Debating defense priorities and expenditures

[Ken White]

I think you and I agree in that we both see policy as the driver, not strategy. I think we disagree in that I believe that can change, where you do not. I agree with many of your observations though. You may appreciate this, 8 Minutes of DoD Acquisition History.

while we agree that Policy is indeed the driver, I have to ask -- why would one want that to change so that, as you appear to suggest, strategy becomes the (or even 'a') driver?

Very serious question.

[Rob Thornton]

I have to ask -- why would one want that to change so that, as you appear to suggest, strategy becomes the (or even 'a') driver?

Ken - that may get into to if somebody wants to be more efficient or more effective in a given area.

I had a discussion with a buddy a couple of weeks ago about how hard it is to convince people that sometimes you become more efficient (not having to spend years adapting, re-doing, or re-learning and spending more blood and treasure while risking other objectives) through being more effective.

The cost may be more up front, but ultimately less than it would be if you went in with the idea that you can always increase effectiveness via efficiencies. This is not just about defense spending priorities, but about the closely held values you design your policies and programs to support.

Caveat 1- sometimes its going to be long and ugly just because long and ugly is what you bit into - buyer beware.

Caveat 2 - sometimes you may not intend to be effective at all, and your actions to become more efficient in one area are based on your priorities in others. Domestic programs cost allot of money (every policitian has them regardless of party) and like R&D engineering they often have cost overuns.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

My point was / is that policies of the US can endure and have done so -- our strategies, OTOH, change frequently. As I believe they must. Perhaps ,certainly will' is more expressive than must; again, that 2,4,6 and 8 year effect on strategizing...

"...that may get into to if somebody wants to be more efficient or more effective in a given area."

I'm sorry, I'm not sure I understand what you mean. To me, whether one calls something a strategy or a policy has little to do with efficiency or effectiveness. Either of the former can produce either -- or neither -- of the latter.

"The cost may be more up front, but ultimately less than it would be if you went in with the idea that you can always increase effectiveness via efficiencies. This is not just about defense spending priorities, but about the closely held values you design your policies and programs to support.

Nor do I see a relationship there... Sorry.

[Galrahn]

while we agree that Policy is indeed the driver, I have to ask -- why would one want that to change so that, as you appear to suggest, strategy becomes the (or even 'a') driver?

Very serious question.

I will look at it from the Navy's perspective, but I would argue an Air Force example could apply as well. To operate at sea, or in the sky, you require equipment. We can field light infantry on land without major technologies, indeed low tech light infantry rules in many parts of the world.

This technology requires long lead times for development and often will be utilized for about 2/5s of a century, meaning every technology decision shapes several generations. Even the JOE doesn't look out far enough to cover the life of a new program.

So I would argue strategy is necessary for effective planning, and also necessary for avoiding mistakes that can take time to develop and even more time to overcome. Policy isn't enduring because it changes. However, strategy is driven by policy so it is constantly changing too, which tends to reinforce your point.

But even with that said, I would argue the Navy's Surface Combatant 21 program, the DDG-1000 and LCS, is a failure not of policy, but strategy. The Navy's littoral strategy is severely flawed in several ways.

The Navy believed:

1) 14,500 ton ships could somehow be stealthy in populated maritime littorals.
2) Unmanned systems can replace manpower in complex human terrains, like the littorals
3) Speed is protection, as if a ship will outrun a missile

Policy, economic in nature, will almost certainly cancel the DDG-1000, but only to save money. The same economic driven policy may mean we build the LCS, not because it actually makes any sense as a technology for the littorals, but because it is relatively cheap as navy ships go.

Then we will spend more money later because the LCS can't do what it needs to do against littoral challenges, because the unmanned systems we have all over the sea allows us to either "shoot" or "watch." The absence of sailors prevents alternatives like "inspect" or "arrest."

If RoE prevents shooting, we don't secure the maritime domain, we watch it. In the end, policy drives future naval capability because strategy failed, and as a result was ignored...

Make sense?

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Agreed friend.

Interestingly enough, our constitutional arrangement of forced triangulation or standoff from a solid geostrategy calls for a surge of support from our population in order to wage war. This effect then increases productivity, enlistment, drives, rationing, support and the all important psychological mobilization that we saw small examples of in '81, '91 & '01.

The people acting together as one always are our greatest strength.

Wars truly are won not on the battlefields, but in the minds of populations.

