Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Bullmoose,

You may find a quite enlightening and spirited previous discussion here:

T/M Cavguy, I'm on my way to that location tm:now......

[Bob's World]

T/M Cavguy, I'm on my way to that location tm:now......

Ok, this is my hip-pocket answer without looking to formal definitions, so assess accordingly:

On a scale of "Strategic-Operational-Tactical" these two constructs would best fit within "Operational."

Back when I did conventional maneuver warfare the number one question I would demand of my S-2 was: Is the enemy force oriented or terrain oriented. Knowing if he achieves his ends by destroying or neutralizing my force if he achieves his ends by controlling some key terrain regardless of the status of my force in my mind is the critical thing a commander needs to know in order to calculate tactics and assess risk.

I do not, however, believe that attrition warfare is the opposite of maneuver warfare, the key difference is what the measure of success is, not how you seek to achieve it.

If destruction of the enemy force will achieve success, then one must conduct attrition warfare. This was the measure of success between European Armies for several hundred years between Kingdoms, but (personal opinion), General Grant proved that this was a false measure in wars between Nations. He made attrition a major supporting effort (Meade's campaign with his Army of the Potomac against Lee's Army of Northern Verginia under Grant's close supervision); while his main effort was maneuver based as Sheridan in the Shenandoah and Sherman in the SE targeted the will and wherewithal of the South to continue to support the fight. I posit that if Grant had simply destroyed Lee's Army we would have slid into a period of insurgency and ultimately would have lost the Union.

Maneuver warfare is usually terrain oriented, but can be force oriented, but uses speed and firepower as both security and to achieve localized advantages over one's opponent.

Both of these are valid in State vs State warfare, where the goal is for one government to achieve a position of advantage over another government so as to force them to succumb to the will of the victor. In Populace-based warfare agreements between governments are interesting, but it is the will and perception of the populace that is controlling.

Many COIN efforts turn into a massive punishment of the populace for daring to be dissatisfied with the poor governance provided by the government. What percentage of such a populace must one kill to gain their support? Certainly you can kill them into submission, but they will re-emerge if the underlying conditions of failure are not addressed. One of the key points that I stress is that the one thing that is truly new today is that due to the information tools available it is much more difficult to "suppress" an insurgency, and one must actually seek to resolve it.

This means that when the US goes someplace, like say Afghanistan, the majority focus must be inward on fixing the government, not outward on killing the dissatisfied populace (or outward focused on killing "terrorists" like the Pakistani agents we call the Taliban, or the Sunni Arab UW HQ we call AQN. The result was the same, we ignored a fragile new governance in favor of our own objectives in the country, and allowed competitors for the sovereignty of the country to slip in behind us and compete against the government). We were literally all on the perimeter looking outward for "enemies," while the government was failing behind us inside the perimeter.

So what is the measure of success in Populace-based warfare? I would argue that it is certainly neither terrain nor the enemy combat force. It is the support of the populace itself, and once gained, must be continuously nurtured. This is the continuous duty of government.

[William F. Owen]

Maneuver warfare is usually terrain oriented, but can be force oriented, but uses speed and firepower as both security and to achieve localized advantages over one's opponent.

Well that's an interesting observation, but it's very different from the concept of maneuver warfare advocated by the US Army and USMC. At the higher Conceptual level, MW plays very well in COIN. The reality, as well all know is entirely different.

MW may have had a purpose once, but what that was is no longer clear.

[Bob's World]

Well that's an interesting observation, but it's very different from the concept of maneuver warfare advocated by the US Army and USMC. At the higher Conceptual level, MW plays very well in COIN. The reality, as well all know is entirely different.

MW may have had a purpose once, but what that was is no longer clear.

4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. See also mission; operation.

[William F. Owen]

4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. See also mission; operation.

Well aware... but this is where I am coming from

[Bob's World]

Well aware... but this is where I am coming from

This one line says a great deal: "Success in battle is based on breaking the enemies will to resist."

I would just add from my perspective as a guy who spends a lot of time and energy working on and thinking about populace based conflicts that while your line is right on in state on state conflicts, I would offer a slight but important modification for populace based conflicts:

"Success in battle is based on breaking the enemies desire to resist." If I simply crush the people's will, they will be back with a vengence. If I defeat the violence and also take away the cause for trending to violence in the first place, I achieve an enduring peace.

States can come back at you too of course, but we have better mechanisms for detering state conflict than we do popular conflict.

