Unified National Will as an Instrument of National Power

[Around Midnight]

Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney make the point in their Op-ed (New York Times November 28, 2006, OP-ED) piece that:

“… Tet and Somalia were not defeats. They were success perceived as failures. Such stark divergence between perception and reality is common in wartime, when people’s beliefs about which side wins and which loses are often driven by psychological factors that have nothing to do with events on the battlefield.”

The battlefield in the Vietnam War and in Somalia was not only on the ground where the combat units fought. It was much bigger than that. Johnson and Tierney do not seem to understand that the battlefield included the ability of our political leaders to cultivate and sustain a “unified national will.” In regard to the Vietnam War and in Somalia, we can say that our national leadership was unequal to the task and was defeated. It is not a media generated false perception but rather a grim reality that this nation must be fought (against our enemies) in a seamless universe of war that includes multiple and varied dimensions. One of these dimensions is military action. Another dimension is the commitment of the people. Both are instruments of war, both can contribute to victory and both can be subject to defeat. In any war, our leaders must lead and develop both. I don’t think our congress and executive branch have understood this. I think the Vietcong did:

‘‘You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel. The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. ‘‘That may be so,’’ he replied, ‘‘but it is also irrelevant.’’ - Harry G. Summers On Strategy

I remember in 1976 at USMC The Basic School (TBS) in Quantico, VA seeing a military instructional movie regarding communication security in the Vietnam War. According to this movie the Vietcong had developed incredible electronic warfare capability using the most humble of equipment. The movie described the apparently laxity of communication security by the US forces and the great success the communists had in compromising our communications in the most deadly ways for our soldiers and marines. If this was true than it described a dimension of war that was not given due leadership consideration at the time. I believe this same “type” of conceptual error is being made in the US war in Iraq. There are dimension(s) of this war that have not been given due consideration by the national leadership. In the same way that our company commanders must use their unit as an instrument of combat and must “fight their company” against the enemy, our national leaders must “fight the nation” in time of war. I am saying that in the universe of war there is a seamless environment composed of many dimensions. One of the dimensions is the commitment of the people. Our elected government has failed to understand this in Iraq.

The organized application of violence on the battlefield is clearly the most dramatic and traumatic component of war…, but it is not the only one. If national leadership takes this country into a war and does not have a legitimate plan to cultivate and sustain a “unified national will” to support that war..., than they have not done their job. It is not a problem of the media or press, it is a failure in leadership. Can you imagine a unit leader, leading his or her company into an attack without reconnaissance, without considering the situation, mission, execution, admin and logistics, and command and signal? This administration has done the moral and operational equivalent of this kind of unacceptable and poor performance. I am saying that it is not "perception" but reality: one of the components of war is the will of the American People. It is simultaneously a weapon against the enemy and an objective of opposing forces. If we go into war without a plan and contingency plans or if we fail to execute a plan to cultivate and sustain a unified national will we are fighting with our hands tied behind our back.

Whatever we do in Iraq at this dismal point in time, if we do not have a national leadership that cultivates and sustains with integrity, an unified national will than we can say once again, (to paraphrase Bernard B. Fall) that our elected government is accountably “unequal to the task” that is at least Iraq.

(Around Midnight at Sunday School For Sinners)

[120mm]

Wow. That is exactly what I was trying to say to a friend, recently, only I lack the elegant expression.

[Around Midnight]

Check out LtCol Key's excellent paper:

Cultivating National Will, An Introduction to National Will; LAWRENCE E. KEY; Lieutenant Colonel, USAF; Air War College; Maxwell Paper No. 5.

[marct]

Check out LtCol Key's excellent paper:

Interesting paper. I am not sure if his use of a volksgeist model is appropriate in countries such as the US and Canada. There is a very interesting theoretical problem for this type of nation which is the preponderance of immigration in the formation of national populations. A volksgeist really requires a faily homogenous culture as the core of the nation, and most settler societies just do not have that (e.g. the US, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, etc.).

If you are going to create a volksgeist from a collection of people, then there are some requirements, mainly ideological. Certainly the US had this in the first 150 or so years of its existence, i.e. there was a unifying national myth. That myth, however, has become pretty tattered since the 1930s. Even worse is the polarization of US politics into an entrenched two party system that seems to only reflect itself rather than any national will. As Key notes (I am paraphrasing), if people feel that they are not represented, then the national will will be weakened.

