IW Terminology and the General Purpose Forces

[Cavguy]

All,

I am currently working on a tasker that requires I define the terms Stability Operations (SO), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Irregular Warfare (IW) in relation to the effect/scope of each term on the conventional force.

I have a lot of working material from inside the army - but would like to solicit input on how this community views the venn-diagram intersection of the above in Army doctrine and terminology (vis a vis 3-0, 3-07, etc.)

Thoughts?

[marct]

All,

I am currently working on a tasker that requires I define the terms Stability Operations (SO), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Irregular Warfare (IW) in relation to the effect/scope of each term on the conventional force.

I have a lot of working material from inside the army - but would like to solicit input on how this community views the venn-diagram intersection of the above in Army doctrine and terminology (vis a vis 3-0, 3-07, etc.)

Thoughts?

Hey Neil,

Rob has some good venn diagrams on the interplay as well as some verbiage to go with.

Just out of interest, are you stuck with using venn's or do you have latitude? I'm asking because I think it would make a lot more sense to use fuzzy set topological boundary conditions.

[Cavguy]

Hey Neil,

Rob has some good venn diagrams on the interplay as well as some verbiage to go with.

Just out of interest, are you stuck with using venn's or do you have latitude? I'm asking because I think it would make a lot more sense to use fuzzy set topological boundary conditions.

Okay Marc,

I have no idea what you just said, can you give me an example of a "fuzzy set topological boundary conditions?"

[marct]

Okay Marc,

I have no idea what you just said, can you give me an example of a "fuzzy set topological boundary conditions?"

Sorry Neil - my heads in academic language right now ...

Okay, fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets allow an individual "object" to be a partial member of a set with a relative weight (from 0.0 to 1.0). This is opposed to crisp sets which only allow an object to either be or not be a member of the set.

Topologies are one way of conceiving "spaces", including perceptual spaces. A topology is defined by boundary conditions that define the membership requirements of an object or area as being within that topology. So, for example, we can define "irregular warfare" as a topology with certain boundary condition (the same for COIN, etc.).

Now, one of the two mathematical languages used to define topologies is set theory so, rather than using crisp sets, we can replace them with fuzzy sets.

Now, there are two main advantages to using this type of model:

1. you can include actions (requirements, missions, etc.) that don't necessarily "fit" exactly into any definition.
2. you can measure change over time of a particular "object".

Does that make it a bit clearer ?

[Cavguy]

Sorry Neil - my heads in academic language right now ...

Okay, fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets allow an individual "object" to be a partial member of a set with a relative weight (from 0.0 to 1.0). This is opposed to crisp sets which only allow an object to either be or not be a member of the set.

Topologies are one way of conceiving "spaces", including perceptual spaces. A topology is defined by boundary conditions that define the membership requirements of an object or area as being within that topology. So, for example, we can define "irregular warfare" as a topology with certain boundary condition (the same for COIN, etc.).

Now, one of the two mathematical languages used to define topologies is set theory so, rather than using crisp sets, we can replace them with fuzzy sets.

Now, there are two main advantages to using this type of model:

1. you can include actions (requirements, missions, etc.) that don't necessarily "fit" exactly into any definition.
2. you can measure change over time of a particular "object".

Does that make it a bit clearer ?

Okay, a little clearer, can you give me a visual of what such a diagram looks like?

BLUF, this is an info paper for some senior officers and I am looking to represent the overlap between the above terms graphically but with some more precision than a standard Venn allows.

Thanks,
Niel

[marct]

Okay, a little clearer, can you give me a visual of what such a diagram looks like?

BLUF, this is an info paper for some senior officers and I am looking to represent the overlap between the above terms graphically but with some more precision than a standard Venn allows.

Hmm, well this book has some material on it. In general, they tend to be three or more dimensions, or vary between boundary conditions (e.g. this one). I'd really have to do a lot more thinking about it and get a set of boundary conditions worked out, to figure out how I would do it .

