US Military Information Operations FM

[Rockbridge]

In further proof that the conspiracy theorists of the world use the military's unique language and misquotations to their advantage, DOD's 2003 IO Roadmap has been severely maligned as a document that advocates destruction of the internet in an attempt to prevent free speech. The quote below is from the "Knowledge Driven Revolution" (http://www.knowledgedrivenrevolution..._Fight_Net.htm)

"The Pentagon's Information Operations Roadmap is blunt about the fact that an internet, with the potential for free speech, is in direct opposition to their goals. The internet needs to be dealt with as if it were an enemy "weapons system."

The actual quote, from page 13 of the IO Roadmap refers to DOD's Computer Network Defense efforts, stating that "DOD's Defense in Depth" strategy should operate on the premise that the Department should "fight the net" as it would a weapons system."

Military folks understand the concept of "fighting" a tank as a weapons system, meaning that you're going to employ the thing as an integral element of your operation, not attack it. Furthermore, this specifc reference is to developing better defensive capabilities against enemy penetrations, not about developing offensive tools to attack the internet at large to prevent free speech.

Unfortunately, this sort of ridiculous stuff gets traction. This specific, misquoted posting has been repeated on dozens of other sites, yet we do nothing to counter this sort of activity. Offensively countering this sort of posting would obviously prove it true, but we can sure do better about debunking some of the more overt BS gets disseminated.

[Team Infidel]

The DOD IO Roadmap signed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed that all the services make IO a core military competency. The Army has come a long way toward this goal but five years later the Army still does not have an Army Regulation that provides policy guidance for IO. During the 26 April 2007, Council of Colonels meeting, DAMO-ODI was tasked with developing the draft copy of an Army Regulation that provides guidance on IO.

With this in mind AR 525-20 Command and Control Countermeasures dated 31 July 1992, has been rewritten and renamed AR 525-20 Information Operations.

AR 525-20 is currently in staffing. For those with an AKO account, PM me and I will send you a copy of the draft. It goes counter to FM 3-0 and the rewrite of FM 3-13. It is more nested in Joint Doctrine.

[kwalker007]

I'm interested in receiving the draft of AR 525-20.
ken

[joelhar]

PM sent

[SpykeSzeredy]

Team Infidel - What is your PM on AKO? Thanks

[Team Infidel]

And it is about time. Congrats to COL (P) John Davis.

[Spud]

Not bad since the FA30 stream/proponent doesn't actually have any 1-star slots ... hopefully it heralds a realisation that people that understand the info environment are strategic thinkers and have a hell of a lot to offer at the senior levels. Here’s to uniforms having a bigger say in things rather than just employing civvie PR specialists on contract.

[Team Infidel]

With a little luck, after his new assignment he will find his way over to the G3/5/7 as the deputy director for IO. We just need the power behind a star to push things where they need to go.

[politicsbyothermeans]

It looks like the new FM 3-13, Information, will be released in the next week or so. The intention of the manual is to go into much greater detail concerning the doctrinal changes made to Information in Chapter 7 of FM 3-0, Operations.

Specifically, there is going to be further development in the processes and techniques required to ensure Information is properly executed in full spectrum operations. With the elevation of stability and civil support operations on par with offensive and defensive operations, Information has become even more important. The war fighter that wakes up to the reality of the importance of Information across all operations will be given a much stronger base from which to engage in one, or all, of the Army information tasks or communicate with those staff and operational elements that do.

The update will also help the force “open its hand” and use Information to engage, communicate and elaborate by, with and through relevant publics and actors as opposed to merely using the closed fist of the destructive capabilities of information.

I'm interested in what information practitioners, and others that are interested, have to say about evolving information doctrine a la US Army.

[haughtdd]

The Army has now in fact released its latest version of FM 3-13, Information.

This version of FM 3-13 describes how commanders can use Information as an element of combat power to shape the operational environment. It expands the Army’s approach to the use of Information beyond “Information Operations” to one focused on applying the five Army Information Tasks that are fundamental to full spectrum operations.