Of probably greater concern, at least to me, is that we are not really operating in a global situation where "national will" is the determining factor. While it is important, what needs to really be considered is "trans-national will". As I've mentioned in a number of places, we are dealing with coalitions rather than state vs. state (or non-state) actors. I believe that we would do well to look at histoprical cases where colelctions of nations have managed to win long term ideological conflicts through expressions of trans-national will and, also, where such coalitions have failed.

Marc

[Around Midnight]

Marc’s (above) comments are interesting and I found a lot to think about in his thoughts. For now I would like to focus on his statement:

“Of probably greater concern, at least to me, is that we are not really operating in a global situation where "national will" is the determining factor. While it is important, what needs to really be considered is ‘trans-national will’.”

I think this is a miss-reading of the American experience. Gen Maxwell Taylor’s words in his book “Swords and Ploughshares” have profound meaning for me:

"One thing is sure: the international challenge tends to merge more and more with the domestic challenge until the two become virtually indistinguishable. The threats from both sources are directed to the same sources of national power which provide strength both for our national security and our domestic welfare. It is clear, I believe, that we cannot overcome abroad and fail at home, or succeed at home and succumb abroad. To progress toward the goals of our security and welfare we must advance concurrently on both foreign and domestic fronts by means of integrated national power responsive to a unified national will."

I am proposing that a positive relationship between foreign policy and a unified national will are absolutely required in times of intense and/or sustained US combat operations overseas. There can be no redemptive US participation in Marc’s so called “trans-national will” when it involves combat or war…, if there is not a supportive national will to do so. The national endurance of the military and the economic, political, industrial and cultural strength of American is powerfully mobilized with the onset of the commitment of the People. Not only that, the ability for the nation to sustain combat causalities is dependent on the people’s commitment to the mission and objectives of the war or combat operations.

As I have written before, the war in Iraq does not have the commitment of the American People. More than 64% of the American people are opposed to the war (CNN Poll Oct. 13-15, 2006). We are a divided nation and the grim arithmetic of war keeps adding up it’s horrific toll of suffering. Bruce Catton (“America Goes To War; An Introduction to the Civil War and It’s meaning to Americans Today;” p. 32) describes a similar situation at the beginning of the Civil War. In 1861 there existed the

“…possibility that the two political parties (Republicans and Democrats) in the North would eventually line up, as a war party and a peace party. If the war was to be won, the administration had to win and hold the support of a great many people besides those who had voted for it in 1860… Mr. Lincoln met the problem at the very beginning, and met it in the traditional American way – the way of ward and courthouse politics. That is, he gave to various important people, including the leaders of the political opposition a piece of the job.”

Lincoln understood the importance of a unified national will and he invoked it through the appointment of generals and civilian leaders (including the Vice President), in whom the constituencies of a highly divergent America believed in. Any plan for the US war in Iraq that is not supported by an unified national will is a plan for failure. Can this administration and can our system of Government do what Lincoln was able to do? Is this nation doomed to be hijacked by the Executive Branch's loyalty to it’s minority base? Our government should take a page from Lincoln and mobilize a unified national will. As Catton wrote (“America Goes to War;” p. 47):

“Often enough, the political system by which our democracy works brings out, or seems to bring out, the worst in people; the saving grace is that in times of crises it also brings out the best, and the best is pretty good.”

Now is the time for a unified national will.

[marct]

Hi Around Midnight,

Marc’s (above) comments are interesting and I found a lot to think about in his thoughts. For now I would like to focus on his statement:

“Of probably greater concern, at least to me, is that we are not really operating in a global situation where "national will" is the determining factor. While it is important, what needs to really be considered is ‘trans-national will’.”

I think this is a miss-reading of the American experience. Gen Maxwell Taylor’s words in his book “Swords and Ploughshares” have profound meaning for me:

"One thing is sure: the international challenge tends to merge more and more with the domestic challenge until the two become virtually indistinguishable. The threats from both sources are directed to the same sources of national power which provide strength both for our national security and our domestic welfare. It is clear, I believe, that we cannot overcome abroad and fail at home, or succeed at home and succumb abroad. To progress toward the goals of our security and welfare we must advance concurrently on both foreign and domestic fronts by means of integrated national power responsive to a unified national will."

