I wanted to thank you guys, let you know how the debate went, and formally introduce myself. I’m sorry that I didn’t do that to begin with, please forgive me.

My name is Laurel McCormack. Faye Valentine is a femme fatale from a favorite TV series. Anyhow, I came into college thinking I wanted to be a photojournalist but knowing I wanted to do something with international affairs. We’ll see what comes of it.

I won the debate! After hearing first my and then my opponent’s case, the class voted between conventional and counterinsurgency techniques and which they thought the army should be focusing on. The score: 22 people for COIN and 2 for conventional. This is even cooler, because usually the class comes in having already made up their minds from the case study we all have to read, and the case study had more to back up conventional warfare. I’ve outlined my main points for you guys, not because it is an infallible or even great argument, but because I thought you might be interested to see what someone who’s only just got into this stuff pulled out of it.
1) Afghanistan and Iraq became deadly because the U.S. was not prepared to fight insurgents. Conventional war techniques DO NOT work in insurgency warfare, as the large amount of U.S. casualties at the middle of these wars prove, when insurgents began their attacks. Later successes in Iraq were because specific leaders were able to teach their troops counterinsurgency. In Iraq, U.S. troop causalities dropped by two-thirds from 2006 to 2008. There were only a fourth as many Iraqi civilian casualties in 2008 as 2006.
2) COIN makes troops stronger, not weaker. Opponents argue that insurgents are not skilled enemies and will not be hard to fight. They can be far more dangerous than drafted soldiers in a huge state military (using the 7th cavalry’s experience in Baghdad in 2003 as an example). They know their terrain like the back of their hands, they believe wholly in what they’re fighting for, and they do not adhere to the rules and etiquette of conventional warfare, so anything goes. As a result, troops have to become extremely mentally flexible and adaptive out of necessity. As the Counterinsurgency Field Manual states, “In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly usually wins.” You’re going to become more disciplined, accurate, aware, and flexible, not less so. Counterinsurgency used to be regulated only to the Special Forces A-Team. Throughout history, they’ve gotten into big conventional fights and are renowned for how well they do in them. It is easier to switch from COIN warfare to conventional than vice-versa.
3) Of course pulling from Nagl, we must prepare for immediate dangers first. It is guaranteed that we will continue to need counterinsurgency in the next few years, and not at all that sure that we will be fighting on huge fronts again. It is irresponsible to put more emphasis on hypothetical future wars than the wars we are committed to right now. Learning before deployment results in fewer lives lost in combat. According to the COIN field manual, America’s military history is mostly stability operations. Out of hundreds of U.S. military operations since the American Revolution, only 11 were conventional wars. As Lt. Col. Steve Leonard states, the most the most likely threats to America will come from failing states rather than aggressor states, which are “breeding grounds for the threats that we fear the most, criminal networks, international terrorists, ethnic strife, genocide."

My opponent pulled her argument entirely from our textbook’s case study on counterinsurgency. She made three main arguments:
1) Conventional warfare is where we’ve had success in the past, what we’re known for.
2) From Gentile, cited in our textbook, “the Israeli Army that stumbled its way into south Lebanon in 2006 received a sharp response by Hezbollah fighters who operated like-small unit infantry. One of the reasons for the Israeli Army's poor performance… was their heavy focus on counterinsurgency operations in the Palestinian territories for the six preceding years.”
3) What if a nuclear arms race begins with Iran or China? Counterinsurgency will not help then.

In regards to her arguments, I said it is inadequate to cite an Israeli example of this when we do not have much evidence that this is true for U.S. troops. And also that if a true nuclear war begins, arguing between COIN and conventional warfare won’t be particularly important anymore, but if we were going to have to choose, counterinsurgency would still be more effective unless we invoked the Powell Doctrine before they began to fire anything off.

I prepared by pulling all-nighters and reading every article you guys recommended, along with some others that the man who directed me to you guys recommended. I owe each of you a huge thank you for tolerating my elementary questions and being willing to share your knowledge and passion for this topic with me. That being said, I can’t stop reading about it now. I already understand more world news and make connections everywhere, including while reading Plato’s “The Republic” last night when Socrates says, “Surely the same person is a good guardian of an army who is also good at getting to know the enemies’ deliberations and other actions by stealth?” I will definitely continue to read and learn from your discussions.

I’m assuming you guys already know that there is a large article in my afore-mentioned textbook (Global Issues, Selections from the CQ Researcher, 2009 edition), in the counterinsurgency case study chapter called, “Officers Cross Swords in Online Debate,” and it is almost entirely about Small Wars Journal, citing both articles and posts from the following users on this forums: Buck Elton, Gian P. Gentile, Peter Mansoor, “Cavguy,” and Charles J. Dunlap. As I’d already posted my question and read a lot from this site before I read the chapter, I freaked out. I’d be happy to try and photocopy it and link it for you guys.

Once more, thank you so much. Really. I will be around. In fact, I’ve got two more specific questions, though they are just as elementary. What are some specific instances at any point in history where U.S. troops have had success in switching from COIN to conventional warfare? Also, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...rategy-and-th/, Tim Starr said, “If we focus solely upon conventional preparation, our enemies will hit us unconventionally. If we focus solely upon unconventional operations, our enemies will hit us conventionally.” It seems to me that this is true. I’m glad to be able to learn about all of this, but does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online or for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards?

That’s all. Whew.