Why democracies don't lose insurgencies

[Ken White]

Whoops -- already used that line once this month...

I'll change it; I love inexperienced experts...

...because ... da, da, da - and you're off to the races. After reading through Lyall's articles, I can see why you are considering the topic. Bonne Chance.

See what I mean about the number crunchers getting it wrong. They almost always do.

Always hated it when my Commander was one of them; the intuitive guys just do it a lot better. No numbers or machinery involved. Ain't at, right Niel...

[Cavguy]

Because my degree is in Security Studies, papers tend to focus on the quantitative. I am less than impressed with the way IR "codes" history. I think Stephen Walt captured most of the issues well in "Rigor or Rigor Mortis?"

That said, quant has its uses but can be carried too far. It does tend to delve into "inside baseball" between datasets, coding issues, and regression. It's also why most policymakers pay little attention to "hard" IR theory.

[Cavguy]

What's the dataset coding definition for insurgency, Cavguy? Does it depend on battle deaths (and if so, is the threshold set in absolute numbers, or relative to population size)? How does it differentiate from terrorism?

I ask this because, arguably, the great success of democracies might be that groups never make the transition from protest movement > small terrorist group > full-blown insurgency, and that the "success" of democracies lies rather earlier than their ability to engage in full-scale COIN.

A critic might argue that it is rather like trying to measure the effectiveness of a bug-zapper atop Mount Everest (the body count isn't really getting at the issue of why there are so few mosquitos around...)

Agreed. The RAND Terrorist post-1945 dataset has over 600 listed entries. The Insurgency dataset has 89. The coding is based off of a number of factors, including size, goals, casualties, and other factors. Adding terrorist data actually reinforces the hypothesis, as they are often defeated and rarely successful.

Intuitively, I think you have hit on the reason - the structure of democracy makes it hard for terror groups to metastasize into full blown rebellions. There would have to be a huge reservoir of non-reconcilable discontent unresolvable through political means - which in turn suggests the contest is hardcore ideological (religious-like or separatist) in nature, rather than grievance based.

[Bob's World]

In your opinion, what is the significance and consequences of differentiating between violence as "military means" and other forms of politically-driven violence?

First to preface this, the core concept being developed here is that:

"In order to resolve a problem one must first have a good understanding of what the nature of the problem is."


If an infantry squad is moving down a country lane and enters into an L-shaped ambush, it pretty much looks the same and has the same effect if it is executed by a state-opponent's military force or if it is executed by a bunch of local men who have joined an insurgent movement.

Similarly, the tactical actions to counter that ambushing unit are much the same as well.

To successfully address and resolve WHY the ambush was executed, however, are two very different things altogether. This is why I immediately become guarded when things that appear very similar on their face are immediately lumped into convenient bins based not on the purpose for action, but more by the physical nature of the action itself.

Examples of this currently are those who lump many diverse groups with equally diverse purpose for action under the deliberately inflammatory banner of "Terrorist." Similarly, the U.S. conventional force has recently trended to lumping actions against a similarly diversely motivated set of organizations as being "COIN." Taken to an even larger generalization, because we are using the military to defeat violent activities we lump it again under the even broader umbrella of "war."

Such lack of sophistication in seeking to understand ones opponent's purpose for action prior to defining and shaping your own counter to resolve such problems can only lead to long, drawn out affairs that will tend to be too heavily weighted toward military action directed at the symptoms of the problem, as opposed to a holistic program of engagement directed with laser precision at the sources of the problem.

So just as every fist fight is not a boxing match (both look similar, but begin for different reasons, and are won by different measures) all violence is not warfare. The boxer jumped in the alley on the way home will use all of his boxing skills and have a much greater chance of prevailing over a street fighter than an untrained individual encountering the same problem. But if the boxer thinks he's going to get a break every 3 minutes, receive no punches below the belt, or not get hit on the back his head by a pipe swung by his mugger's girlfriend, he is going to be in trouble. We all can grasp this, but for some reason when 200,000 of us get on planes and fly to a foreign country to wage "war", we can't seem to look past the "threat" we are there to defeat and really do the frontend analysis to figure out not just HOW he fights, but WHY he fights and then correspondingly, how to get him to stand down.