Three main ideas frame the organization and content of the FM. They are:
- Complexity, caused by world-wide connectivity and information saturation, is the unique challenge for conducting full-spectrum operations in the 21st Century.
- Understanding and leveraging this information-driven complexity is fundamental to the art and science of military operations and impacts all aspects of those operations.
- To be effective in this environment, Army forces must be as highly skilled in the art and science of engaging, communicating, and collaborating as they are in disrupting, corrupting, or usurping enemy decision-making.

The manual continues a doctrinal evolution started with FM 3-0. Very interested in thoughts and comments you have.

[Spud]

Anyone got a link or .pdf handy? I can still only find the old one.

[Jedburgh]

The Army has now in fact released its latest version of FM 3-13, Information.

Not completely correct.

An Initial Draft - Not For Implementation, dated 27 Feb 09, is out, but not in general release. (AKO Log-In Required)

The material in this field manual is under development. It is NOT approved doctrine and CANNOT be used for reference or citation. The approved FM is still current and must be used for reference, or citation, until this draft is approved and authenticated. When published, this manual will be approved for public release; distribution will be unlimited.

Edit to add: The linked pdf is set up to facilitate participation in an e-mail based review. Once you've saved the pdf, you can use the Commenting toolbar to add comments and then submit via e-mail once complete.

[haughtdd]

Interested parties can obtain a copy of the 27 Feb 09 DRAFT FM 3-13 by:
- clicking on the link graciously provided by Jedburgh - or -
- send an EMAIL request to: FM3-13_CRM@conus.army.mil

Appreciate all the interest.

[Team Infidel]

Unfortunately this is a great work of fiction.

The concept of IE is good and will work at the Brigade level and below, but Information OPERATIONS officers need to have the flexibility to utilize all 5 pillars of IO at the Corps level and above. Divisions can utilize both concepts to be the linkage between the Brigade and the Corps. Like the Field Artillery (another effects based organization) you don’t have the same capabilities at the battery as you do at higher levels. IE can be effective at tactical level, but IO is effective at the Strategic and Operational levels.

Back in December, the concepts of IE were introduced into Afghanistan and it caused such a stir that the European NATO allies, specifically Germany, threatened to pull out of media operations there. It underminded the credibility of the information released to the public. Another ISAF official confirmed that the amalgamation of public affairs with Information Operations and PSYOP was part of the planned command restructure. This official, who also declined to be named, said the merger had caused considerable concern at higher levels within NATO which had challenged the order by the U.S. general.

Another significant change is that the G7/S7 will be primarily focused on conducting IE while the other information tasks, will be performed by other staff sections. If this comes into effect, the IO officer won't be conducting full spectrum IO or rather, all the information tasks, but they will be limited to conducting IE. In fact, CAC has already submitted a similar change to DA PAM 600-3 (commissioned officer professional development and career management) redefining the duties and responsibilities of the IO officers for doctrine that is not yet approved.

Information Operations is truly about the ART of warfare, and this new document now ties the hands of the IO officer to utilize all of the capabilities offered to him/her to shape the battlefield and the information environment for the commander.

[Hacksaw]

TI,

Thanks for the re-energizing this thread, I was kind of waiting to see where it would go. I assume the writing team is monitoring the wire since they announced the staffing release. I also assume they are looking for input to determine points of contention and possible adjustments...

A couple of points of clarification...

I assume your concerns are referring to Chapter 5 (Information Task Execution and Integration) and Chapter 6 (Information Engagement)...

"The concept of IE is good and will work at the Brigade level and below, but Information OPERATIONS officers need to have the flexibility to utilize all 5 pillars of IO at the Corps level and above... Another significant change is that the G7/S7 will be primarily focused on conducting IE while the other information tasks, will be performed by other staff sections. If this comes into effect, the IO officer won't be conducting full spectrum IO or rather, all the information tasks, but they will be limited to conducting IE. "

You note that the draft doctrine proposes that the lead for IO tasks (as defined in FM 3-0) be moved into different staff boards, centers, cells, and teams... specifically Info Protect into G6, Mil Deception into Plans, C2W info fires/effects, and OPSEC into G3 protections; and that this will constrain the IO Officer's ability to utilize the 5 pillars at Corps and above. I suppose its a two-sided arguement: On the one hand if you lump all beneath the G7 then you have a single belly-button to work cross task issues; on the other hand, moving these tasks into the existing boards and centers better postures the command to integrate IO activities across operations. I leave it to the authors to explain, but I think they would argue that Corps and above HQ don't work (as a general rule) in staff pure smokestacks... rather they provide participants with SME to various boards, centers and teams, and that it is the G7s role to provide SME to those boards centers and teams to integrate information tasks...

