I would have to offer, that at least in my personal experience right at this moment, ODAs can at times have very specific agendas, like the mentoring and development of CT or "I-SWAT" teams that puts that effort at odds with the larger business of doing those things you mentioned ODB. Again, it is my current observation here in N. Iraq; results elsewhere may vary.

What I will also offer is the rant that I think it is totally presumtuous for a HTT to draft a report on the goings-on in my TF's AO, without ever setting one foot on the ground, talking with one single local national (to say nothing about taling with sheikhs, muktars, and men-on-the-stree), or perusing the conditions at any local market. So then how can that HTT presume to write a report about tribal and ethnic tensions on an electoral process, when we already know what their executive summary says? This same report smells exactly as if they simply read intentions reports and intelligence summaries and then slapped their own shade of lipstick on the baboon's ass. It remains a baboon's ass, however.

The problem lies in the fact that the folks who are tasked with employing aspects of HTT support just don't frigging know how to do it, and at time don't want to be bothered...Right as I got into country, the non-kinetic effects manager of our higher headquarters was concerned about the pending arrival of a human terrain team to his command, and he frankly did not know what to do with them, in part because he did not have the exposure, training, or both. I pointed him in the direction of this Council and the data repository of the Journal, in the hope that he would get enough read-in information to avoid getting steam-rolled by any agenda. Heck, he already had a huge wall chart of reconstruction project information that was in various states of disarray. He "got it" but he had neither the staff or time to manage the volume of the effort as effectively as he probably could have. And then a HTT gets tossed into the mix?

I was a huge fan of the PRT concept when I first read about much of it here within this very board. In pratical terms, there is anecdotal information that many battalion commanders find the PRT and embedded PRT efforts as a distraction, waste of time, and often very counter to their understanding of the commander's intent that was received from their higher headquarters. You know what they say about there not being any "I" in team, and I have already dealt with two PRT guys who have impressed me as being almost egocentric to the point that they could not possibly hear and understand what we were saying in response to their ideas and commentary. Couple that with this looming sense of zero movement on about anything that really needs to get done, and it is downright frustrating.

To cite just one example, we had a supporting PRT lead show up and try to pitch his development ideas to my boss, but he continued to harp on the red-tape he had to go through (some 17 steps with DoS) to get a project implemented via his channels. He wanted, however, to support our Task Force's efforts by assisting us with employing our funds to spin up the same sort of project. To all this, my boss told him basically thanks, but no thanks. Why should he utilize his money for something that should be a matter led by State in the first place?...and if it was hard because of the 17 steps, then maybe it just wan't meant to be performed by his TF either.

In just this past year or so, I have begun to rage against the degree with which we are outsourcing so much capability, and the PRTs and HTTs are starting to frustrate me, right along with the Law ENforcement Professional program, which at least for my TF, has turned out to be a bust and is about three years too late.