Cheers,

Marc

[Old Eagle]

These definitions do not lend themselves to a venn diagram. Believe me, many of us have tried. I'm sending you a SOCOM/ARCIC attempt on NIPR because it's FOUO for whatever possible reasons.

The venn in draft 3-07.1 is very wrong.

[marct]

The venn in draft 3-07.1 is very wrong.

Too true!

[max161]

Instead of trying to define these terms please ask the question of why we need so many overlapping and redundent concepts terms? Do we need FID, SFA, SA, BPC, TAA, COIN and all the rest? How is this helpng us (and more importantly how do all the terms help our Sioldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines on the ground - or does it confuse them) And likewise do all these overlapping and redundent concepts help or hurt us when we are dealing with our whole of government partners?

[Ken White]

'nuff said...

[Old Eagle]

Dave's comment would probably be accurate if we could a) redefine "FID" to include missions other than countering "insurgency, subversion and lawlessness" (Do we really want to develop forces for use soley against their own fellow citizens?) and get big Army/USAF/USN/USMC to embrace it (the Army doesn't even have FID doctrine, only Army Special Forces do) and b) expand security assistance to encompass broader missions than are currently authorized. SA folks (I am an SAO) have painted themselves into a little corner that is so restrictive that it is near irrelavent.

When we went into Iraq and Afghanistan we found situations that required much more robust solutions than we had on the books. We made things up as we went along, and maybe we even managed to muddle through. The bottom line is that we need to do a better job, and we need the entire joint force to be able to do it.

[slapout9]

Cavguy, there is a link below on how to draw a systems map. This is old style but it is simple and very clear. Killcullen used this style just a few days ago in an article in the Washington Post. In fact Killcullen has used this style several times in several of his publications. That is one thing that I always found strange, he is often quoted as an expert, and he is, but all his theories are based on systems thinking, which is very sound, but at the same time people claim systems thinking dosen't work
Anyway maybe this will help. When you go to the site click the icon at the top that says system mapping!

http://systems.open.ac.uk/materials/t552/index.htm

PS:Wilf this is a class done in a school in the UK, maybe it make sense now

[slapout9]

Link to Killcullen's system map of COIN...in color no less.


http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.m...ctice_2007.pdf

[Ron Humphrey]

Cavguy, there is a link below on how to draw a systems map. This is old style but it is simple and very clear. Killcullen used this style just a few days ago in an article in the Washington Post. In fact Killcullen has used this style several times in several of his publications. That is one thing that I always found strange, he is often quoted as an expert, and he is, but all his theories are based on systems thinking, which is very sound, but at the same time people claim systems thinking dosen't work
Anyway maybe this will help. When you go to the site click the icon at the top that says system mapping!

http://systems.open.ac.uk/materials/t552/index.htm

PS:Wilf this is a class done in a school in the UK, maybe it make sense now

This may be because systems thinking works extremely well for creating presentations with which to gain buyin on a particular COA. It helps to draw the picture. It does not OTOH give the "right" answer. It as with so many other forms of planning is an effective guide but unfortunately gets sold as the silver bullet sometimes.

Thats probably why you see so much blowback on it.

Getting buyin is all about the sale, getting it done is all about the soldier, I havn't seen too many complain about it when its kept in that context

[Ken White]

Dave's comment would probably be accurate if we could a) redefine "FID" to include missions other than countering "insurgency, subversion and lawlessness" (Do we really want to develop forces for use soley against their own fellow citizens?)

That shouldn't be terribly difficult. You or I -- or better yet, the DCSOPS / G3/5/7/9/11/13/∞ can rewrite that in a day and get it circulated an approved within two to four years.

...and get big Army/USAF/USN/USMC to embrace it (the Army doesn't even have FID doctrine, only Army Special Forces do)

In reverse order, that's because of the GPF/SOF rift born of the post Viet Nam order that is, hopefully, dead and gone. Several Chiefs of Staff in the 80s and 90s did that to us. That can be easily fixed. As for embracing, not the American way. There are always doubters and malcontents who will object. Embracing is nice, doing is better...

and b) expand security assistance to encompass broader missions than are currently authorized.

