Cry of the DIA Analyst !

[zenpundit]

An email from an aggrieved intel analyst was published at No Quarter

"Military Intel: Telling It Like It Is
... received via Larry's friend, from a Marine intelligence analyst on the ground in Iraq ...

If there are 300 analysts I never saw them; we sure as heck did not talk to each other, and I was assigned to the shop from 8 Aug 05 to 2 Nov 06…the shop tasked with monitoring Iraq..we had a very few dedicated solely to Anbar…not enough to map out the insurgency like the Baker Hamiliton report noted because of production requirements. Additionally, the shop as of 2 Nov was split on several floors of the Pentagon where effective interface cannot be affected. Bottom line, the shop is tasked the majority of the time to support J2 briefings, briefing slides, executive highlights, notes in brief, etc…CURRENT INTEL…newspaper crap. And even then, other members of the staff have their own intel sections to identify what they see occurring in Iraq…Very little emphasis is on long-term analysis because of the concern over metrics (SHAREPOINT)…if you do not produce enough material regardless of how useless it is, it looks bad on the numbers.

Sharepoint justifies your manpower, money, etc. Intelligence is an art, not a science, but the intelligence effort is subordinate to institutional processes instead of quality, original, candid military judgment and critical analysis of what is actually occurring, and the actors involved.

Ask a member how long it often takes to get out a DAR…about a month now…what good is that in a rapidly changing amorphous environment?

There are some very talented and intelligent people working the problem set from Lieutenant Colonel on down, but they are slaves to the system, and the system mitigates effective, original and critical thinking. The 101st and 82nd Army Airborne Lieutenant Colonels I worked for come in anywhere btwn 0300 and 0400 daily until about 1900 [every day], to include holidays, just to keep up with the admin and the ad-hoc requirements that come in from political leaders and those within the Pentagon. Those two officers took care of their people and stabilized the shop so others still had some semblance of a normal life, but they take the pain daily without complaints and I have a lot of respect for them for that reason. I’ve had good experience with most of the senior intelligence analysts, whom I will not name for obvious reasons.

Additionally, there are some outspoken intelligence analysts who are restricted with regards to what they publish since it counters mainstream thinking…specifics are sensitive. Analysts are not allowed to candidly identify enemy gaps with appropriate remedies to engage them since it is considered as directing policy or being policy prescriptive. I think of Pearl Harbor, 9/11, etc when such analysts are ignored.

Papers that address information operations, engaging enemy information operations has been ignored because some senior reviewers consider the issue mute at the strategic level. When papers were denied processing via the approval chain, or if the wording was softened so much that its context would be lost, I would personally forward my pieces, to other agencies so what I saw at least got out, even if I could not get approval. It was an underground com network.

Interest in supporting the warfighter stops at the Lieutenant Colonel Level…the papers are focused towards policy makers…reach back capability to deployed forces fighting in competing and exhausting battle rhythms are fighting on their own without someone covering their six. The senior intel leadership wants to get products to the President…justify the organizations existence. I’m not saying this is bad, but what about the exhausted people in the field who need networks tracks, exploitable gaps identified and nascent trends mitigated. CIA personnel have better access information than DIA anyways, so why doesn’t DIA focus more on supporting the JCS and the warfighter in military terms, and brief that perspective to the President?

The JCS, General Pace, demanded early in his tenure that he wanted honest and bold assessments and our “military judgment”, but analysts do not have direct interface with him (as they have briefed him in the past), and what we think and see is closely guarded by gatekeepers who do not want controversy with regards to what the analysts see as the actors posing the REAL threats and why. I personally posted his Commander’s Intent on my bulkhead to ensure I focused my efforts to that guidance…and you know what? We never followed his intent…the words disappeared to both air and memory. We were also restricted from using appropriate military terms, although the organization is known as the Defense Intelligence Agency. I went through hell trying to use the word “subversion” in order to describe insurgent modus operandi…and that word is in the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. Why have an organization that cannot talk the talk so the implications of military actions on the ground can clearly be ascertained and engaged?

I think an inquiry needs to be conducted. I think people should not take my word for it. People should say Bill (the author of this), you are full of crap and I’m going to prove it to you by investigating myself. This is all I’m going to say about the situation…we all have congressman and flag grade officers, they can do the rest and forget about little ole me.