First of all, let me say that I am speaking as a Candadian, not an American, and that is an impoirtant distinction to make. You are probably quite correct in that I may well be mis-reading the "Americam experience", but I doubt I am misreading the Canadian experience .

I am proposing that a positive relationship between foreign policy and a unified national will are absolutely required in times of intense and/or sustained US combat operations overseas. There can be no redemptive US participation in Marc’s so called “trans-national will” when it involves combat or war…, if there is not a supportive national will to do so. The national endurance of the military and the economic, political, industrial and cultural strength of American is powerfully mobilized with the onset of the commitment of the People. Not only that, the ability for the nation to sustain combat causalities is dependent on the people’s commitment to the mission and objectives of the war or combat operations.

Actually, I happen to agree with you on this. The same is true of any national will when it comes to the actions of a coalition. I am reminded of Heinlein's discussion of morality in Starship Troopers (book, not the snuff movie of the same name). To what do we, as humans, owe duty? Family? Group? Nation? Species? The H&MP discussions are well worth examining, since I think they bear directly on what I was trying to get across with the concept of trans-national will.

"National will" is important, and I would never deny that, but so is a trans-national commitment to a particular ideology, vis. individual freedom of choice that ends at the start of the next person's nose. Forget "democracy" - what we are really talking about is the ability of any individual to say "Hey, I think this" and not have them shot by a government or state sponsored organization that disagrees. This, to my mind, is the ideological principle - individual choice - that "we" are fighting for in Iraq, Afghanistan and unversities in North America.

"National Will" is a useful concept in many cases but, I find, is sorely limited in the current situation wherein we find people who oppose the cultural value behnd the rhetoric and ideology operating in every nation. I believe that we are in an ideological war between individual choice and, literally, a "dictatorship" where members of a society are told what to believe. This ideological war crosses national boundaries and has proponents in every nation, hence the term, "trans-national will".

Lincoln understood the importance of a unified national will and he invoked it through the appointment of generals and civilian leaders (including the Vice President), in whom the constituencies of a highly divergent America believed in. Any plan for the US war in Iraq that is not supported by an unified national will is a plan for failure. Can this administration and can our system of Government do what Lincoln was able to do? Is this nation doomed to be hijacked by the Executive Branch's loyalty to it’s minority base? Our government should take a page from Lincoln and mobilize a unified national will.

Again, I certainly don't disagree with you. I do, however, feel that while national will is important, the US is unlikely to become an Imperial power in the sense of Rome. You don't have either the "national will", the history or the philosophy. The US was founded on the principle of individual choice, and that is your legacy to the species, not a recapitualtion of Persia, Rome and Alexander.

You mentioned the US Civil War, but that is, in some ways, a chimera - it was an internal "disagrement". It is certainly not a model to take onto the international stage. If the US is going to export its ideology, then you should seriously consider what that means in terms of both body counts and commitment. Britain did this during the period of Imperial Construction and ended up with 25% of the globe under their control. The cost was also insanely high - I would recommend both Kipling and Sasson as insightful analysts of that cost.

I also find that limiting the discusssion to Iraq is, in the long run, another chimera. Yes, certainly the US is highly nvolved in Iraq, but to what end? What is the goal of this involvement? Is this merely the reflection of "... the Executive Branch's loyalty to it’s minority base"?

I remember the lead up to the invasion of Iraq. I followed the debate in Canada quite closely and, I almost hesitate to admit it here, but I supported the Liberals position of not going in. Why? Because you (the US) did not have international support filtered through the required ritual site of the UN (an organization I personally think is useless outside of ritual purposes). On a personal level, I would love to see Saddam hanged heigher than Hamman - he is a mass murdered and a blight on his people. And, while I disagreed with the initial invasion of Iraq, I do have two neurons to rub together and know damn well that to pull out would be a disaster. I do not believe that I am expressing a case of national will but, rather, individual choice based on an examination of the probablities.

Honestly, I find little fault with the US military (okay, 4th army group excepted) over their handling of the Iraq war. I do, however, find a serious flaw in the motivations behind the war and the rhetoric used to support it. And this brings us back to the concept of "national will". Unless the US is willing to try to reconstruct itself along the lines of Imperial Rome, you don't have the national will to succeed in what your political leaders have commited you to.