[ipopescu]

I attempted to address some of the questions that would need to be considered in order to bridge the strategy-resources gap in a recent piece in the new JFQ http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pa...ons/i53/17.pdf
The article struggles with some of the same questions raised on this thread, so I thought it would be germane to link it here. The intro is pasted below:

With a large increase in funding rather unlikely, it seems reasonable to expect that President Barack Obama will attempt to solve the Pentagon’s financial problems by trying to achieve a closer match of budgetary resources with its overall defense and national security strategy. Ideally, the Obama administration should be able to choose among competing funding priorities the ones most needed to accomplish its goals, and eliminate some of the less relevant ones to free up funds and hence make its plan affordable and sustainable. Should this happen, it would be one of the few times in history when the American defense planning process made a great deal of strategic sense. The reasons for this are twofold: first, the Pentagon’s budgeting priorities are like a big ship, where small rudder changes are all that is possible; and second, military procurement plans are more often than not rather impervious to policy direction.
Despite the sorry state of the previous administration’s plans, it would be overly optimistic to hope for a dramatic overhaul from President Obama; the institutional inertia is just too powerful. The best that could be realistically demanded of the national security team is to integrate at least some of the hard budgetary choices to into a coherent strategic framework that truly connects means with ends and that takes into account both the internal and external factors determining the future of U.S. defense policy. This article is dedicated to providing such a concise analytical framework that suggests some of the critical questions that should be considered during the process preceding the first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the Obama administration.
The article is grounded in a theoretical understanding of war and strategy strongly influenced by Clausewitzian thought. Thus, an appropriate depiction of future challenges must necessarily employ a holistic understanding of conflict. Descriptions of future war that fail to take into account both its operational grammar and its policy logic are incomplete at best and dangerously misleading at worst. For traditional and historical reasons, American defense planning has too often suffered from a debilitating bifurcation of strategic thinking: debates on war’s grammar have been conducted without regards to political objectives, while policy and strategy debates rarely considered the actual realities of the battlefield and the suitability of current military means to achieve the specified policy goals. Keeping in mind that strategy-making is above all a continuous process of matching means and ends according to dynamic changes in real-world circumstances, this study focuses on pointing out four inter-related factors—grand strategy, the Bush legacy, the nature of the threat, and the nature of modern warfare—that need to be considered during any strategic deliberations on defense policy planning, programming, and budgeting.

[Entropy]

Ken,

I'd submit most all weapons systems are designed with a clear vision of the potential threats so that was not unique to that period.

Sure, but the difference today is there isn't much agreement on our threat focus - there's no "peer competitor." We built a military during the cold war which, despite the many problems and incoherence along the way, was focused on the Soviet threat. My point is there isn't any such focus today so the incoherence is much worse.

We also bought a lot of dumb stuff that would not have lasted long in combat and was terribly difficult to maintain. I can name you a dozen birds that were bought that were a total waste of $$ -- start with the B-58, B-70, F-104 and F-105 or the A3D, A5, F11F. Where are the Nuke Cruisers today?

You're quite right, but there are some big differences today. First of all, those "mistakes" didn't cost as much, relatively speaking, as defense projects do today. There also used to be a lot more competition in the defense industry - many aerospace companies have consolidated into two, for example. There were, generally, more contracts that cost less than today. To use a couple of your examples, the F-105 cost about $10 million each in 2009 dollars, the B-58 about $97 million (again in 2009 dollars) and the entire Valkyrie program was about $11 billion in today's dollars, or about the same amount congress has spent on the "alternative" engine for the F-35 (which still isn't finished). All those programs you mention were comparatively cheap in terms of development and unit cost to equivalents today.

Additionally, like AIG, defense programs are "too big to fail" today thanks to collusion between the Congress, defense industry and the services. That has produced all sorts of negative consequences.

In short I agree with the general thrust of your argument that there has been a long history of incoherence - on that we agree - but I think things are much worse now due to the factors I've argued here. I freely admit that may be my own perception, tarnished by my relative youth, but the numbers in terms of cost, development timelines, number of programs, etc. I think support my argument.

[Ken White]

...I think things are much worse now due to the factors I've argued here. I freely admit that may be my own perception, tarnished by my relative youth, but the numbers in terms of cost, development timelines, number of programs, etc. I think support my argument.

That and the deterioration of some but not all of our science and engineering?