I’m not perfect, and I’m not trying to sharp shoot…just telling it like it is…others can judge for themselves…and its not like these issues were not addressed via the chain of command.

Semper fidelis,"

Haft of the Spear also comments on the email:

"Basically what he is saying is that outside of rare instances like this,intel in Iraq is your standard DC office job goat-screw, with IEDs. Bogus bean-counting, middling, medling bosses who think they can read the chief's mind but don't have the stones to actually ask questions, grunts watching days of hard work get boiled down into a PowerPoint bullet devoid of any meaning or context.

Regurgitating the news, pummeling original thoughts into mindless gov-speak, a process that turns "current" intel into ancient history . . . it's like reliving the bad old days . . . must be what a bad acid trip feels like.

Is there really any doubt in anyone's mind that radical change could not possibly be worse than the status quo?"

[Jedburgh]

The lead states "on the ground in Iraq", but the manner in which it is written reflects the Northern Virginia experience of an analyst working the problem from a distance. But it is definitely spot-on.

Hell, with relatively minor rewording, this could also illustrate much of my experience with intel on the ground - both pre-and-post OEF/OIF. I lived it for too many years, until the progress of the war unhinged the balance of the love-hate relationship over to the other side and I had to get away from it.

…if you do not produce enough material regardless of how useless it is, it looks bad on the numbers...

We've had this "quantity vs quality" discussion on intel before, here on SWC. It is a crippling bureaucratic mindset that has long existed in the military - as it does throughout government. This is having a significantly negative impact upon intel production in the LE intel community as well - mostly at the state and national level, at the FIGs, the JTTFs and the fusion centers.

It damn sure hurts intel when IIRs are generated for crap - or when a single cogent IIR is broken down into several minimal-info IIRs (that now require piecing back together at higher) simply to build the stats.

This is a very serious problem that goes well beyond Iraq and significantly affects the broader GWOT.

[Uboat509]

As an Intel guy (technically) I have often wondered what was going on up there at the mighty DIA. I have had clues that things were not all sunshine and warm cookies but there are a lot of guys out there who swear by them. Not that they don't put out a lot of good stuff but I have seen some stuff that I have been less than pleased with.

SFC W

[Tom Odom]

Additionally, there are some outspoken intelligence analysts who are restricted with regards to what they publish since it counters mainstream thinking…specifics are sensitive. Analysts are not allowed to candidly identify enemy gaps with appropriate remedies to engage them since it is considered as directing policy or being policy prescriptive. I think of Pearl Harbor, 9/11, etc when such analysts are ignored.

I can vouch for much of this; one of the joys of being a Defense Attache in a conflict zone was that I could offer useful intelligence that inside the Beltway upset the gatekeepers but pleased the senior consumers. When you get personal cables (not emails) from the DIA Director, the Director of Defense HUMINT Service, the J2, and OSD as well as the NSC thanking you for analytical reporting versus history/news reports--at the sametime the gatekeepers are trying to shut you down--the utterly Kafkaesque nature of DC intelligence "cooperation" emerges in stark terms.

Best

Tom

[SWJED]

IC Strategic Human Capital Plan: Leadership at Haft of the Spear blog.

...Why is IC management so bad? Since under the current system the only demonstrable way to show you are successful is to climb the grade ladder, people who would rather be studying hard analytical or operational problems feel compelled to become managers (the only realistic and timely way to make 14 or 15 or SES/SIS). Most are ill-suited to the task despite attempts to train them (as the numbers would suggest) and if Dr. Peter weren’t dead he could base volume two of his seminal work at various secret institutions in the DC area. It isn’t that they’re bad people (though that sometimes comes into play) its just that they didn’t’ get into this business to validate timecards, balance office budgets, and mentoring subordinates. Focusing on hiring mid-career types who actually like that sort of s*** would go a long way in fixing workforce confidence in those who count the beans...

The Community’s Emerging Underclass at Kent's Imperative blog.

...It is no wonder that many of the best intelligence officers – whether government or contractor – flee the environments which are defined by these dynamics. Sick shops face attrition. If shops were suffering battlefield casualties at the rate of current attrition, their leaders would be rightfully cashiered. But because it is a slow and un-dramatic process, there are no consequences for bad leadership, arbitrary decisions, or poor morale whose cumulative effects drive the brightest elsewhere and leave the incompetent to continue the cycle...

Breaking the Analyst / Collector Divide at Kent's Imperative blog.

