It is worth pointing out, that the meaning and essence of nearly every sentence above was originally said by Clausewitz in some shape or form - back when warfare was "simple" and before it become "complex."CT Lab has Antoine Bousquet's comments on his book The Scientific Way of Warfare:
Quote:
Finally, I would like to briefly comment on what progressively emerged from my study as a central dynamic at the heart of both military practice and scientific theory and did eventually structure much of my thinking: the relationship between order and chaos. The human psyche, the organisation of human society, and the production of knowledge all strive for order and regularity and to keep at bay what threatens to bring disruption and meaninglessness into them. However, not only does chaos inevitably resurface with the capacity to upset the most stable and established of arrangements but it seems to be in fact a necessary condition of creativity and even order itself. Science has recurrently needed to concede to chaos and indeterminacy to permit the development of its understanding of the natural world, notably through the introduction of probabilities or non-linear dynamics. Throughout the development of the sciences I have charted, this tension between their drive for predictability and the limits they consistently encounter has been a perennial constant, even if the ways in which these tensions are navigated are never quite the same. What one might characterise as an on-going dialectic between chaos and order (I tend to privilege Edgar Morin’s notion of dialogic understood as the simultaneous competition, antagonism and complementarity of distinct logics and for which there exists no possible higher synthesis that might resolve this tension) is echoed in the forms taken by the organisation of military force. Indeed, all attempts to bring complete control and predictability prove to be inherently self-defeating while a tolerance for (and capacity to profit from) chaos and contingency seems an enduring necessity.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
Sapere Aude
Don't screw w/the German. The language used is almost impossible to put in context due to evolution of the German language.
Get the Paret/Howard annotated translation, even if just from the library. It is the touchstone of Clausewitz translations. It also has great interpretive notes by two of the world's great military historians.
Old Eagle, as usual, is correct... Paret/Howard...
In this case so is Wilf
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
I'd also recommend H.R. Smiths work on Clausewitz. It is excellent.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Just finished an interesting book called "How We Decide". One of the key insights of the book is that we have eveolved BOTH rationalmodes of decision-making, and emotional (intuitive) modes of decision making. People whose brain's lack rational components (Due to accident or illness) can't make good decisions, those whose brains lack emotional components can't make ANY decisions. Seems we need BOTH to be effective.
I think the same is true of the debate between systems theory and design inspired theory. There are cases where one or the other approach should be emphasized, but always preferring one over the other leads to trouble.
From what i have seen out working with 2 and 3 star level staffs, we have over-emphasized systems thinking and 'metrication' within the staffs, and only the Commanders (and perhaps his council of colonels) add the intuitive approach.
The methodology that reserves the balancing of system thinking with intuitive thinking at the highest levels of command creates a false sense of certainity implied by staff focus on numerics, and an unfortunate atmosphere of the staff efforts being more to create a "valid" justification for things the commander intuitively decides, rather than to be proactively engagged with the commander improving the quality of deisions...
A stereo type yes, and obviously not universal, but seems particulalry true in exercise/experiment circumstances...
The value of the design approach is not that it should replace a systems thinking approach (which has proven invaluable in appicable areas like logistics and communications) but in re-emphasizing the value of the intuitive and "non-metrical" approaches in supporting decision - making.
Design and systems analysis CAN live together!
"All models are wrong, but some are useful"
-George E.P. Box
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
This is the THE cornerstone of Robert Leonhard's book. You'll either love it loathe it. It's about the only work I think even comes close to the CvC in modern times.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
System Engineering, Operations Research and Systems Analysis are highly structured, formal processes for problem definition and system development. Having read through his paper Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions (and thanks for the pointer, Slapout), I agree with his thinking completely. In fact, I'm having a hard time understanding how anyone could have thought this would be a good idea.
However, when he states "use of systems engineering to solve problems no longer works," it should be understood the type of problem he is referring to. I very much doubt he intended the statement to apply to material development. Referring back to an earlier post from selil: "I get concerned any time I see the military re-purposing a fairly well understood field of study and then referring back to internal military documents to support contention. " Absolutely. Using System Engineering to develop operational plans, knowing that the "system" is human centric, which makes it a messy system, that the problems are all wicked, well ... that's just wrong.
Last edited by J Wolfsberger; 04-07-2009 at 02:12 PM.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
What I found confusing was the concept that somehow Design had become separated from systems analysis or systems engineering!!! It used to be called Brain Storming (I think) but it was the first step and progressed through planning and engineering to make sure it was feasible. Anyhow here is the entire process that Colonel Warden teaches for over 10 years now. Design is the first and hadest step.
Short version: is Design-Target-Campaign-Finish.
Long Version: is Design The Future-Target for Success-Campaign to Win-Finish with Finesse.
Maybe some of this helps (From a briefing on SOD):
Strategic Appreciation and Design is a New Approach
Relies on an open-ended critical method.
Strategic Appreciation generates an improved understanding of the larger system in any situation with any scope or depth.