Mistakes are more expensive per capita today -- but there are far fewer capitas.

[Ken White]

...We can field light infantry on land without major technologies, indeed low tech light infantry rules in many parts of the world.

I broadly agree but would suggest some care -- our Light Infantryman today costs about 25 to 50K to equip, job dependent and they have some high tech gear that took a long time to develop; and there's more on the way.

...meaning every technology decision shapes several generations. Even the JOE doesn't look out far enough to cover the life of a new program.

Totally true, ergo...

Policy isn't enduring because it changes. However, strategy is driven by policy so it is constantly changing too, which tends to reinforce your point.

I believe that our policies have changed not nearly as sweepingly or as often as our Strategies. Strategies are changed not only at our whim but alos due to situational changes and opponenets actions. Polices are less affected by those outside factors.

...I would argue the Navy's Surface Combatant 21 program, the DDG-1000 and LCS, is a failure not of policy, but strategy. The Navy's littoral strategy is severely flawed in several ways.

I totally agree -- but submit that was mostly because of a poor understanding of the environment AND a 'blue wate' lust plus Congressional influence.

...1) 14,500 ton ships could somehow be stealthy in populated maritime littorals.

Don't think so. They believed that a 14,500 ton ship could stand off and dominate the littorals -- not the same thing at all. For proof of that, simply look at the original weapons fit. Ask the Navy why they're playing with ATACMs or what happened ERGM -- and the Mk 148.

2) Unmanned systems can replace manpower in complex human terrains, like the littorals

A littoral is not complex human terain; it's shallow near shore water, nothing more. The use of unmanned systems may or may not prove viable; we'll see. What the nearby humans in the littorals do won't have nearly as much to do with that as the technology.

3) Speed is protection, as if a ship will outrun a missile.

Don't think so. Not at all correct (regardless of what some know nothing may have said...) -- speed was and is seen as affording flexibility in employment and rapidity of movement from one action location to another. The M1 tank did not change the speed of comabt -- but its ability to move to blocking or reinforcing positions at very high speed complicates the planning of opponents.

Point is that those STRATEGIC assumptions made by one person (or several...) are now being questioned by others. As they should be.

...we build the LCS, not because it actually makes any sense as a technology for the littorals, but because it is relatively cheap as navy ships go.

Doubt it -- I believe the LCS will be seen as significabnt over match for its actual job description and a significantly cheaper alternative of the same or slightly less size will appear.

In the end, policy drives future naval capability because strategy failed, and as a result was ignored...

Make sense?

Sure it does. I thought that's what I said...

Or, differently put; strategy is infinitelt variable and MUST change as circumstances direct. A policy cane exist for years and survive numerous minor differences in the environment.

Strategies are short term efforts to achieve specific goals -- try to make them long term (as in Grand Strategy) and you will screw the pooch. Take a look at WW II Strategies and ships / shipbuilding. Five years and myriad changes...

The US can and has adopted long term policies. Long term strategies are beyond us and that's a good thing...

[Galrahn]

The US can and has adopted long term policies. Long term strategies are beyond us and that's a good thing...

Ken,

I think you are wrong on so many parts of that post it would take us enormously off coarse on this discussion to go through it, only I will suggest that I don't think you know what you think you know about naval programs, and I think your view of what the littoral is matches very well with the folks in the Navy who have unsuccessfully developed a littoral strategy for the post cold war US Navy.

On the quoted section above, I think that is an interesting view. I think Bush had some policies that the Obama administration is rejecting, interventionism and unilateralism among the most influential policies that will impact defense strategy.

But I disagree that long term strategies are beyond us. I don't believe the absence of a long term strategy is proof they aren't possible nor that they would be ineffective if implemented. Implementation is difficult, but not impossible.

I note Russia, India, and China all have long term strategies and I see no evidence it is beyond any of those countries, and I would note that India is a democracy and even more of a political mess when it comes to policy than the US. Our national inabilities are rooted in our indecision, not our incapacity.

[Ken White]

...only I will suggest that I don't think you know what you think you know about naval programs...

Great minds apparently run in the same channel, that was exactly what I thought about your knowledge of them. I'd never heard anyone suggest that monster of a DDX as a littoral operator (as opposed to dominator). I'd also note I do not profess to be a naval gazer. All I know about the programs are things I read open source and a few things passed on by friends and acquaintances and they are not of great interest to me as my limited naval knowledge from growing up around the Navy (and even a Bubble Head for a Father in Law for many years) has been blunted by over 60 years of running around with folks in green. .