Increasingly the Long War is surfacing one of the most serious challenges to the classic model of the intelligence community, in which analysts reside comfortably in their ivory tower and the collectors are forcibly kept out of the briefing conference rooms lest they track mud over the nice clean floors. Now, analysts are forward deployed in ever increasing numbers, and are more often than not starting to do things, rather than just sit behind a desk or pass papers in the hallway...

The challenges posed by this new dynamic are manifold from classic theoretical perspectives, but the key issue underlying all of these is one of knowledge management. How are the results of these interactions captured and shared, and how does knowledge and insight arise from this process?

The use of the term knowledge management has perhaps doomed many of these efforts from the start. Entire industries exist to facilitate KM systems and processes, each with their own highly paid consultants and patented buzzword solution sets. But offering up technologists, or even methodologists, with the “one true answer” is merely to spill additional blood upon the alter of the irrelevant...

Iraq: Not Serious at Haft of the Spear blog.

...Basically what he is saying is that outside of rare instances like this, intel in Iraq is your standard DC office job goat-screw, with IEDs. Bogus bean-counting, middling, medling bosses who think they can read the chief's mind but don't have the stones to actually ask questions, grunts watching days of hard work get boiled down into a PowerPoint bullet devoid of any meaning or context.

Regurgitating the news, pummeling original thoughts into mindless gov-speak, a process that turns "current" intel into ancient history . . . it's like reliving the bad old days . . . must be what a bad acid trip feels like.

Is there really any doubt in anyone's mind that radical change could not possibly be worse than the status quo?

[Stan]

Greetings from Estonia !

If there are 300 analysts I never saw them; we sure as heck did not talk to each other, and I was assigned to the shop from 8 Aug 05 to 2 Nov 06…the shop tasked with monitoring Iraq.

Tom wrote a very interesting page related to this very same issue.
At that time, Tom was part of a one-man-TDY team in one of the most inhospitable places I know of to this day. Social and Political upheaval, a civil war and a refugee crisis all in one package.

He was for some time, the only U.S. Military Officer and DIA rep. "there".

"Headquarters had just promised to look at reinforcements and would let Stan know the next day."

"Headquarters said my reports had proven to be of very high interest in the Pentagon and across the river. But because I had called them into the Pentagon, they were not getting to other concerned commands like U.S. European Command or Air Mobility Command. Their solution was for me to call Kinshasa every time I called the Pentagon watch. Then Stan could write the reports up as electronic messages. The Pentagon has 28,000 workers in it. I naively believed I could get headquarters to have the watch center, a DIA post, write up the reports."

Regards, Stan

[Tom Odom]

Thanks for that Stan....you should have also mentioned the absolute criticality of comms for the guys on the ground: you were the reason I was able to talk for more than 45 minutes on a standard battery for the cell phones in use in Zaire.

Stan, as an excellent NCO pack rat, had a case of SATCOM batteries; he modified a DC power adaptor for the cell phones and taught me how to use them without blowing myself up. As a result of the pure luck that the Goma refugee festival took place where thete was a cellular base station and the use of those SATCOM batteries, I could and did call the Joint staff as many as 8 times a day, running up a phone bill for some $27K for the last 2 weeks of July 94.

Even as all the discussions over message transcription took place and we ended up spending 40 days out in Goma, DIA attempted to get an IMRSAT to us. I finally got the thing in Rwanda; it was the size of a medium foot locker and you had to have a power source (no batteries included). In contrast, the USAID DART that was on the ground had laptops that doubled as SATCOMs for voice and email; so did the PAO on the JTF.

Where DIA did come through was really not DIA's initiative; my 2 biggest breaks in Rwanda were getting an Navy chief who volunteered to come out when he heard a rumor that a slot might be available--I had him for 14 months. Second the DIA analyst on Rwanda--then MAJ Rick Orth--volunteered to come out on an analyst support to attache burst that lasted 60 days. Rick was superb; he ultimately became the 1st official US Defense Attache to Kigali after I left; he later was attache in Kampala, Uganda and is now I believe in Ethiopia.

All of us on this site know the truism that it is people NOT organizations that make things happen; I was very lucky that I had Stan Reber in Zaire and Mickey Dunham in Rwanda. Rick Orth was critical in backstopping us from DC. There were others in the same organization who were minor and on occasion major hindrances. One of the benefits of being far from the flagpole was you could use that to your advantage as others used it against you. That sounds like politics and it is. But it is a fact of life (or perhaps a fact of humanity) as organizations are frameworks of common purpose for different and therefore disparate people, with multiple agendas.