Many previous operations chalked up as COIN "victories" were really little more than a temporary set back for the insurgent movement. Insurgencies are internal violence for political change by a populace against its own government. If beaten down from phase II to phase I or even 0, so long as the conditions giving rise to the insurgency remain unaddressed, the populace will move back up into higher phase insurgency as soon as they have the capacity to do so. Algeria and the Philippines are both great examples of this. You can kill Berbers and Moros every generation for the next 1000 years; or you can take the time to figure out why they are so willing to keep getting back up to fight, and attempt to shape a solution that provides some sense of justice and good governance for the affected populace.

Intervening powers are like police officers responding to domestic violence calls. Dangerous crazy stuff. You can't really hate someone unless you love them first. Similarly, a populace driven to violence against itself has a whole other degree of motivation than a professional army sent against another state for King and country. The latter is just business. The Former is personal.

So, in a democracy, a populace is less likely to revolt as they typically can resolve their differences with their government by legitimate means short of violence. Democracy is the greatest COIN tool ever devised for this very reason. The other side of this though, is that when a democracy intervenes in someone else’s insurgency their actions are tempered by their own populaceslack of will for harsh violence, which prevents them from waging the type of insurgent crushing operations that will put an insurgency into phase 0 for an extended period of time. Insurgency was not a big problem in Yugoslavia until Tito's iron hand was removed from back of the populace’s neck.

So I guess here is a take-away: Insurgency is not apt to erupt in either a strong democracy, or a strong dictatorship. The first because the conditions giving rise to insurgency can be addressed peacefully, the second because any effort to protest those conditions can be immediately and brutally crushed. Insurgency will then tend to occur in those governments that lie in between these two poles. Worst case is a democracy too insecure to allow true popular input to effect change, but not heavy handed enough to crush those who chose to act out. When you intervene in such a country (think, oh, how about Iraq or Afghanistan) you are in for a challenge. But remember what pole we are there to lead them toward, and shape your engagement accordingly.

[AmericanPride]

Bob,

I agree with much of what you said, though I would go further and argue that violence is at the foundation of all political activity, and only that mitigating factors such as time, resources, the strength of the opposition, etc prevent distributing power based solely on the capacity to impose one's will on another through violence. That said, selective and subjective definitions of 'democracy' and 'dictatorship' (i.e. modern, Western versions of either) seems to suggest that insurgencies are unlikely to erupt in either. But I would dispute any correlation on the basis that every democracy, dictatorship, and insurgency are different, and that any conclusion drawn from such comparisons would be incomplete. There is no absolute democracy or dictatorship that we can use as an appropriate measure. I would argue that why democracies (and dictatorships) are successful in either mitigating insurgency or do not generally face the threat in the first place is a function of class factionalism and not the organization of government (which, IMO, reflects the distribution of power among classes; hence the different shapes of governments that are nonetheless characterized as the same or similar). Whatever the agenda of post-WW2 insurgencies, the common attributes are often a dispossessed concentrated ethnic majority led by an educated, relatively well-off (whether in wealth, prestige, power, etc) ideological elite. Looking through Cav's examples in his first post, I have to ask how many of those insurgencies "lost" as a direct result of the system of government in place? Or in contrast, how many "lost" because of violence, resettlement, etc but they happened to have been defeated by a democratic government (Chechnya, Lebanon, Turkey)? Another question: given that the minority of states were democratic through the latter half of the 20th century, what is the possibility that democratic states appear statistically more likely to defeat insurgencies because there are fewer examples of 'democratic insurgencies'?

The common factor, IMO, seems to be that democratic governments are more willing to use violence to defeat insurgencies that are considered 'illegitimate' according to the political climate/context of the time. Given that democracies are generally ruled by the ethnic/ideological majority, are democracies more likely to pursue violence until the 'bitter end' so to speak? And since the democratic state is often at war with a dispossessed minority, how does the advantage in resources and mobilization for the state impact the outcome of the conflict? Last question: if democratic governments are more successful in mitigating insurgency because of ease of accommodation for rival political factions, why do 'democratic insurgencies' occur in the first place?

Just my thoughts.

[AmericanPride]

Ron,

In Post #40, you describe a number of different classes of governemnt and how that may impact the distribution of power and the propensity for internal violence. I will suggest here a similar argument: that liberal/revolutionary/revisionist states face less problems with internal violence than do conservative/reactionary/traditionalist states because the factions within the former can more easily redefine/reshape/modify ideologies, institutions, and policies as the circumstances dictate. I would further argue that most liberal/revolutionary/revisionist states eventually become conservative/reactionary/traditionalist as the 'dust settles' so-to-speak, and power becomes more formal and institutionalized.