Agreed. we need to remove a number of mission constraints and not just in SA.

SA folks (I am an SAO) have painted themselves into a little corner that is so restrictive that it is near irrelavent.

They helped but a lot of factors caused it -- not least our overall geostrategic ignorance and national narcissism -- both of which IMO can be attributed to a terribly flawed educational system. Penalty of a laissez faire democracy.

When we went into Iraq and Afghanistan we found situations that required much more robust solutions than we had on the books. We made things up as we went along, and maybe we even managed to muddle through. The bottom line is that we need to do a better job, and we need the entire joint force to be able to do it.

I believe you have just made a long standing point of mine. Quoting Halsey again, "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." The limitations you cite and the ad-hoc 'cobble something together' -- that worked, albeit too slowly (and that slowness was due to dampening pressure from above...) -- and has been typical of all our wars. Doctrine becomes dogma. Conversely, the absence of dogma allows, even demands, innovation and the Troops will make it work. Our doctrine needs to be broad based and far less restrictive (Love the Lawyers and drive 'em nuts). Fortunately, the Troops try to do it by the woefully inappropriate book, realize that doesn't work and then adapt to reality and get things done. The speed of adaptation is directly related to the intensity of combat (acknowledging the wrong General in the wrong place can impede adaptation. See MacArthur, D; Westmoreland, W. and Sanchez, R.).

We do not need ten sets of abbreviations to discuss OOTW (no longer a valid abbreviation, is it?). All we do with that is confuse people.

I'll take the liberty of quoting a comment originally posted by Wilf:

“Moreover, in a day of rapid technical change, when British soldiers were apt to be employed anywhere in the world under conditions that varied widely and could not be anticipated because the tactics, equipment, and transport requirements differed with the circumstances of each campaign, the British Army could not preserve one uniform pattern…About all that could be done to prepare the army to fight was to retain an elasticity in outlook, simplicity in drill, and adopt a common, simplified…training manuals. When the next war came, the British would feel their way amidst the new conditions, but at least their feet would not be chained to a rigid system of tactics long since outmoded”.(Maj Gen Sir John Maurice. The Advantages of Simple Drill 1888)

Said 120 years ago about another Army and perfectly valid for us today. We are trying to be too definitive to preclude legal problems. We simply need to train and educate properly, obey the law and discard all that excessively finite hand-tying (and hand wringing...) excess.

We need to stop trying to micromanage an Army that's entirely too big and too busy for that to do anything other than impede it. We need to stop concentrating on minutia and the correct set of precise definitions and acronyms and get serious about training and warfare -- and roles and missions.

It's the result, not the process, that is important

[Entropy]

Great comment Ken (especially the quoted WILF quote). Less really can be more.

[slapout9]

This may be because systems thinking works extremely well for creating presentations with which to gain buyin on a particular COA. It helps to draw the picture. It does not OTOH give the "right" answer. It as with so many other forms of planning is an effective guide but unfortunately gets sold as the silver bullet sometimes.

Thats probably why you see so much blowback on it.

Getting buyin is all about the sale, getting it done is all about the soldier, I havn't seen too many complain about it when its kept in that context

Ron, that is a rather penetrating insight. I would add that people often forget that for it to be really useful you have to do a fractal analysis down to where the targets are concrete(tactical level). I did this at a workshop recently and people were surprised how useful at problem solving it can be when brought down to this level instead of just leaving it with broad general concepts (Strategic Level). No one ever told them to do this!

[Ken White]

...I did this at a workshop recently and people were surprised how useful at problem solving it can be when brought down to this level instead of just leaving it with broad general concepts (Strategic Level). No one ever told them to do this!

and hopefully they learned the value of a thorough drill down to the basics without forgetting that you don't want to lose sight of the forest for the trees...

That, unfortunately, happens a lot, too.