In regards to the observations of George Singleton, our own Army suffered from many of these issues in the early days. There are many "reasons" to get overwhelmed with the myriad of issues that "should" by nature hold Afghanistan in the dark ages. These "shoulds" and "reasons" become rationalizations for failure.

It has been pointed out before that Afghanistan does, in fact, have "democratic" traditions that have been part of tribal society. Jirgas and Shuras, for instance, are representative in nature. While the representatives are not chosen via election per se, those representatives represent their constituents via the consent of the represented. While there are dissimiliarities, the similarities indicate that Afghanistan does have a basic understanding of democratic principles.

My experience with Afghans bears little resemblance to Mr. Singleton's presentation.

Ken White makes some very good points on the causes for Big Army's slowness in grasping COIN. The longer the time that has passed since the beginning of COIN operations, the less it matters what the causative factors (or excuses) for not being excellent practitioners of the doctrine and the more it becomes a failure to really do what is necessary in a time of war.

A workable government that can defend its own territory and provide basic services will not require 50 years. It is a tough job, but not that tough. To bring Afghanistan up to speed with the western world; now that would take 50 years. The effort required to provide guidance and assistance will fade with time, but until the insurgency is defeated through good well-rounded COIN it is going to be intensive.