Design is concerned with creation of systems-of-actions designed to exploit identified tendencies and potentials, in order to change existing situations in desired directions.
Why is Strategic Appreciation and Design needed?
We often act before we understand our situation well enough.
As a result, we define our problems incorrectly, which leads us to apply the wrong solutions.
Ill-conceived solutions for ill-defined problems actually create greater problems.
This new approach encourages the free movement of good ideas and makes the reasoning of our actions more transparent, helping us to see how to improve what we are doing.
What is different about Strategic Appreciation and Design?
Challenges and improves our normal thought processes and decision procedures.
Focuses on a more robust form of intellectual leadership defined as the ability for an organization to move good ideas around.
Before, during, and after imposing solutions to solve problems.
Strategic Appreciation and Design is time intensive, and works best when considering future action. It is also a sound method for assessing current operations, and evaluating past actions.
The goal of Design is the creation of more favorable, self-sustaining situations.
Assessment shifts away from learning about any single action to a focus on monitoring transformation of the system itself and sustaining sensitivity to the need to make adjustments by reframing both system understanding and operational approaches to better deal with emerging conditions.
As the diagram shows (I know, what diagram? If I can figure out how to paste it in I will), reframing can occur at any point where new knowledge is developed that challenges existing understanding of the system.
As understanding increases, formulate actions to transform the system to meet our aims; identify potentials, opportunities, risks to these actions; identify how to ensure self-regulation of system after our inject in the system.
Pay attention to the creation of a learning structure to enable observation of the system during action.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
In the 1970s, I was taught that the first step in addressing a problem was "qualitative system analysis." (The text I was given to get a handle on the technique was On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn.) The process consisted of expanding the problem as given to include "the whole world." After doing so, you began to shrink it back down. The purpose of the exercise was:
- Make sure you were solving the right problem. On several occasions the SA/SE group would be tasked with optimizing X, only to come back with the answer that "X" wasn't the issue.
- Account for the non-quantifiable dimensions of the problem. It's possible to come up with a count of victims of the Rwanda Genocide. But the event and aftermath are governed by the hate of the perpetrators and the anger and grief of the survivors. Those are thing that cannot be quantified, but they will dominate any attempt at resolution. Failure to do this leads to such stupidity as suggesting the survivors should "just get over it," which actively and strongly prevents resolution.
- Ensure you've accounted for everything. That goes beyond declaring something relevant, to explicitly determining what isn't relevant with an explanation as to why. I know of at least one combat system (actually a subsystem) under development today that will never see production because the proponents and developer refuse to account for the fact it will be used in combat. (Yes, it really is that bad.)
I think the paper you attached as well as the paper by BG Czege are advocating exactly this kind of approach. I'm really glad to see people getting back to it.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
OK, I dl'd that link, read it, (twice) and I can't understand what the article is about. It just leaves me confused. Can anyone explain it to me?
...and while we are about it, I don't understand this either. It doesn't even seem to be good English.The goal of Design is the creation of more favorable, self-sustaining situations.
Assessment shifts away from learning about any single action to a focus on monitoring transformation of the system itself and sustaining sensitivity to the need to make adjustments by reframing both system understanding and operational approaches to better deal with emerging conditions.
Last edited by William F. Owen; 04-15-2009 at 11:39 AM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
To be clear... I'm not exactly a proponent or critic of Design... Always thought I did design to support my commander's understanding of the situation so that he could provide adequate guidance, but if it helps some from jumping to solutions before they understand the situation/problem... I can live with another construct for what I consider common sense...
translation of text in question...
Adopt approaches that create conditions on the ground that allow military forces to conclude full spectrum operations and what remains is an environment that is self governing (as in self regulating system) that Coalition members can live with...'
or
leave a situation that doesn't necessarily smell like a bouqet of roses, but doesn't smell like a heaping pile of pig turds
Live well and row
PS: I'm in the midst of an exercise design to, in part, determine the applicability of design in a time constrained tactical environment... I think its nuts
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
I think I am familiar with the scenario Hacksaw referenced in his post. Unfortunately, if the team is applying "design" to an isolated event, rather than an evolving environment it probably won't seem that useful.
We've been applying design against several long term scenarios that require planning teams to take our construct and develop plans and orders for events while we continue to apply design as the environment changes.
Apparently ARCENT is using design for a series of complex problems and link their design team into planning cells within the staff to deal with a series of plans and orders. This seems to me to be a beneficial method for keeping design useful. The earlier posts about the USSOCOM Strategy Directorate also indicate a useful use for design.
One additional comment - the current SAMS version of design has elements that would seem to come from SOD, but links more closely to some of the academic components of design theory.
My impression is that with the different schools of thought out there regarding design (SOD, CACD, USMC doctrine, SAMS Art of Design, FMI 5-2) that design is getting a bad reputation.
I'm still interested in hearing from folks that are out there using design in its various forms.
Appreciate the input from our senior council members too. Thanks.
All,
Some interesting comments on design from the CAC blog - read down.
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/B...e-command.aspx
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