You might also check around on the prognosis for many more LCS' -- or a cheaper, lower tech or at least less gold plated replacement. I didn't grab that thought out of the air.

and I think your view of what the littoral is matches very well with the folks in the Navy who have unsuccessfully developed a littoral strategy for the post cold war US Navy.

Geography and water depth are geography and water depth; one can only do so much given the constraints. I don't think there has been or is a 'littoral strategy.' Nor should there be -- which littoral will you design it for? There are a number, all different -- one strategy cannot encompass all nor will one strategy fit all littorals (nor will one ship type fit 'em all...). Seems to me, admittedly lolling about on the periphery and paying only casual attention, that rather there has been a reluctant and grudging acknowledgment that some operations in littorals may not be avoided now matter how much the Navy would prefer to avoid them...

But I disagree that long term strategies are beyond us. I don't believe the absence of a long term strategy is proof they aren't possible nor that they would be ineffective if implemented. Implementation is difficult, but not impossible.

In order; may not be beyond but we have not managed it in my lifetime and I'm close to 80 (nor, as I read our history, have we ever had one...); they are possible (just very highly improbable in my view); I think the relative 'effectiveness' would depend on what the strategy envisioned but I also am firmly convinced that the geopolitical and domestic political milieus would cause a need for constant change and revision -- that could be more detrimental than not having such a strategy at all.

I note Russia, India, and China all have long term strategies and I see no evidence it is beyond any of those countries, and I would note that India is a democracy and even more of a political mess when it comes to policy than the US.

Yes, all purport to do so and Indian democracy is chaotic. China may have one that is effective; the other two, not so much...

Do recall that our problem is not a political mess (which we are) nearly so much as the design intent of a governmental system specifically to preclude too much coherence and singular direction. It is admittedly inefficient but I wouldn't want to change it.

Our national inabilities are rooted in our indecision, not our incapacity.

Well, yes. That's the gist of the problem. That's essentially what I said -- just about the time someone gets decisive, the great unwashed go to the polls and vote -- and things get changed. New people, new ideas (well, not so much...). In 2012, who knows what will happen.

So we can agreeably disagree. Time will tell who was / is correct.

[Ron Humphrey]

Ken,

I think you are wrong on so many parts of that post it would take us enormously off coarse on this discussion to go through it, only I will suggest that I don't think you know what you think you know about naval programs, and I think your view of what the littoral is matches very well with the folks in the Navy who have unsuccessfully developed a littoral strategy for the post cold war US Navy.

On the quoted section above, I think that is an interesting view. I think Bush had some policies that the Obama administration is rejecting, interventionism and unilateralism among the most influential policies that will impact defense strategy.

But I disagree that long term strategies are beyond us. I don't believe the absence of a long term strategy is proof they aren't possible nor that they would be ineffective if implemented. Implementation is difficult, but not impossible.

I note Russia, India, and China all have long term strategies and I see no evidence it is beyond any of those countries, and I would note that India is a democracy and even more of a political mess when it comes to policy than the US. Our national inabilities are rooted in our indecision, not our incapacity.

Note also the real difference in the aforementioned nations perceptual ties in relation to doing what their populous calls for vs sticking to something regardless what the popular sentiment is.

Although I too agree that we should be able to come up with at least some degree of consistency in our overall approach to international actors it is probably as important to make sure the US population never gets the perception that what they think about a given action is less important than the action itself.

It's a tough balance and as the last administration unfortunately suffered from just a sampling of how perception can kill ones ability to act even if appropriately given the circumstances without suffering devastating results in elections.

If for no other reason than that I would say Ken's correct in saying policy is probably as good as we're gonna get



PS : What he said

[William F. Owen]

and I think your view of what the littoral is matches very well with the folks in the Navy who have unsuccessfully developed a littoral strategy for the post cold war US Navy.

I think Ken's view is that of the US Navy, and it is their definition that is the relevant one. The "Littoral" is physical, not conceptual. It's the "conceptual" framework which is most probably doomed to be "not useful." Extending the debate into a "human terrain," may well be a choice that extends you no benefit whatsoever.