[William F. Owen]

"Success in battle is based on breaking the enemies desire to resist." If I simply crush the people's will, they will be back with a vengence. If I defeat the violence and also take away the cause for trending to violence in the first place, I achieve an enduring peace.

...or removing the enemies reason to resist? Breaking people's Will works, as well as anything else. It is the cause of military activity. It's why we have armies. Reason falls outside the scope of military thought.

So It works for a generation? Sometimes more. Sometimes less. Nothing lasts forever. King Hussein of Jordan eradicated the PLO in the Jordan in 1970. They never came back. Yes, he seceded the West Bank in 1988, but the point is, the "reason" is sometimes, not negotiable, so an enduring peace is not a solution. A period of a better peace may be achievable.

[Bob's World]

The difference between being an Idealist in the real world and a realist in the real world, perhaps? I could tone down my positions to be more realist, but I think it is important to set the bar high, even if not achieved, there is great value in making the effort.

Often what is seen as impossible one day, becomes very possible the next with a simple change of perspective. For example, I saw an interesting piece on TV where an archeologist has sound evidence to support his theory that the Wailing Wall is actually a remnant of a Pagan Roman Temple (matchs exactly plans to another roman temple elsewhere) and that the Dome of the Rock is not built on the Temple, but rather beside it. It would take some digging to prove, and that is not allowed. How would that change the equation. If these structures were co-existing side by side and not either or, perhaps the people could move in that direction as well.

Of course no Jew wants to learn that he has been worshiping at a pagan Roman wall all these generations...

Point being though, if they could redefine the issues, they could redefine the conflict. To simply keep fighting over the same perspective will never resolve the problem. Oh well, won't solve this one here.

[William F. Owen]

Of course no Jew wants to learn that he has been worshiping at a pagan Roman wall all these generations...

Eyh... Not so bad. I'd be intrigued as to the evidence. THE Wall is actually the face of a platform, on which the Second Temple stood. It's known not to be part of the actual Temple itself, and yes the Dome of the Rock is built over the rock, so that was not inside the Second Temple.

Point being though, if they could redefine the issues, they could redefine the conflict. To simply keep fighting over the same perspective will never resolve the problem. Oh well, won't solve this one here.

For sure. Wanna send the girls home and go get a beer?

[William F. Owen]

If you want to be concerned about the future of the US Armed Forces, see here

Apparently,

Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy, said America's conventional dominance gives incentive to its enemies to use asymmetric means to undermine U.S. strengths and exploit its weaknesses.

“Preparing for this operating environment will pull the Army, and the military writ large, in two very different directions,” she told the roughly 200-person audience at the Army Leader Forum at the Pentagon.

On the one hand, the United States must be ready for irregular warfare, in which combatants blend in with civilian populations and conduct roadside-bomb attacks, suicide bombings and similar tactics, she said.

“Those of you who served in Iraq and Afghanistan know firsthand how challenging it is to operate effectively in such an environment,” she said.

Meanwhile, she said, the United States must remain prepared to deal with high-end threats, though these are much more likely to be asymmetric in character. Illustrating this concept, Flournoy described a scenario in which rising regional powers and rogue states use highly sophisticated technologies to deny U.S. access to critical regions and to thwart its operations.

These tactics range from anti-satellite capabilities, anti-air capabilities and anti-ship weapons to weapons of mass destruction and cyber attacks.

Further complicating the battle landscape is the prospect of sophisticated nonstate actors using high-end capabilities such as weapons of mass destruction or guided rockets or munitions, as in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon during its 2006 war with Israel.

If anyone wants to tell me Ms Flournoy is correct in her assertions and reasoning, I would be fascinated as to the actual evidence or train of thought.

[Spud]

C'mon WILF at least you've got a policy ... even if it just sitting on the fence.

Our latest effort contradicts itself paragraph by paragraph. See Greg Sheridan for the best 1000 words written on a 140-page 'blancmange.'

You guys are only wondering about where to apportion money. We're still trying to figure out what we have a Defence Force for.

[Bob's World]

We're still pressing full steam ahead trying to make a Cold War strategy work in a rapidly changing environment.

Many military commentors and analysts who also take the correctness of that obsolete strategy look at the resultant friction to it and our challenges in dealing with the misdiagnosed threats as being "hybrid" or "irregular."

The fact is, of course, that the nature of man, and the nature of warfare does not change much. If your policies lead to conflict, those who you are in conflict with will seek their best advantantage to resolve the conflict in their favor. This is all quite regular, as it is also quite regular to apply a savvy mix of approaches to that same end. It has always been so.