Furthermore, despite the Federalist agenda, the American people are, IMHO, not an imperial power in the classic sense. An incredibly principled people, a volksgeist based on individual choice with a history to back it up, but I sincerely doubt that, at a national level, you would embark on an imperial expansion that would make Cortez blush. The problem is not that the American people lack a national will but, rather, that they lack a "national will" to impose their beliefs on the world.

This, in my usual round about (and slightly tipsy) way, brings us back to the concept of a trans-national will. The national will of most of the US population, as you note, does not support the war in Iraq. Why? Because individual freedom and choice is not happening as a result of that war. Furthermore, I suspect that a large percentage of the American electorate is womdering why so many people outside the US are saying they are wrong.

How many people feel that the operations in Afghanistan are "wrong"? A lot fewer that those arguing about Iraq. Yes, I will admit that Iraq has control oif the media space and, hence, is a cause celebre. Still and all, Afghanistan is an examople of trans-naional will, while Iraq is an example of national will. In an age when al-Jezira is available world-wide alongside CNN, I would strongly suggest that the trans-national trumps the national.

Marc

ps. I should, in all honesty, point out that the rant above comes after a rather "difficult" argument earlier on (offline) and may, in part, be the result of inspiration derived from the products of several fine breweries and distilleries. In all honesty, this is a discussion that should, IMHO, take place in a pub rather than a board.

pps. Around Midnight: if we ever get together, the first round is on me.

[Steve Blair]

Lincoln's use of national will during the Civil War was also focused at preserving a vision, dream if you will, of the Federal Union. When he decided that might not provide enough grassroots motivation, he switched part of his focus to ending slavery. There is also a significant body of evidence that Lincoln hijacked many processes (both legal and legislative) to achieve his goals. Northern national will was a very unstable thing (witness the draft riots in New York City and other places, and some of the steps Lincoln took to bring Maryland under Union control). But that's more of a historical quibble on my part...

Marc, I agree with you regarding the position of the US in most of this stuff. If you look at the history of US military involvements, there has always been a significant body of dissent IF the preservation of the nation was not at stake. With exceptions based more on corporate and Administration preferences (Woodrow Wilson used the military far more often for "Imperial" missions than Teddy Roosevelt, for example), the "US street" has been pretty content to ignore international events. And as I've said before, leaders these days are VERY reluctant to stir up the level of involvement on the part of the public that is required to mobilize national will. Even in the immediate aftermath of September 11, when the will was already mobilized, you could see this reluctance on the part of most elected officials.

Do the American people lack national will? I really don't think so. What we lack is the required cultural arrogance to project that will onto others. Before I get lynched by others for that statement, let me explain what I mean by cultural arrogance. Americans may believe that we have the best system on the planet, but there is also a strong undercurrent within the body public that others should just recognize this and adapt our system to their own needs. What we lack is the Imperial conviction that our system is naturally better than others and should be imposed on them.

At the end of the day, I think it comes down to political reluctance to mobilize any sort of national will and the ingrained American preference to "conquer through kindness, Coke, and MTV" as opposed to military force. It is this level of political cowardice and complacence that has led to the ideological side of the conflict being buried.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

Do the American people lack national will? I really don't think so. What we lack is the required cultural arrogance to project that will onto others. Before I get lynched by others for that statement, let me explain what I mean by cultural arrogance. Americans may believe that we have the best system on the planet, but there is also a strong undercurrent within the body public that others should just recognize this and adapt our system to their own needs. What we lack is the Imperial conviction that our system is naturally better than others and should be imposed on them.

I would certainly agree with that. I think that there was a fairly strong "Imperial conviction" from, say, 1800 to, maybe 1850 or so. I'm thinking mainly of Jefferson's program of expansion, and the run ins with both first nations and Mexico. Then again, that could easily have been a situation deriving from settlement / immigration pressures. The same thing seems to show up again in the wars against the disintegrating Spanish Empire.

At the end of the day, I think it comes down to political reluctance to mobilize any sort of national will and the ingrained American preference to "conquer through kindness, Coke, and MTV" as opposed to military force. It is this level of political cowardice and complacence that has led to the ideological side of the conflict being buried.

