While I believe that the authors drew the absolute wrong conclusion due to their predisposition to prove their thesis; the recent article on the failure of mechanized forces in COIN operations fits well here:

Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars
Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson
International Organization , Volume 63, Issue 01,

http://journals.cambridge.org/action...01&iid=3291884

Some great research, and I really like the "Alternative Explanations" that were raised, briefly discussed, then by-passed to get on to the armor objective (Fond memories of roaring across West Germany as Team Mech attached over to one of the two armor battalions in our brigade during the Cold War...but I digress). I need to take some time with it, but a combination of 3-4 of these alternatives is closer to the truth.

They set out to prove that as armies became more mechanized, they became less effective at COIN, and that that is the cause of a corresponding decline in effectiveness. I buy the part of the argument completely that mounted forces are less capapble that dismounted forces in this type of populace-based engagement. I just think that it is far more due to advances in communications among the populace/insurgent than mechanization among the government/counterinsurgent that truly drives the trends described.

Worthwhile read for those who have not seen.