Fact is that there is a lot of bad advice being offered at very high levels, not the least of which is because those at very high levels are almost universally very skilled, successful Cold Warriors.

But as Secretary Gates essentially said in his oft quoted (and a guiding document for the currently ongoing QDR) Foreign Affairs article: Thank God for Radical Special Forces Colonels. I resemble that remark.

There is no panacea in either "Hybrid" or "Irregular Warfare."

The key is to understand that the current is only irregular if one takes the positon that the Cold War was "Regular." Hardly. But that great anomally lasted so long in current memory that it is how we measure the world. Time for a new ruler to measure with.

Populaces held static in their governance by Cold War controls are in "movement" once again, those still held static by outside controls attempting to sustain an obsolete status quo are resisting those controls. We need to recognize this, and not be the obstacle to change.

Irregular Warfare, in my opinion, is best looked at not as a form or warfare, but rather as a clumsy description of this globalized, post Cold War world that we live in today. The tools of globalization are doing many very new things:

1. The speed and availability of information don't change the principles of Insurgency, but they do render obsolete many of the tactics. Become more principle based when studying why tactics that worked historically worked, and modify accordingly for today.

2. Islam is reforming. Understand the inner conflict in the middle east. This religious aspect to their quest for self-determination and our efforts to sustain a status quo all make for a very volatile mix.

3. Non-state actors can now act in very state-like ways. AQN wages UW. This is a new thing and it confuses our approach. It also creates new forms of "sanctuary" that we need to sort through.

[William F. Owen]

We're still pressing full steam ahead trying to make a Cold War strategy work in a rapidly changing environment.

Many military commentors and analysts who also take the correctness of that obsolete strategy look at the resultant friction to it and our challenges in dealing with the misdiagnosed threats as being "hybrid" or "irregular."

Well Bob, what worries me is that everyone wants to believe that it is all changing when it is not.

• Al Qieda is NOT A NEW TYPE of enemy. They are a very old one.
• War is not becoming more complex.
• The challenges of today are not "greater than the cold war" - just different

The problem is the folks inventing the problems, which forgives stupidity, and allow solutions of choice, rather than solutions of need.

All this "complex adaptive" stuff is rubbish. If want complex adaptation, look at 1914-18! Far worse than anything the world could throw at us today.

All that is needed is adjustment, not revolution, and re-building.

[goesh]

Just a civilian's opinion but the Conventional will always assure good order and discipline and the flow of goods and services in a timely manner - the rank and file will be marching forever and day. Naval and Air compoments of our national defense aren't being pulled apart, not even with my reach of imagination. With 300+ years of Indian warfare under our belt for starters, the Asymetrical hardly invokes confusion and disarray in the Army. I do see a lot of turf wars having been fueled by AQ and other assorted insurgents/jihadists but it is quite a reach to even speculate that it has caused systemic dysfunction or can cause it.

[Surferbeetle]

All this "complex adaptive" stuff is rubbish. If want complex adaptation, look at 1914-18! Far worse than anything the world could throw at us today.

All that is needed is adjustment, not revolution, and re-building.

Wilf,

Napoleonic warfare and trench warfare are static datapoints in the flowing history of human warfare.

I hope that where we can agree is that in most fights one picks up whatever is available/at hand: stone, stick, common electronics & explosives, computer, radio/tv/cell phone, a highly engineered rifle, reconstruction policies and uses them over a continuum of violence (which is not just limited to physical violence) in order to have one's way.

From this particular vantage point complex adaptive means having the abilities and skills to use not just gray matter by itself but to augment it with math/computers/electronics in order to rapidly exert influence out of proportion to what we were given by the creator (the whole basic tool using primate thing).

Since these tools are widely available to everybody who is skipping around on our worldwide battlefield, and as per the usual battlefield rules it's adapt or die out there, the choice is clear...

Regards,

Steve

[William F. Owen]

Since these tools are widely available to everybody who is skipping around on our worldwide battlefield, and as per the usual battlefield rules it's adapt or die out there, the choice is clear...

Steve, if you are telling me that adaptation is inherent and essential to warfare, I agree absolutely. It is, always was and always will be.

...so why do we suddenly talk about adaptation as if it is a new requirement or warfare now being complex. Warfare always was. War is not changing in ways we don't understand. Nor are our enemies changing in any degree that requires new insight. What we seek to achieve by violance, does not change.