I've often wondered if Imperial adventures aren't the product of a social order with a fairly strongly established aristocracy that is loosing power in the central state. That certainly seems to be the case with most of Britains adventures. I wonder if the Northern victory in your civil war didn't transform American imperial drive into an economic / TNC format.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Hi Steve,



I would certainly agree with that. I think that there was a fairly strong "Imperial conviction" from, say, 1800 to, maybe 1850 or so. I'm thinking mainly of Jefferson's program of expansion, and the run ins with both first nations and Mexico. Then again, that could easily have been a situation deriving from settlement / immigration pressures. The same thing seems to show up again in the wars against the disintegrating Spanish Empire.



I've often wondered if Imperial adventures aren't the product of a social order with a fairly strongly established aristocracy that is loosing power in the central state. That certainly seems to be the case with most of Britains adventures. I wonder if the Northern victory in your civil war didn't transform American imperial drive into an economic / TNC format.

Marc

In regard to Mexico, there was a substantial "anti-war" faction in the Northeastern and New England states. The Indian situation is a bit more complex, but it's worth remembering that even then there was a domestic opposition to expansion in that area (although some of it was Abolitionist fervor migrated to a new cause). Roosevelt's imperial drive is a slightly different beast, but even then some of the tone was different from what was seen with Britain. Much of it was framed by the "Yellow press" as a conflict to free oppressed peoples from the harsh yoke of Spain. Was that the real goal? Not really, but it was pitched that way.

I would tend to agree with you that the Northern victory in the Civil War changed the complexion of many of these policies. My own theory has been that most imperialist urges do emerge from an aristocracy that has an elevated view of itself and tends to look down on others (to include those within their own nation) who do not reach that level. It's also easier to be imperialist when one does not have to take popular urges into account. Also, I think there is a trend within those aristocracies to try to replicate their "dream state" overseas once conditions for it fade domestically. That could explain to a degree why Dutch and French colonial regimes tended to be harsher than those of the British.

[marct]

In regard to Mexico, there was a substantial "anti-war" faction in the Northeastern and New England states. The Indian situation is a bit more complex, but it's worth remembering that even then there was a domestic opposition to expansion in that area (although some of it was Abolitionist fervor migrated to a new cause).

Interesting. I'm afraid my knowledge of US history is somewhat surface level. I haven't studied it in-depth the way I have ancient history or Canadian history.

Roosevelt's imperial drive is a slightly different beast, but even then some of the tone was different from what was seen with Britain. Much of it was framed by the "Yellow press" as a conflict to free oppressed peoples from the harsh yoke of Spain. Was that the real goal? Not really, but it was pitched that way.

So, was Spain the "Evil Empire" in the yellow press then? Actually, if you know of any good books covering the wars against Spain, especially in the Pacific theatres, I would appreciate the references.

I would tend to agree with you that the Northern victory in the Civil War changed the complexion of many of these policies. My own theory has been that most imperialist urges do emerge from an aristocracy that has an elevated view of itself and tends to look down on others (to include those within their own nation) who do not reach that level. It's also easier to be imperialist when one does not have to take popular urges into account. Also, I think there is a trend within those aristocracies to try to replicate their "dream state" overseas once conditions for it fade domestically. That could explain to a degree why Dutch and French colonial regimes tended to be harsher than those of the British.

I'm not so sure about the "dream state" - I would suspect that it holds better for regimes such as France and Belgium than for, say, England. Then again, England's empire was built by merchant corporations, and used as a dumping ground for second sons, religious minorities, and criminals. It only gradually came under the purview of the government. Certainly by the time "national will" was involved, say around 1860 or so, it was melding in with both unilinear evolutionary theory and a "civilizing" imperative. As a pure side note, I always joked that Britain built the empire to find edible food - note, if you will, that we stopped expanding once we had India fully under control .

Marc

[Steve Blair]

My comments about the "dream state" did refer more to the French and Dutch (and to a limited degree the Spanish) than it did the British, although I suspect this might have been a motivation in certain corners of the Empire.