[William F. Owen]

I would further argue that most liberal/revolutionary/revisionist states eventually become conservative/reactionary/traditionalist as the 'dust settles' so-to-speak, and power becomes more formal and institutionalized.

"Every revolution must end with a reinforcing of power to the state". - Lenin!

[50Bravo]

The short answer is, no, I can't think of one.

As to suitability for your Thesis, the information you provide seems to me, possibly correlated but not necessarily causal. If the data are not or cannot be demonstrated to be causal then you are in for a long walk in the sun.

It is difficult for me to fit those governments into one box called Democracy, as many of them are at odds with what you and I might think of as a democracy... so you got that definitional thing.(Maybe the "spectrum" of democratic characteristics might have some impact on the term of the insurgency?)

I would be leery of making the commitment to this topic until I had found some relationship that looks causal. The tough part about a Thesis (IMHO) is picking a subject that you can run with and use that yet allows a narrow enough focus to allow a clear and succinct examination of your hypothesis. This is what you need for a clean product.

I think that to make this work, you'll need to tunnel deeper and discover something that might (or might not) be demonstrable as a causal factor. If it was my assignment and I could not identify that prospective relationship, I'd shift targets.

[50Bravo]

Fishel's post from another thread came to mind...


With that in mind, I would guess (and this is a pure guess - not even an "eduated" one) that most democracies tend to experience less drastic social upheavals than other forms of government. Using the theory above, less drastic upheaval means less intense insurgency (if any). The weaker insurgency gets defeated.

Another uneducated guess: in a democracy, change is less likely to take the form of armed upheaval because a democracy, in theory, gives everyone at least some voice or the perception that they have a voice and they are less likely to lash out. Hitler comes to mind. He didn't wage an insurgency. He got elected.

Is the corollary that, in a democracy, insurrection is more likely if a large enough part of the polity perceives that they have no voice, that the situation is out of control? i would also suggest that Hitler did wage an insurgency, there was plenty of violence and intrigue. Saying that his deal wasn't an insurgency is, I believe inaccurate. The elections were a side show, the game was over well before then. Another example would be Hamas. They were "elected" yet who believes that there was no violence or coersion. w

Third thought: an insurgency can gain legitimacy by demonizing a king or oligarchy. Who does it demonize in a democracy? The people? That doesn't sound like much of a rallying cry. "We suck - let's overthrow ourselves!"

But you could say (as many do) our representation sucks, lets remove them. It seems that there is a lot of that going around these days. Cavguy you may have a foam rubber pinata here..

[Schmedlap]

This is somewhat of a rambling post, but I'm pressing "submit reply" anyway.

To answer the question, another question may be worth pondering. Why have some countries not converted to democracy?

I was re-reading Bernard Lewis’ piece in the latest Foreign Affairs (March/April 2009) and I thought his description of the models of Arab governance was interesting. Starting on page 86, he writes “most Arab regimes belong to one of two categories: those that depend on the people’s loyalty and those that depend on their obedience. Loyalty may be ethnic, tribal, regional, or some combination of these… The regimes that depend on obedience are European-style dictatorships that use techniques of control and enforcement derived from the fascist and communist models. These regimes have little or no claim to the loyalty of their people and depend for survival on diversion and repression: directing the anger of their people toward some external enemy.”

The recent order has been the loyalty regimes like Morocco and Saudi Arabia or the obedience regimes like Egypt or Syria (I presume). But, he goes on to point out that these two models “are becoming less effective; there are groups, increasing in number and importance, that seek a new form of government based not primarily on loyalty, and still less on repression, but on consent and participation. These groups are still small and, of necessity, quiet, but the fact that they have appeared at all is a remarkable development.”

A trend for the future may be a move away from the either-or choice of loyalty versus obedience toward a third option of consent (democratic-like models). Lebanon, he states, “is one country in the entire region with a significant experience of democratic political life. It has suffered not for its faults but for its merits – the freedom and openness that others have exploited with devastating effect.”

