddis has a blog - local home town type - which is here. This guy seems credible (also a fav comment by at least one ex-agency person who disagreed with him about Panetta).

PS: Sbee - I like Steve Cohen's stuff on Russia - which is a bit strange given my own politics. In any event, he is here and here - and quite a few other places.

[bourbon]

Perle, however, follows this up with the argument that Iraqi governance ought to have been turned over to the "DoD Iraqi Exile Group" - Ahmad Chalabi and others. There are many negative takes on Chalabi (including the agency's burn notice of many years standing).

Ahmad Chalabi is at best an Iranian agent of influence, and his organization was reportedly penetrated on every level by the Iranian's. (Jeff Stein reported on Chalabi's recent activities in October.)

After all that has since come out about Chalabi and company, Richard Perle still says this is the guy/group we should have handed the country over to. Richard Perle has no shame.

[Ken White]

to who. Or why. I'm not a fan and never have been, he was not particularly effective as the ASecDef for International Security Policy in the Reagan Admin.

However, I do agree with him that staying to 'occupy' Iraq was not a good idea and I agree that the guy who messed it up -- Bremer -- was not one of Perle's in-crowd. As for Chalibi, more to him than that. He's a chameleon, no question but the CIA had and has their own agenda...

[jmm99]

After reading over (several times) the Faddis portion of the book, it is not at all clear what the CIA HQs' overall agenda for Iraq was - except as it related to his in-country team.

Beyond the Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction report, which is here, and associated WMD stuff, including the Niger stuff,

1. How much agency involvement was there in the run-up to OIF1 ?

2. Did it have an overall agenda in that situation ?