Back in December, the concepts of IE were introduced into Afghanistan and it caused such a stir that the European NATO allies, specifically Germany, threatened to pull out of media operations there. It underminded the credibility of the information released to the public. Another ISAF official confirmed that the amalgamation of public affairs with Information Operations and PSYOP was part of the planned command restructure. This official, who also declined to be named, said the merger had caused considerable concern at higher levels within NATO which had challenged the order by the U.S. general.


I will refrain from discussing the context that surrounded how IE was introduced into Afghanistan, but I think the draft doctrine is very specific in Chapter 6 in discussing the unique role that PA plays in the IE task...

Principles of Info Engagement:
-Coherent
-Human-centered
-Adaptive
-Truthful
-Timely
-Persistent
- Balanced
-Pragmatic

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
6-19. Public affairs are a commander’s responsibility to execute public information, command information, and community engagement directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.
6-20. Public affairs proactively inform and educate internal and external publics through public information, command information, and direct community engagement. Although all information engagement activities are completely truthful, public affairs is unique. It has a statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize or manipulate public opinion. Specifically, public affairs facilitate the commander’s obligation to support informed U.S. citizenry, U.S. Government decisionmakers, and as operational requirements may dictate, non-U.S. audiences. Effective information engagement requires particular attention to clearly demarking this unique role of public affairs, protecting its credibility. This requires care and consideration when synchronizing public affairs with other information engagement activities. Public affairs and other information engagement tasks must be synchronized to ensure consistency, command credibility, and operations security.
6-21. The public affairs staff requires augmentation to provide full support during protracted operations. (JP 3-61, AR 360-1, and FMs 46-1 and 3-61.1 govern public affairs.)

While acknowledging the considerations you mention... I would think that this verbage takes into account the needs of the PA community...

I'm just a former operator who worked the spectrum from Div thru GCC, neither the brightest nor dimmest bulb on the tree, but the toughest issue was to bring all the assets to bear (otherwise known as cat herding)... The biggest problem was staff elements who worked their lane exclusively (usually leading to being out of sync with the remainder of the staff)... bring info tasks into logical staff forums for integration across the command makes a lot of sense in my brain casing...

In a related, anecdotal note, I had a front row seat to the III Corps/MNC-I After Action/Collection Team... less doctrine directing them to, this is how they conducted business to great effect....

I'm not sure their is a perfect solution, but this one seems an appropriate weighing of considerations...

Live well and row...

[zzman]

PM sent

[Nickel]

I would agree with your assessment of AR 525-20 not accurately reflecting FM 3-0, capstone doctrine of the Army and the selected application of concepts by senior leadership. Having worked on this project and heard the guidance given by senior leadership, I find it interesting that the manual is not more in line with FM 3-0.

[BobKing]

I would agree with your assessment of AR 525-20 not accurately reflecting FM 3-0, capstone doctrine of the Army and the selected application of concepts by senior leadership. Having worked on this project and heard the guidance given by senior leadership, I find it interesting that the manual is not more in line with FM 3-0. (emphasis added)

AR 525-20 is not a manual - it's an Army Regulation.

What takes precedence? Doctrine or Regulations?

I could just as easily say:

I find it interesting that FM 3-0 capstone doctrine (and the new Draft FM 3-13) is not in line with Army IO Regulations and Joint IO Doctrine.

As a matter of fact, I'm sure there are probably people within the Army, and within OSD & the Joint Staff, that are looking at Army IO doctrine and thinking the same thing.

Perhaps those drafting the AR 525-20 actually tried to nest it within higher order doctrine and guidance, which is why there's a disconnect with FM 3-0.

[Team Infidel]

Policy (AR) trumps doctrine....

[Hacksaw]

Don't think you are right...

You don't have to wait on policy in order to change doctrine... Policy often follows...

This isn't an all or nothing, can't use an 525 AR as a final answer to this type of conflict...

Live well and row