Was Rep. Murtha right?

[DDilegge]

Congressman Murtha's plan (points) for Iraq:

1. Immediately redeploy U.S. troops consistent with the safety of U.S. forces.

2. Create a quick reaction force in the region.

3. Create an over- the- horizon presence of Marines.

4. Diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq.

I cannot agree with Murtha's proposal to "immediately redeploy" U.S. troops if it means a complete withdraw from Iraq. Moreover, his caveat (point 1) of redeploying to an area consistent with the safety of U.S. forces is quite ambiguous and could mean anything from Fort Apache type bases in-country to a complete redeployment to home bases. Neither option contributes to a favorable end-state in Iraq.

The implication of Congressman Murtha’s point is that force protection is the focus of main effort. Force protection as a friendly center of gravity has never won battles nor contributed to winning a war. Force protection is inherent in all operations we conduct and must be looked at as risk vs. gain – not as the mission statement, not as a specified task nor an implied task. The trick here is to define the desired end-state and the lines of operations that, if successfully accomplished, lead to achieving that end-state. A part of the lines of operations analysis addresses risk vs. gain and naturally includes force protection.

In consideration of points two and three in his plan; create a quick reaction force in the region and create an over-the-horizon Marine presence – again, fairly ambiguous statements. A quick reaction force is a desirable and normally planned for capability in any military operation.

The bottom line here is “quick” and able to “react” decisively. The QRF cannot be, either real or perceived, an impotent force laying in wait while a thinking and adaptive enemy conducts an intelligence preparation of that battlefield and concludes their actions can be conducted decisively before a decision to commit the QRF is made, the QRF can be properly in-briefed on the situation (actionable intelligence), deployed and decisively engage the enemy. Our enemy is acting on the tactical level and desires our forces to “react” rather than act. This is a “boots on the ground war”, the implication that a regional quick reaction force may be successful is wishful thinking and a throwback to the Cold War era when the U.S. and our NATO allies could template the two-up and one-back doctrine and tactics of our Soviet foe should they attempt a punch-through in the Fulda Gap.

On an over-the-horizon Marine presence – we have that now – wherever our National Command Authority wants it. That said - I assume Congressman Murtha is considering such a presence as being afloat and stationed in the Persian Gulf. This proposal has the same drawbacks I addressed in the discussion on the QRF, compounded.

A sea-based over-the-horizon capability is a good thing, a very good thing. But there are limitations - fine if your destination is Basra or even maybe Nasiriya, but complicated at best if your final destination might be Baghdad, the volatile An Anbar province or even further north in such urban areas as Tikrit, Mosul and Kirkuk. We are talking distances that range 300 – 500 miles. I submit that this would be a bridge too far.

Considering Congressman Murtha’s fourth point - diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq. I will be the first to jump on the bandwagon – especially when our Congress properly funds and otherwise resources our sister departments / agencies to ensure that their full capabilities can be brought to bear to ensure all elements of our national power are executed and coordinated. Unity of command comes to mind here.

This means pushing those capabilities and resources out of “inside the beltway” and the Combatant Commander level down to the tactical level - where decisive military, political, economic, security, cultural, and information actions make a difference.

We are building a legacy of attempting to build from the top – down. Fine if you just defeated Nazi Germany – not so fine if you just placed a tribal centered culture into a situation of no central control and removed all elements of what might have been considered “normal” in that culture only hours / days after crossing the LOD…

In summation, and to avoid writing a tome here, I’ve addressed what I consider the weak points in Congressman Murtha’s plan. Next post – after I finish researching tomorrow’s SWJ news links – will be some suggestions to address the issues that Murtha posed.