While I will certainly agree, and history supports, that the defeat of the insurgent's military capacity within ones populace will effectively suppress an insurgency, often for years. But it has not to my knowledge ever truly resolved an insurgency. So long as the conditions giving rise to insurgency exist, the insurgency will re-emerge. It may come back with new leaders, or a new ideology, but it will come back.
Make defeat of the insurgent a supporting effort, but do so while understanding that he is a part of the same populace who's support you are trying to regain as the counterinsurgent and tailor your defeat mechanisms accordingly. The main effort must be upon reestablishing conditions of good governance with the populace writ large. This is not social work with guns, but simply a recognition that when governance fails, it often has to use force in its efforts to re-establish itself with the populace.
To hold that one size fits all, that the solutions that one seeks with ones own popualce are the same that one seeks with a competing state is a concept that I have not seen any convincing arguments made to support. Frankly, I suspect CvC would scratch his head at the concept as well.
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