from Wilf
EG: Suicide bomber on NY train = Terrorist. Suicide bomber in Baghdad Market = Insurgent. Given context, I can't see the problem, even at the higher strategic level. 9/11 = Terrorism (no military means or intent). Something in A'Stan = Insurgency - (use of military means with military intent).
9/11 - Act of Aggessive War.

9/11 was an act of aggressive war against the US waged by a VNSA (Violent Non-State Actor). Not having cruise missiles, AQ improvised and, as a weapons system, used the functional equivalent - hijacked airliners. AQ's selected targets (WTC, Pentagon and the DC government complex) were militarily logical (disruption of US C&C and of the US economic system). In many ways, the AQ attacks resembled Pearl Harbor (a VSA, Violent State Actor, attack), and was so regarded by many here (including JMM).

In response to that AQ violence, Congress passed the AUMF, which was accepted by the President. By that political decison, the situation became one of an armed conflict between the US and AQ (with Taliban and associated groups included) - governed incidentally by Common Articles 2 and 3 of the GCs as ratified by the US.

Prior to the attacks, AQ had made clear its purpose: that absent conversion or submission of the US to Islam, AQ would employ violence as the means to cause the US (government and people) to submit to its immediate demands in the Middle East. The strategy followed by AQ was made clear by the series of attacks beginning with the 1993 WTC attack and continuing through the Cole attack. The response of the US government to the pre-9/11 attacks was a collage of law enforcement efforts and minimal military actions.

The 2001 AUMF was a formal response to AQ's message of intent - we will not submit to your will regardless of the violent means that you employ.

Terror is an Effect

Terror, like its cousin Shock & Awe (and other "EBOs"), is subjective, based on the psychological reaction of the targeted population (an effect) to the violent event (the means). As such, it is essentially useless in classifying the means or the actor, either for legal or military purposes. One must concede that consideration of terror is important to the targeted population because, if a substantial segment of that population is terrorized, it will lose its resolve to resist and will be inclined to submit to the will of the attacker. Thus, the best tool to fight "terrorism" (or any other "EBO") is a targeted population that refuses to be terrorized, shocked or awed by the violent means used by the attacker.

Status of the Attacker

In the case of 9/11, AQ can be validly classed as an aggressor (of the VNSA type). One can if one wishes call them "terrorists", but that is not the status which justified the political decision made; and shaped the legal and military actions taken pursuant to that political decision. That status was one of an aggressor, based on the facts of the event (violence as a means with intent to overcome the resolve of the targeted population).

I have no objection to someone calling AQ "terrorists" (and worse names which I and others have used); except that to some (e.g. the Eminent Jurists), "terrorist" and "terrorism" have a meaning which seriously limits the legal and military options which can be used.

Insurgency and Insurrection

Following the OED (Oxford English Dictionary), insurgency and insurrection are cognates developed from the same stems: in- & -surge. In this context, in- has the concept of "within bounds"; and -surge that of a "rising". So, both amount to a "rising within" a nation - in short, the natives become very restless, indeed.

An insurgent taking part in an insurgency or insurrection (the US constitutional term used cognatively with "rebellion", as in the 14th Amendment), can be a "terrorist" - assuming that his violent act (the means) causes terror (an effect). An insurgent can also be an aggressor if he attacks first (Mr. Lincoln's position re: the South when Fort Sumter was attacked) - a status based on the facts surrounding the violent act (the means). However, neither name tag ("terrorist" or "aggressor") helps in defining that person's status as an insurgent.

The bottom line is that an insurgency is fundamentally a domestic problem of a nation whose natives become restless enough to resort to violent acts. Of course, those native insurgents may have external support (by either a State or Non-State Actor). Whether the nation treats those insurgents as criminals or participants in an armed conflict is again a political decision. If it elects the latter course, it enlarges its military options at the cost of some recognition of the insurgency as a "Power" to the armed conflict (Common Article 2 of the GCs) and bringing into play Common Article 3.

Transnational Violent Non-State Actors

An insurgency can be a Violent Non-State Actor (and a "Power" to an armed conflict as in the paragraph above), of course; but an insurgency is primarily focused within the bounds of the nation where it is indigenous. With the advent of groups that act transnationally (such as AQ, which in effect has no nationality as a group), the neat little boxes of international law and military doctrine became a bit discomforted.

The more conservative view (although I would call it a "bound to the past which is gone" view) is to basically continue with the Laws of War (which indeed vary from nation to nation) as being applicable to armed conflicts between nation states, with some rules (not universally accepted) being applicable to some domestic armed conflicts (insurgencies, wars of national liberation, etc.). Violent acts, even though by organized groups which in every other sense could be considered "Powers", are relegated to the arena of criminal law. That is basically the view of the Eminent Jurist Panel and its report. There are pros and cons for and against that viewpoint.

It is up to each nation to decide whether it will adopt the position of the Eminent Jurists (which has substantial, but not universal, international support); or whether it will reserve the right to make the political decision as to whether or not it is engaged in an armed conflict with a VNSA.

A Transnational Violent Non-State Actor, as I have described it, cannot be an insurgent as such to any nation - it has no nationality. It can, of course, support a insurgency in a given nation. But, its own violent acts are acts of aggression against the nation it attacks. If those acts result in terror, then it can be called a "terrorist" if one is so inclined; but, if one does so, one must be aware that to the Eminent Jurists (and all who think like them), "terrorism" is a criminal act to which the Laws of War do not apply - as a matter of law.

Making War is a Political Decision

The theory of the Eminent Jurists (and any of its variants) is that determination of whether or not there is a war (an armed conflict) is to be made as a matter of law. Presumably, this would be made by the Eminent Jurists Panel (as they in effect have done in their report as to the actions of the US since 9/11). Perhaps, they would suggest an all-powerful international body to decide whether a war (an armed conflict) exists - and apply a Uniform Global Law of War and Rules of Engagement - as matters of law.

On the other hand, there are still some of us who have a respect for the national state and its sovereignty; with the capacity to adapt to Transnational Violent Non-State Actors and their violent acts. In that view, the decision to make war (authorize the use of military force in an armed conflict) is a political decision, to be made according to the constitutional framework of that nation.

Today, in the US, the Laws of War and military doctrine are both works in progress. So far, the decisions seem to incline to the view based on national sovereignty and that war (an armed conflict) is an extension of the national political process. Each nation will have to pick its own ground on how it treats that process.

My bottom line is that law enforcement is law enforcement; and that war is war. In extraordinary circumstances, we (US) reserve the right to make the political decision to shift from the first to the second condition.