Lincoln was also worried about losing the support of the Northeast during the Civil War, in part because of their role in anti-war agitation during the Mexican adventure. That can in part explain the timing of the Emancipation Proclamation. Remember, Lincoln's main goal was the preservation of the Union. There's a quote of his (can't remember the source off the top of my head) to the effect of "If I can save the Union by freeing no slaves, I would do it. And if I can save the Union by freeing all slaves, I would do it." Not exact, but it does capture his core motivation well.

[Around Midnight]

Thanks Marc for your thoughts. I would indeed look forward to a round of drinks to sort this out! You can buy the first round, if I can buy the second one?

I actually do agree with your idea regarding the need for “trans-national will,” but I think that also requires excellence in domestic and political national leadership, at least in US contexts. Leadership decision making is well and good, but unless there is a intentional and effective mobilization of a supportive US constituency, how can any American decision or plan for intense and/or sustained combat succeed? Robert S. McNamara sites in his book “In Retrospect, The Tragedy and Lessons of the Vietnam” 11 major causes or mistakes for our disaster in Vietnam. He is so on point for this Iraq war that we are in. We have ignored the lessons of the past and are repeating our mistakes. I am convinced more than ever that it is the importance of a “unified national will” that we need to pay attention to right now. McNamara’s point #7 (p.321) says it well:

“A nation's deepest strength lies not in military prowess but, rather, in the unity of its people. We failed to maintain it.”

This concept of the commitment of the nation’s military being a co-commitment of the people is not a theoretical construct, but rather a harsh political reality. I was trying to make this connection with my earlier referral to Abraham Lincoln. President Lincoln (as Steve Blair notes) did have a vision of the national mission. He was able to articulate the mission in a way that was clearly understood: preserve the Union. The connection I was trying to make was that Lincoln was able to form around this mission a “unified national will” that was so robust that it could tolerate tremendous casualties and multiple major battlefield defeats and still persevere. The way that Lincoln did this was by getting people who didn’t vote for him or agree with him to support the war. He did this by appointing generals and civilians who represented the diverse constituencies in America. President Lincoln was in fact the only president to represent two parties. In order to accommodate both the Republican Party and the Northern Democrats an alliance was created and a new hybrid political party was created: The National Union Party! The consequence of this kind of politics was to stress the national character of the war in such a way that it mobilized two adversarial parties into one wartime political effort. The National Union ticket won in 1864 with 42 Senate seats, and 149 House or Representatives seats. This was a critical component of the Union’s war making ability. This is the kind of excellence in Government that is needed it times of war.
Col Key in his paper noted above quotes Gen Fred C. Weyand as making the American context of the connection between the American People and their military crystal clear… I can’t say it any better:

“The American Army really is a people’s Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed the American people are committed, when the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly.”

[marct]

Thanks Marc for your thoughts. I would indeed look forward to a round of drinks to sort this out! You can buy the first round, if I can buy the second one?

You're on . I have a feeling if the lot of us actually got together in contiguos reality, many, MANY beers would be discarnated.

I actually do agree with your idea regarding the need for “trans-national will,” but I think that also requires excellence in domestic and political national leadership, at least in US contexts. Leadership decision making is well and good, but unless there is a intentional and effective mobilization of a supportive US constituency, how can any American decision or plan for intense and/or sustained combat succeed?

Two good points, here. I certainly agree with you about "excellence" in national politics. Unfortunately, that is lacking in many states <wry grin>. The idea you metioned later on of a national party during wartime probbaly would have worked after 9/11 in the US, but I honestly can't see it working right now (I'm trying not to fall off my chair laughing at the images my brain is tossing up ).

The second point is also interesting - the assumption of Americam leadership. I will certainly grant you that that is the current reality, but does it have to be? Or, more to the point, would it be better to turn leadership in some of this war over to other nations? I know it can't work in Iraq, but I am thinking more of any future conflicts.

This concept of the commitment of the nation’s military being a co-commitment of the people is not a theoretical construct, but rather a harsh political reality.

Personally, I would say it was both . I'm thinking of the way our wishy-washy Liberal party handled the Afhganistan conflict and the spontaneous "Red Friday" demonstrations in support of our troops (no, not communist - red is our national colour). "THeoretical" doesn't necessarily mean "a bunch of silly academics sitting in an ivory tower pontificating" (okay, it can mean that). It's actual meaning, before it was highjacked, is something like "a map of a part of reality; a model".

Still and all, this is a conversation that would definately go better with beer

Marc