The challenge of Institutionalizing Adaption - the question SASC did not ask SECDEF

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Steve,
Marc and I have talked allot about this. This month he and I presented the SFA Case Study (you can find it on the journal) to a group of analysts and other members of the Modeling and Sim community as part of a TRAC sponsored event at the Army Analysis Center on Belvoir. We'd been invited as that community is discussing alternate ways to better answer questions associated with IW-the case study methodology being "a" way to get beyond regular M&S. Marc hit them hard with questions concerning epistemology and "why" we believe what we believe. This is a very relevant question to institutionalization of adaptation and innovation. BTW-Marc will soon be publishing an additional chapter to the Case Study which will get into the box of "beliefs" as they relate to advising.

This question of why we believe what we believe is related to looking for ways to reinforce what we (or our bosses) believe, counter what we wish not to believe, and trying to confine our methods of exploration to those which are in line with the latter.

I mentioned Bob Killebrew's piece above because it is a symbol of a larger paradigm shift where we must move into support of the HN and constrain ourselves to where our interests overlap. Yes we can still make choices, but there are fewer, and they have consequences of a different nature. Bob and I were on the same panel at an event and I remarked that the U.S, military at this point (a point further in the future) in our campaign discussion was not doing COIN in its DoD role - this did not mean that all USG activities were not leading some facet of a COIN campaign. The US military at the point under discussion was largely supporting the development of HN security forces (in a FID context), and providing support to other JIIM participants.

There was some serious debate on that, one person remarked that would not play well because we'd just expended a great deal of effort to get the US military to wrap its mind around COIN, and now I was suggesting that we were no longer leading COIN in this phase of a campaign. Yes, you bet that is exactly what I was suggesting - the conditions and objectives had changed and now we must adapt our operational approach to further the objective. However, I also remarked that we may be hip deep leading COIN somewhere else, possibly somewhere that we are not even contemplating now as a result of an action we could not foresee or of which the consequences led to an event we did not anticipate. We could also be blind to the consequences of some other state's or group's objectives that call for us to respond in another manner. This is why I say that the SASC and HASC should not only be concerned with one capability, but all relevant capabilities and these begin with having a flexible, adaptable and innovative mind set.

While it is the "hard won knowledge of war" in that it is about understanding that in order to succeed you must understand the "Clausewitzian" nature of war (Marc's page also has a good link to a superb discussion on the "Chicago Boyz" blog about Clausewitz) and that as things occur in the operational environment they must be accounted for in our assessments - meaning the theory that got you there is overcome by reality - and as such we must adapt.

So yes I do have some ideas - but its more difficult than just pitching an idea. Its about establishing the relevance of "why" we should do one thing over another. This gets back to Marc's points you mention.As an institution we have to accept that war (and the ways we wage it) requires the institution at least support the adaptation required on the ground. I'm not sure we do that well. For all the discussion by the M&S community, the search goes on for models that we can point to for support of our risk averse institutional decision making - "well, the model supports it..., so this is the way we should go." Indeed we are far more comfortable with Jomini than Clausewitz because Jomini seems to say that any __________ can do this job given they follow the list. We do this even though implicitly at the lower levels we know it requires art to pull it off under certain conditions - conditions which are subject to change, and as such are difficult to anticipate.

This is my problem when I see leaders look for templates, reach almost exclusively for the "O" or the "M" in DOTMLPF. I think we can and must do better,but for the reasons I mentioned in the opening post (and some I probably missed) we can't, won't or don't. When we do poorly , we reinforce self imposed institutional constraints and constrained thinking. So while we may have some ideas on ways to improve institutional adaptation and innovation, it may be the Archimedian lever for doing so is too short and too weak because the level of self interest and individual apathy may be too great.

I applaud the Secretary of Defense for his efforts, and I think he as a leader understands the issue (I don't think Congress as a body does - although I've met 2 members of the HASC who do I believe - as a "body" I think its counter to their nature and at odds with their other priorities). His testimony on the challenges of leading DoD bear it out. I also know a few in the military education arena who are working on this at various levels, and who subscribe to the idea that education is for preparing for the unknown.

In my opinion, this should be our focus. The rest of the DOTMLP-F should be nested in the idea that our ability to adapt faster than our enemies and innovate at all levels is the key achieving our objectives and reducing risk (tactical, operational, strategic and institutional).

Best, Rob