This, to me, seems to suggest a first-mover disadvantage within the Arab world. The creation of a government modeled on consent necessarily creates a situation in which there is also freedom to openly oppose the government without fear of suppression or social chastisement, creating a situation amenable to not just political disagreement, but is also like sending an invitation to Hezbollah or al-Qaeda to come set up a recruiting center or a jihadist FOB (see Lebanon and Iraq).

Who wants to be first to open up if it means you trade your tyranny, which for whatever its sins at least ensured stability and security, only to get in return Hezbollah or the latest “al-Qaeda in (insert region)” franchise? This creates a paradox in which the only way to ensure your consent model of government is to rely upon the very secret police and oppressive arm of the government that you were hoping to get rid of. And what if they finally purge the foreign fighter? Can they be expected to just disband, as their rank and file smoothly transition into the private sector? Not likely.

Iraq seems to be the best hope for the region in transitioning to the consent model. But is OIF a blueprint for success? Operation Syrian Freedom doesn’t sound good. Operation West Bank Freedom? Sounds like an industrial meat grinder, wrapped in flypaper. How about sanctions against the bad regimes and foreign aid for the goods ones? How’s that working out for us?

Democracy may simply be a manifestation of a country's social evolution to a point where it is more resistant to the elements of a successful insurgency (rather than having any special tools to combat them after the fact). That the insurgencies were unsuccessful may be due to their failure to achieve certain decisive tasks, rather than the democracy's success in responding to the insurgencies. Democracy may be more akin to a preventive vaccination than to a post-diagnosis dose of antibiotics. But in some countries, like in the Mideast, it is like a flu vaccine - the vaccine brings risk in the early stages.

[AmericanPride]

Schmedlap,

I'm not convinced by Lewis' argument. While accurate to some degree, it has no precision. The 'people', 'loyalty' and 'obedience' are too broad to be of any use (which goes along with another criticism I have of the concept of the 'mass base', but that's for later). All governments use a mix of loyalty and obedience (and even some consent) to maintain influence over different elements of the population. The problem isnt that these states are dependent on "loyalty" or "obedience" but that they are generally weak institutionally (with the exception of the security forces), and liberalizaiton, democraticization, and modernization create significant instability because the state is the prime mover. The elites that govern therefore assume all of the risk. And in the last 100 years, how many states have successfully been pushed into modernity? Anyone other than Stalin's USSR?

Who wants to be first to open up if it means you trade your tyranny, which for whatever its sins at least ensured stability and security, only to get in return Hezbollah or the latest “al-Qaeda in (insert region)” franchise?

That's not really an accurate definition of the problem. Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood offer consent-based alternatives to the Western-backed "obedience" regimes. And because the states are weak institutionally, these groups have significant influence when filling the capabilities gaps (social welfare, etc).

Iraq seems to be the best hope for the region in transitioning to the consent model.

I disagree. Iraq (and Syria) had republican forms of government in their recent history. Both failed to be sustained because of factionalism and instability, resulting in the establishment of a one-party state (Egypt is not remarkably dissimilar). What has changed in Iraq that will prevent future factionalism? Will Iraq require an enduring US presence to maintain stability?

I'd argue that Syria is in the best position to modernize (and eventually democratize), if it can make peace with Israel. Peace will allow Syria to integrate into the international community, draw in wealth that will enable modernization, and allow it to address some of its social and economic problems that currently prevent modernization and the subsequent liberalization.

Why have some countries not converted to democracy?

Because the risk of failure is too costly and the cost of success is too high.

[Schmedlap]

Thanks for taking the time for a lengthy reply. I was beginning to fear that I rambled on for nothing.

While accurate to some degree, it has no precision. The 'people', 'loyalty' and 'obedience' are too broad to be of any use...

I don't think so. I think there is an important distinction between a government that has a ruling family in a country where kinship lines are respected versus a government that has a repressive bureaucracy of ideologically driven nutbars from all walks of life. The former would never work in Iran and the latter would never work in Saudi Arabia, imo.

The problem isnt that these states are dependent on "loyalty" or "obedience" but that they are generally weak institutionally (with the exception of the security forces), and liberalizaiton, democraticization, and modernization create significant instability because the state is the prime mover.

I don't think he was articulating "the problem" so much as "the situation." But, I agree with the second half of your sentence. Good point.

Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood offer consent-based alternatives to the Western-backed "obedience" regimes. And because the states are weak institutionally, these groups have significant influence when filling the capabilities gaps (social welfare, etc).

