Why democracies don't lose insurgencies

[Schmedlap]

Thanks for taking the time for a lengthy reply. I was beginning to fear that I rambled on for nothing.

While accurate to some degree, it has no precision. The 'people', 'loyalty' and 'obedience' are too broad to be of any use...

I don't think so. I think there is an important distinction between a government that has a ruling family in a country where kinship lines are respected versus a government that has a repressive bureaucracy of ideologically driven nutbars from all walks of life. The former would never work in Iran and the latter would never work in Saudi Arabia, imo.

The problem isnt that these states are dependent on "loyalty" or "obedience" but that they are generally weak institutionally (with the exception of the security forces), and liberalizaiton, democraticization, and modernization create significant instability because the state is the prime mover.

I don't think he was articulating "the problem" so much as "the situation." But, I agree with the second half of your sentence. Good point.

Groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood offer consent-based alternatives to the Western-backed "obedience" regimes. And because the states are weak institutionally, these groups have significant influence when filling the capabilities gaps (social welfare, etc).

I think there is an awful lot of fear mixed in there that is more significant than the consent. I think the consent is just feigned in public by many who privately live in fear. But, regardless of my disagreement on that point, I think your second sentence is correct.

What has changed in Iraq that will prevent future factionalism?

Prevent? Nothing. Significantly reduce the odds? I think you answered that when you responded to my question of, "Why have some countries not converted to democracy?" You responded...

Because the risk of failure is too costly and the cost of success is too high.

Exactly. So what changed in Iraq, you ask? The injection of US troops changed the situation in Iraq to reduce the risk of failure (primarily that of ethnosectarian factionalism) and to shift the cost of success to the American taxpayer.

The Bernard Lewis piece requires a subscription, so I'm not sure if you were able to read the full thing. I suspect that his full essay is more convincing than my brief summary - don't take my word for it. Many have gone astray by relying too heavily upon me.