Again, Stan, you made it happen before I knew I needed it

Tom

[Stan]

Tom,
I was extremely fortunate, that in some of the worst holes on earth, I had the best NCOs and Officers the Army had available !

DIA didn't produce these fine folks, rather they found them.

I could not in good conscience together with a feeling of obligation, send (then) LTC Odom "there" without an edge (my years of experience in that hole), and in turn, he would pass on the very same to me over the following year.

You would think that's the way it was always intended to be.

At least I do

Regards, Stan

[sdml1977]

Hello. I'm writing to solicit some career advice on this forum given the intelligence backgrounds of many readers of this blog. Recently, I applied for and was accepted as a Defense Intelligence Scholar at the DIA, which entails a year of M.S. level coursework at the JMIC and then assignment to a DIA analytic unit afterwards. My interest in a career in intelligence has stemmed from desire to serve our country and I viewed this program as an opportunity to get my foot in the door. My question to everyone here is straightforward: would you recommend that someone new to the intelligence field take this opportunity given what you know about the working environment, the potential for impact, and the direction of changes at the DIA? The recent postings about morale at the DIA have raised a few concerns in my mind, making me think that it might be better for the dust to settle a bit.

Thanks for your comments.

[selil]

Knowing the following is pedantic, "Wherever you go there you will be". Purported morale issues aside you can't make people feel good about themselves, but you can be teflon and work with the options you have and not worry about the ones you don't. Are you mature enough to not be entangled in the snare of faint and negative environments and still get your job done to the best of your ability? Or, do you need an outside structure to allow your success?

[Stan]

Morning SDML !
In my opinion and 6 back-to-back tours with DIA in various capacities, I would say join. I am one of those who had raised issues about DIA personnel morale. Those issues however had more to do with relations between the Department of the Army and DIA, leaving Army personnel in limbo.

Are you mature enough to not be entangled in the snare of faint and negative environments and still get your job done to the best of your ability? Or, do you need an outside structure to allow your success?

Greetings Sam !
Very clear-cut and well put. I had few dealings with the D.C. end so most of the negative conditions surrounding us were not distracting, rather merely frustrating. DIA field work has its professional rewards and once in the field, social and cultural conditions establish "environments", positive and negative.

Regards, Stan

[sdml1977]

Stan and Sam, thanks for your replies and advice. I sincerely appreciate it. I would like to think I am a mature individual with thick skin, capable of perservering to see a mission through to its end. It's just that comments I've read about DIA analysts leaving in droves and applying for jobs with the local county police have gotten me a little worried about morale there. I would rather not jump into a dysfunctional working environment that has a high probability of being subject to a drastic overhaul in the short order, if that is truly the case. I also have an offer with the CIA and am wondering about the relative pros and cons of the DIA versus CIA for a prospective analyst without military experience and not battle-hardened, so to speak, for work in "the field."

Morning SDML !
In my opinion and 6 back-to-back tours with DIA in various capacities, I would say join. I am one of those who had raised issues about DIA personnel morale. Those issues however had more to do with relations between the Department of the Army and DIA, leaving Army personnel in limbo.



Greetings Sam !
Very clear-cut and well put. I had few dealings with the D.C. end so most of the negative conditions surrounding us were not distracting, rather merely frustrating. DIA field work has its professional rewards and once in the field, social and cultural conditions establish "environments", positive and negative.

Regards, Stan

[SWJED]

When you get down to basics there are two different 'classes' of DIA employees - the active duty military and the civilian government employees.

I would opine that you would get a different perspective / opinion on the work sit at DIA from each camp. One thing about being active duty - no matter how dismal the assignment you always have a light at the end of the tunnel - your next duty assignment. Sometimes that alone gets you through.

I would seek out the opinions of current DIA civilian employees for advice. Just my 2 cents worth.

[selil]

I also have an offer with the CIA and am wondering about the relative pros and cons of the DIA versus CIA for a prospective analyst without military experience and not battle-hardened, so to speak, for work in "the field."