I think there is an awful lot of fear mixed in there that is more significant than the consent. I think the consent is just feigned in public by many who privately live in fear. But, regardless of my disagreement on that point, I think your second sentence is correct.

What has changed in Iraq that will prevent future factionalism?

Prevent? Nothing. Significantly reduce the odds? I think you answered that when you responded to my question of, "Why have some countries not converted to democracy?" You responded...

Because the risk of failure is too costly and the cost of success is too high.

Exactly. So what changed in Iraq, you ask? The injection of US troops changed the situation in Iraq to reduce the risk of failure (primarily that of ethnosectarian factionalism) and to shift the cost of success to the American taxpayer.

The Bernard Lewis piece requires a subscription, so I'm not sure if you were able to read the full thing. I suspect that his full essay is more convincing than my brief summary - don't take my word for it. Many have gone astray by relying too heavily upon me.

[Schmedlap]

I'm considering my grad thesis on Democracies and Insurgencies. Specifically, in the RAND insurgency dataset of 89 insurgencies 1945-2006, I found no examples of a democracy (defined by government enduring the insurgency, not the government of external supporters) losing an insurgency, as defined by the insurgents attaining all of their objectives (overthrow or secession).

This thought just popped into my mind today.

Perhaps democratic systems condition the populace to wage its battles at the battle box rather than in the streets by...
1. providing a mechanism for grievances (throw the bums out)
2. providing the belief that something as drastic and risky as overthrow/secession is unnecessary
3. creating a climate where discourse and airing out grievances publicly is encouraged, preventing the need to go underground. Removing the need to go underground ensures that grievances are not only aired - which gives some therapeutic effect, but also invites rebuttal, which deters others from joining and helps to prevent the aggrieved from becoming too removed from reality.

In other words, provide an alternative, raise the risk-reward ratio, and counterattack while the threat is emerging, rather than after it arrives.

This might also be a "chicken or the egg" case. Democracy is more than just casting ballots. The process must be fair, the choices must be real, the debate must be unrestrained, and there must be no fear involved. Otherwise, it is only a democracy in name, not in substance. How many countries achieve that highly sophisticated state of social order and stability? Once a country achieves that, it seems that the society should also be smart enough to figure out how to sort out its differences before they devolve into fisticuffs, tomfoolery, assassinations, and urban sniping.

Likewise for the bad guys. If they have somehow arrived at the conclusion that things are so bad/backwards/intolerable that armed action is the only solution, then they are probably hopelessly disenfranchised. Why? There are always a few outcasts in society. But when enough of them exist to form a viable counter-movement, then that means that something is wrong.

This may lead back to one of the conclusions that many of us so often find ourselves revisiting: the way to defeat an insurgency is to prevent it.

[Ken White]

This may lead back to one of the conclusions that many of us so often find ourselves revisiting: the way to defeat an insurgency is to prevent it.

I came to that conclusion in 1962. Nothing I've done, heard, read or seen since has given me any reason to change my mind...

[Bob's World]

It's really not about "Democracy" at all, and I find very dangerous broad proclamations such as:

"Democracies never fight each other!" or "Democracies never lose insurgency!"

The reason being that some huge importance is then placed on democracy itself, which leads to dangerous policies, such as the one embarked under the Bush administration of promoting and imposing one form of governance that we think is best. To me that always seemed a little too much like what we were so opposed to the Soviets doing during the Cold War; and also very counter to the American principles of Self Determination that are codified in our Declaration of Independence and that shaped our foreign policies all the way up through the end of WWII.

So, I think one gets to this concept of why insurgency don't fare well in democracies far better by starting not with the form of governance in place, but instead by going to what causes insurgency in the first place.

Many focus on human aspects at the bottom end of Maslow's hierarchy as being causal. Lack of security, hunger, etc. But history really simply does not support that as being the true cause. Many people are widely hungry or fearful in their nations, and are loyal citizens. So it must be something else.

Many then point to dynamic leaders that are opposed to the government, and the ideologies they use as being causal. Yet this too falls short of any historical study conducted with even a basic understanding of the nature of insurgency. If the populace is not ripe for insurgency no amount of ideology or charisma will incite it to insurrection. As I have stated before, the Pied Piper is a fairly tale.