[J Wolfsberger]

There are a few questions that have to be resolved or we're simply going to flail about, making decisions on the basis of force of personality and political maneuvering. Which, incidentally, is what we pretty much did (on both sides of the aisle) after the USSR imploded. After all, that was the "end of war" and the dawn of a "new world order" that made "warfare obsolete." Right?

1. What kind of international situations are we likely to face/do owe want to plan for in the next 20 to 30 years? Will another genocide (ala Rwanda) occurs? Will country C decide it can do a better job managing the resources of country R? Will a natural disaster occur (ala the tsunami in the Indian Ocean)?
   
2. And what will we do about them? If another genocide occurs will we intervene? Do we help defend country R? Do we want to have a naval task group in the area to quickly render assistance? Even more important, will we have a national consensus on the answers, or will we see one party, for example, commit to intervention and four years later the other party swears it won't?
   
3. Is the US Army serious about the new FM 3-0? Does it really want a force capable of successfully executing all those missions across the complete spectrum of conflict?
   
4. After we answer those questions, the next set revolves around how we plan to execute the various mission profiles. i.e. What is our doctrine? How quickly do we respond, with how many troops? What will be the operational goals in the mission? Will the strategy be Populace or Threat Centric? What will the small unit tactics look like?
   
5. What capabilities do we need in order for the troops to successfully execute the strategy? What kind of logistic footprint will we need to support? What threats will they face? What weapons will be appropriate?

I don't care if its called "strategy" or "policy," but these questions must be answered if we are going to make intelligent, rational decisions about our needs for manpower, training and equipment. And I'm not referring to discussions inside the Pentagon. Those take place in response to Congress and POTUS saying "here's what you get." I'm referring to the public discussion that needs to take place about what role we, as a nation, plan to play in the world at large.

Until we have that discussion, and answer the questions above, our entire defense structure, military, civil service and contractors, is going to be the random result political gamesmanship.

[William F. Owen]

Until we have that discussion, and answer the questions above, our entire defense structure, military, civil service and contractors, is going to be the random result political gamesmanship.

I submit that your excellent and well informed questions may be irrelevant.

a.) You can't tell the future.
b.) The biggest constraint on the US Army is the mind set of it's senior officers, whom history has not been kind to, and with some good evidence.
c.) It's not about what your forces should look like. It's about what they can do for the money and the manpower.

It like house keeping. No one works out what they need. You work with what you can afford. Military capability generally informs policy. Very rarely does policy inform capability.

That's this Hedgehogs view!

[Ken White]

There are a few questions that have to be resolved or we're simply going to flail about, making decisions on the basis of force of personality and political maneuvering. Which, incidentally, is what we pretty much did (on both sides of the aisle) after the USSR imploded

and it's also what we did after the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea, Viet Nam and, as you point out, pretty much since 1989. Note that the Spanish American War is not on the list. That's because the Army screwed up so bad in that one that it got reinvented after the war. The Navy, OTOH, did real well and improved upon its successes.

The Army also screwed up badly in Korea but it was an unsatisfactory tie on a political basis so the public screaming was muted. However, the Army did try to reinvent itself and really did fairly well -- but then we went to Viet Nam, forgot all we had learned over the previous six years and fouled up big time pretty much because the pre war 'planning' (there really wasn't any. Sound familiar?) had been based on the wrong assumptions (thus my caution on that topic below...). Unfortunately, the reinvention post Viet Nam got bogged down in domestic politics and thus was skewed and poorly executed...

As you also point out, said domestic politics are still an effector. Always have been and likely always will be as long as we're around -- until a major trauma (we have not had one of those as a Nation since 1865) forces us to reinvent the government milieu to one extent or another.

[*]And what will we do about them? If another genocide occurs will we intervene? Do we help defend country R? Do we want to have a naval task group in the area to quickly render assistance? Even more important, will we have a national consensus on the answers, or will we see one party, for example, commit to intervention and four years later the other party swears it won't?

No one knows what we will do and the US political system does not lend itself to forcing a predictable answer.I'd also submit that the fact that no one knows what we will do is not a bad thing.

[*]Is the US Army serious about the new FM 3-0? Does it really want a force capable of successfully executing all those missions across the complete spectrum of conflict?

It better be serious. Consider how much different the last seven years might have ben had the Army been a full spectrum force. It is not that hard to do -- we've done it before but then, as we're prone to do, ignored all our careful planning and expensive training and did something else based primarily on domestic politics -- make no mistake, Viet Nam was more about domestic politics than anything else. So, to a far lesser extent, was Iraq.