When the Kansas Fire Brigade, attack Jerusalem, for fun, using hot-air balloons, I'll admit I was wrong!

[Surferbeetle]

Steve, if you are telling me that adaptation is inherent and essential to warfare, I agree absolutely. It is, always was and always will be.

We are on the same page here...or to use SWJ-speak, we are in violent agreement...

...so why do we suddenly talk about adaptation as if it is a new requirement or warfare now being complex. Warfare always was. War is not changing in ways we don't understand. Nor are our enemies changing in any degree that requires new insight. What we seek to achieve by violence, does not change.

The nature of war has not changed nor will it ever change (unless of course we somehow manage to radically change our genome)...it has always been adapt or die...basic biology.

However, where we seem to sometimes disagree is upon the definition of Warfare: the act or methods of waging war which is of course imbibed with change itself. Change: mutation/chaos/complexity/stochastic/randomness. This is where the terms hybrid, special operations, asymmetric, economic, conventional, unconventional, etc. are placed in front of the word warfare and shortly thereafter we here at SWJ collectively lose our minds and spew coffee all over the computer monitor...

When the Kansas Fire Brigade, attack Jerusalem, for fun, using hot-air balloons, I'll admit I was wrong!

This would be an amazing sight in and of itself...if it ever goes down give me a call, I'll bring the beer and perhaps we can find a good vantage point to compare notes from...

Best regards,

Steve

[Tom Odom]

When the Kansas Fire Brigade, attack Jerusalem, for fun, using hot-air balloons, I'll admit I was wrong!

Which Kansas Fire Brigade?

There's lot's of hot air at Leavenworth

It could happen...

[Ken White]

Hybrid warfare? Those pesky Steppe dwellers and the Egyptians invented Composite Bows. Then there was the thought "Let's distribute blankets from smallpox victims" ...

[Bill Moore]

If anyone wants to tell me Ms Flournoy is correct in her assertions and reasoning, I would be fascinated as to the actual evidence or train of thought.

Wilf, the hybrid concept is not new, but some of the potential threats are new (that is simply due to an ever changing geopolitical environment and new technology available, which is simply a continuation of history), so the character of war has changed. I'm trying to discern exactly what you disagree with Ms Flournoy on? The list of threats or the hybrid war concept?

Bob's World

, I agree with most of your points, but the majority of Cold War conflict was so called irregular warfare, where one side attempted to win over a select population using armed conflict in Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Angola, Greece, Italy, Turkey, etc. Fortunately for us the communist system was bankrupt, so even if we weren't that good at counterinsurgency, we still won that particular round. I think an argument could be made that this war is still ongoing, based on the apparent surge in Maoist insurgency activity throughout many parts of the world. The difference is we don't have near competitor nuclear superpowers fighting a largely overt proxy war. Proxy wars are kind of like computer games, the guys pushing the buttons don't get dirty.

From this particular vantage point complex adaptive means having the abilities and skills to use not just gray matter by itself but to augment it with math/computers/electronics in order to rapidly exert influence out of proportion to what we were given by the creator (the whole basic tool using primate thing).

Steve, not to reopen an old debate on our opposing views of EBO, but complex adaptive systems is not about tools, it is about human behavior and the ability for humans to learn and adapt. In simple grunt terms (my language) the enemy has a vote, because they will adapt to our response and we will adapt to theirs, thus conflict co-evolution. I strongly disagree with your assertion that a tool will allow us to simplify war into a math equation. Tools may help, but I tend to trust a "good" commander's inutition much more than a tool.

Wilf makes the point that none of these concepts are new is correct (that is only half true, our descripton of something as old as mankind is new), but again I would argue not useful. 90% of our failures in so irregular warfare are due to leadership failures to understand the nature of the problem and respond correctly. 90% of the successes are due to leadership successes. The other 10% is random or luck. You would think fixing the leadership issue would be relatively easy, but it isn't due to our deeply embedded culture for conventional warfare, thus whether new or not, the concepts of IW and hybrid warfare are useful forcing mechanisms. I suspect you'll disagree, but I don't know how you can argue the point that we didn't do very well initially fighting this type of war, and I'm not sure how the argument that war is war (even though its true) is helpful is fixing our underlying problems. Please explain your positon?

I think the main issue for our general purpose forces creating an awareness of the holistic nature of war through education and training. In addition to fixing our professional education and culture, we need to direct more funding towards Special Operations, security force assistance, and so called asymmetric capabilities such as cyber, missile defense, space dominance, etc.