So where I am currently at is that insurgency is caused by poor governance, that being:Some situation or condition, real or perceived, that is so egregious to some significant segment of the populace, that they also perceive they cannot resolve through legitimate means, so as to move them to seek change through illegitimate means.

The safety valve that democracy provides is that if it is a democracy that the populace has confidence in, then it provides the hope of addressing such conditions through legitimate means. The key is that other forms of governance that also provide some mechanism of legitimately addressing such grievances will also effectively deter insurgency.

This is why I am a firm believer of promoting self-determination. This in of itself implies some democratic process in determining what form of government one wants to live under. To have someone else impose democracy is really not very democratic at all. So if a populace votes for dictatorship, then they have exercised democracy and achieved the form of government they desire. Any government desired by a populace is superior to any form of government imposed upon them. Likewise, any country that is seen as an enabler of such self-determination is far less likely to find it self on the blame line (target list) of a populace that drifts into conditions of poor governance than a country that has directed the establishment or sustained artificially the despotic power.

Legitimacy and goodness. Promote goodness for others, but avoid taking on a perception of legitimacy for their governance. This strikes at causation. A good democracy achieved through self-determination is very resilient to insurgency for this reason. It self-corrects "poorness" and it has "legitimacy" that is fully recognized and accepted by a majority of the populace.

[Schmedlap]

So where I am currently at is that insurgency is caused by poor governance, that being:Some situation or condition, real or perceived, that is so egregious to some significant segment of the populace, that they also perceive they cannot resolve through legitimate means, so as to move them to seek change through illegitimate means.

That sounds about right to me. I would only add that "poor" is pretty relative; relative to the culture. If a government demonstrates no particular acumen for governance, then it might resort to changing the culture, so that the tipping point of perceived injustice is defined downward. For example, North Korea's culture may have become so obsessed with the ideas of unity at any cost and subservience to their potbellied ruler that no matter how poorly they are governed, they will accept that poor governance as a necessary evil to retain their national unity. Eating tree bark? Babies dying for lack of immunizations? Childrens' growth stunted due to malnutrition? All due to a closed, command-economy administered by boobs? No problem for North Koreans. Transpose that level of incompetent governance here in the US and there would be blood in the streets. We get outraged if ATM fees go up another quarter and the gov't refuses to intervene.

[Bob's World]

"Poor" is absolutely relative. It only matters what the populace in question believes. An outsider's opinion or standards of what is "good" for them, or what they think an "effective" government does is interesting, but should never be the basis for a FID effort to help prevent or quell insurgency in some other country.

North Korea is an interesting example because it is one of the few completely state controlled dictatorships in the world that can still control information to it populace as well as the populace itself. A populace experiencing condtions of poor governance is easily suppressed by such a government from rising up. They are also far less likely to realize how bad their situation is relative to everyone else in the world and not realize that it is "poor" governance. It just is what it is. As the people of the North come to realize how different their world is from that that has emerged in the South, it is only a matter of time before the people will effect change to end the current system. (I.e. there will then be causation, so all required then will be the elements of motivation to get things moving. Some event, some leader, some ideology...

[slapout9]

BW, can you give us an example of your concept of operation against Target Country X. How would you do it?

[Bob's World]

Slap,

Yes, but right now I am hairline deep in a major QDR project. Will gladly address. In general though, we tend to fear the wrong things, and then launch into COAs that probably create even greater dangers than if we would have gone with what scared us. We also then tend to exert too much control into the environment, which tends to paint us with too much legitimacy over the government we are helping; which both undermines their efforts while increasing our risks of attacks from that same populace.

Some of this is a little counter-intuitive. I worry about what decisions my kids will make as they enter adulthood as well; but at the end of the day you have to primarily trust them to do the right thing, and recognize that any action they choose for themselves is going to be better that any action you impose upon them. They'll get bumps and scrapes, but they won't blame you for them. Right now we are treating a whole lot of countries around the world like a controlling parent treats it's young adult children with predictable results.

[slapout9]

Some of this is a little counter-intuitive. I worry about what decisions my kids will make as they enter adulthood as well; but at the end of the day you have to primarily trust them to do the right thing, and recognize that any action they choose for themselves is going to be better that any action you impose upon them. They'll get bumps and scrapes, but they won't blame you for them. Right now we are treating a whole lot of countries around the world like a controlling parent treats it's young adult children with predictable results.

BW,can't wait for your response but I like your analogy