That's a no brainer. I really like the guys I know at the CIA. Most if not all the people I know have gone to work for some organization on the east coast that shall not be named have reported it was a great decision. Not that they would tell their fellow student/professor anything about the hiring process. That being said based on who might be working for the CIA it would be fun that I shall never have to worry about. I'm to much of an academic to fit into their structure. I like to do stuff that isn't necessarily single threaded or in a stovepipe of expertise. My bosses in academia refer to that as unfocused when they are nice and scatter brained when they are less than generous.

[Stan]

Hi SDML !
There are many analyst positions being filled without military backgrounds and working abroad doesn't always require battle-hardening (you get that on the ground !) I can't really comment on the CIA side, although we often worked on similar projects together. They always saw our reporting, and sometimes we would get a look at theirs

DIA versus CIA for a prospective analyst without military experience and not battle-hardened, so to speak, for work in "the field."

Take SWJED's sound advice. Tom Odom has been on both ends of the world, including some of the most inhospitable. His thoughts would be eye-opening.

I would seek out the opinions of current DIA civilian employees for advice. Just my 2 cents worth.

Regards, Stan

[lazlo]

All,
I have been trying for an entry level position with DIA for some time. I received the following from them 9 July:
"Your resume was reviewed by our Agency entry-level hiring board, and your qualifications are of interest to us. The hiring board may forward your resume to a selecting official at any time during the upcoming year as positions that match your qualifications arise. Your application will also be retained in our resume database for one year for further review by selecting officials. During this period, you may be contacted by selecting officials to discuss specific position requirements.
If you are selected for a position, you will receive a conditional offer from our Office for Human Resources."
Do you have insight as to the implications of this missive? I have heard it takes a long time to go through the hiring process. Should I take this to mean there is good possibility of moving forward in the hiring process?

Best Regards,

William R. Clark
CISSP, National Security Agency IAM & IEM,
GSNA, GSEC, SCNA, CNA, Security+
Member: SANS Advisory Board, Infragard, ISSA, ISACA

[Old Eagle]

I was never directly involved in the HR processes, so I have no direct knowledge of their practices.

Why entry level? If you are already in the IC at NSA as your impressive signature block implies, there is a separate hiring program for established intel professionals. I know, because we used to steal each other's stars.

[lazlo]

Thank you for the reply. I sure didn't want to just barge in on the topic, and apologize for including the sig block. Although my skills and experience have been in InfoSec, my father and brother are both in the Ranger Hall of Fame. I am trying to serve my country as well, especially since 9/11. Hence my interest in the Intelligence community as opposed to the commercial sector. Although I have certifications from NSA, I do not work for them, so am not an 'established intelligence professional". I was told a good place to start would be the DIA entry level program (although CIA would be a dream come true). I am looking to contribute to the concept and practice of "Network Warfare". As a complete rookie to intelligence, I very much appreciate your (and the forum's) counsel.
Best Regards,
Bill

[marct]

Hi Bill,

If the DIA's HRIS system operates like most of them, then this means that you have passed the first hurdle. Basically, they are treating your application like a "standing offer". What it does mean, on the positive side, is that you can now bypass the "official" system and start networking since you are already "in" the system.

The reality is that about 30-50% of hiring managers don't trust their HR departments and prefer to use their own personal networks to find potential employees. Since you are already in the system, they can now contact the HR person and "request" that you be called for an interview.

So, my advice is to start networking on a very serious basis. BTW, I wrote a paper on this about 12 years ago (The Gift of Information) listing the various strategies involved in this type of job search. It's now a touch out of date), but it might prove useful to you.

Marc

[SWJED]

Like the other posts - you have passed the first hurdle. Having a current Special Background Investigation (SBI) on file may help to speed things up - I thought that maybe you had a SBI if you worked as a contractor for NSA. Single-scope or life-style poly is a plus also.

If the DIA process proves too long you might want to consider one of the Service Intel centers / activities as a foot in the door - Navy's NMIC is in Suitland, MD; USMC's MCIA is in Quantico, VA; Army's NGIC is in Charlottesville, VA; and the USAF’s NAIC is at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

When I was with MCIA years back I thought we were the recruitment / training guys for DIA and CIA as MCIA would send new analysts to Intel Community courses and training and then some would just ease on over to the bigger guys on the block. The reason I bring this up is you might like the Service Intel organizations better and if not, you are already established in the IC and the transfer to DIA is not that hard - CIA is a bit more time consuming.