[*]After we answer those questions, the next set revolves around how we plan to execute the various mission profiles. i.e. What is our doctrine? How quickly do we respond, with how many troops? What will be the operational goals in the mission? Will the strategy be Populace or Threat Centric? What will the small unit tactics look like?

You can ask for that much detail but I suggest that's an invitation to problems. Organizations, like people can get tunnel vision and target fixation. I believe those are valid questions and answers (plural) should be sought but I further believe that settling on one or two answers per question is unnecessarily limiting. Viet Nam as one example and Iraq as another resulted from such fixations -- note that one was initiated by someone from each political party.

Consider also Bosnia/ Kosovo on the one hand and Darfur / Tomahawks to Afghanistan and Sudan on the other. All were short term, little warning events and arguably improper actions were taken in all four cases essentially for domestic political reasons. They are also noteworthy from the standpoint that the first two were probably overkill and the second two were inadequately responded to or poorly done -- all due to domestic political concerns.

I can answer one of those questions, though -- small unit tactics will look just like they have for the last three hundred years unless someone invents a better weapon than the firearm.

I don't care if its called "strategy" or "policy," but these questions must be answered if we are going to make intelligent, rational decisions about our needs for manpower, training and equipment. And I'm not referring to discussions inside the Pentagon. Those take place in response to Congress and POTUS saying "here's what you get." I'm referring to the public discussion that needs to take place about what role we, as a nation, plan to play in the world at large.

Until we have that discussion, and answer the questions above, our entire defense structure, military, civil service and contractors, is going to be the random result political gamesmanship.

I do not think you, we -- the nation -- can answer those questions sensibly. Nor do I think that most in this nation are willing to get involved in such a discussion -- until such time as they see an impact on themselves. Political, geostrategic and military junkies will debate those things for weeks if you let them (to little real effect) but the public at large isn't interested -- nor really, are most in Congress. Too many of them will get interested only when it effects their reelection prospects or the nation is in deep trouble -- not minor as the last 20 years or today but deep as in we have not been since 1943...

Long way of saying I really do agree but history leads me to doubt it will happen and I believe that's probably okay. Not great; not even good -- but okay...

[davidbfpo]

(taken from) I'm referring to the public discussion that needs to take place about what role we, as a nation, plan to play in the world at large.....Until we have that discussion, and answer the questions above, our entire defense structure, military, civil service and contractors, is going to be the random result political gamesmanship.

I am not sure how much public discussion there has really been on the US or UK's national role; discussions within the 'Beltway' or Westminster are not a public discussion and rarely has the UK parliament debated national role. the last two I can recall were the second Gulf War and the Falklands; IMHO rather late for discussion of 'role'.

Politicians and others make assessments of how much the public will tolerate. In the Cold War our (UK) national role appeared to be set in concrete, until economic factors intervened and the UK concentrated on Europe.

I would suggest in the UK and Western Europe the commitments made to Afghanistan recognise the lack of public support, so are subject to limits of varying strengths.

Clearly the UK has left behind a focus on Europe for having an expeditionary role; not just in Iraq (due to end in July), Afghanistan and smaller, discreet presences in places like Kenya, Oman and West Africa. "Punching above our weight" crops up regularly in Westminster-Whitehall explanations.

No-one could have predicted the UK would have 8k troops in Afghanistan in 2009, six years after arriving; nor that Pakistan has become our No.1 foreign policy focus - the UK did after all leave South Asia in 1947.

A different viewpoint from my armchair.

davidbfpo

[Stevely]

I don't care if its called "strategy" or "policy," but these questions must be answered if we are going to make intelligent, rational decisions about our needs for manpower, training and equipment. And I'm not referring to discussions inside the Pentagon. Those take place in response to Congress and POTUS saying "here's what you get." I'm referring to the public discussion that needs to take place about what role we, as a nation, plan to play in the world at large.

Until we have that discussion, and answer the questions above, our entire defense structure, military, civil service and contractors, is going to be the random result political gamesmanship.

This discussion won't take place, for the reasons others in the thread have given, but also I think because the public discussion - such as actually happen in the US - is going to dedicated to more pressing matters very soon now, like "how do we cope with the collapse of the economy?" Our strategy discussion can probably be held off until we know what drastically reduced economic circumstances will have to try to maintain some military capability under.