As an Armor guy, I'm not shedding any tears for the demise of FCS. Its fundamental assumptions were invalid - namely - that "information=force protection", and risk could be assumed with armor in favor of deployability. If "information dominance" would protect us, we wouldn't be losing soldiers to IED's. Like EBO, FCS tried to eliminate fog and friction from war, instead of embracing it and developing systems to compensate.
Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.
I suspect that when one ties this in with the earlier fracas over the OMB position about calling what is happening in IZ/AF a species of overseas contingency operations, then the overall position becomes more clear. GWOT and supplemental budgets have been a license to steal for the operational forces, buying a lot of non-sustainable capability at tremendously inflated prices. Actually, the GWOT-funded COTS capability is sustainable, but the maintenance fee will also be grossly overpriced.
What the budget announcement from the SecDef seems to be saying is that we have to wean ourselves from the GWOT funding fix and get back to a realistically sustainable force that has a balance between the current fight and likely future contingencies. I'd love to be able to build Battlestar Galactica, but I don't think we really have to worry about Cylons attacking Earth any time in the next 50 years or so. A loose ICBM/MRBM from some of the more screwy leaders of middling (maybe that ought to be muddling or meddling?) nations in North and SW Asia or a conventional intervention in support of some treaty obligations seem much more likely (and closer to the small war type efforts in which we currently engage) as targets for our future force structure.
By the way, bringing more discipline to what is currently a "grab-and-go" approach to acquiring technology seems more likely to make our cyber problems a little easier to manage. At least we might all be using the same or very similar technology across the force so we won't have to devise as many different defenses for the smorgasbord of systems currently in use
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Sam Liles
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Like the new choppers for the WH, Entropy. Both requirements exist now and will only get worse with age. Both will die temporarily only to resurface later and be more expensive. Hopefully each with a decent bird not over equipped; though we do seem to have to try to gold plate everything...
Not necessairly, as you need both capabilities. What matters is how we organize. Do we need large armored formations for COIN? No. Do we need heavy armor to support troops in COIN? Absolutely.
I wrote a post awhile back on how I tasked organized a heavy company team for COIN - and thought it was pretty successful and flexible. It provided dismounted ability to engage the population with the firepower needed to support those dismounted troops when the sh*t hit the fan (and potentially discourage those who saw an easy and exposed target.
My flexible MTOE with the ability to customize forces to the mission was the key ingredient. My tankers sometimes used the tanks and sometimes acted as infantry. My mech guys did all kinds of varied tasks, as did the combat engineers. The mission/environment dictated our equipment set, not the other way around.
To go along with that, I think it sends the message that The Pentagon wants out of the Strategic level of diplomacy.
If the United States wants to continue with missle defense, power projection, etc on the scale that it has over the past few years, then Congress will have to legislate it as a seperate and unique issue; not bury it in funding for other more pressing needs.
Whats going to be really interesting is how the folks on the hill scramble to keep funding for unpopular projects that have domestic and international political value.
Sounds like a "silver bullet, one-size fits all" (actually two sizes) approach to a problem set that requires a little bit of everything used flexibly as the situation requires. Seems to me a force based around a collection of H or J-series TOE Cav squadrons would be a pretty good fit for most stuff, with suitable equipment modernizations of course.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
Agree totally and completely. A key phrase used by Gates, that I doubt any of the media picked up on, was "full spectrum." Based on the new FM 3-0, that has a very specific meaning - and I hope he was revealing his intent when he used it.
One of my big pushes is doing a better job at executing up front system analysis to translate desired capabilities into system functions that support the intended doctrine. That means evaluating effectiveness across the entire spectrum, a wide variety of missions, and working with the user community to provide systems that have the kind of flexibility to let you do that.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
While good in a mechanized fight, most heavy cavalry organizations don't have enough dismounts for IW/COIN. Even when shutting down a pair of Bradleys to up the total number of dismounts, it is still significantly less than what a mech platoon brings to the fight.
Our present Combined Arms Battalion, with 2 tank and 2 mech companies is a great base to start from. Many of the battalions have companies create semi-permanent task organizations which works well. These companies share the same company TACSOP and consider each other their wingman. The great weakness is the continued small size of the tank platoon and its lack of capability when not mounted.
It would be nice to have more mortars but this organization has more dedicated dismounts than the cav organizations and they have the greatest utility in any war.
I have noticed an infatuation (sorry for the potentially inflammatory word) with the cav construct. We have really screwed up the current BCT with an entire 'squadron' and only 2 maneuver battalions. It seems that people forget that reconnaissance is a mission, not an organization. I think that a maneuver battalion could conduct effective reconnaissance, but these horribly undersized/undermanned squadrons, designed for reconnaissance, do not perform well as additional maneuver formations.
Hopefully, with the move to stop the BCT growth, we can focus on properly manning the BCTs we have. Maybe, as retired COL Mansoor wants, we can get a 3d maneuver battalion back into the BCT, perhaps by cutting down the size of the RSTA squadron to a robust troop (it would help).
Tankersteve
Steve,
Agree all.
More dismounts needed in HBCT - desperately. What I enjoyed when we were in Tal Afar was the ability to customize the vehicles of a given unit to a mission - a high/low mix.
I think people like the Cav construct because it is a mix - of tanks, scouts, and aviation, which grants flexibility to the commander.. You are right - way too low on dismounts. Fix that though ....
Totally agree on the three maneuver Battalions and only a Cav Troop per light or heavy Bde -- plus a RSTA company with UAV /UGV (the Cav Troop should not be encumbered with that very necessary stuff).
Understand the current design was, rightly or wrongly,selected as 'the best we can do with what we have' but it really needs a relook as we head into the future.
I also believe we not only forget reconnaissance is a mission, we don't even generally do reconnaissance. With the caveat that there are a few exceptions, the Infantry commanders, mostly, do not understand the concept of mounted reconnaissance and misuse their forces badly all too often. Armor units tend to believe in flash and dash rather than painstaking recon; there's a reason for the old "bypass, re-gas and haula$$" cliché. That also with only rare exceptions -- as is the generalization that entirely too many senior people in all branches do not have the patience to wait for the length of time required for effective and competent Recon so their alternative is to send an overly heavy, unstealthy, high speed and undermanned force out to hurry up and draw fire.
That's why current Cav units are too small, they're not scouts (or dragoons) nowadays, they're sacrificial lambs.
Not only is reconnaissance a mission, but I believe it is an art. Ken's points are spot on; I'll try to add a bit. Now (quite possibly before), we have to conduct reconnaissance of the physical AND human terrain. An indigenous guerilla has a comparative advantage in information- he can see us, we cannot see him. Moreover, he is the master of his terrain.
For the villages, particularly restricted areas, I believe a light approach is best. In my light RSTA, we tried to incorporate lessons learned from the LRRPs of Vietnam to employ. It worked. One distinction we made was empowering our junior leaders. My SCO sent the majority of scouts to RSLC, Ranger, Sniper, etc... to add to our human capital. In my troop, we had E4 fire supports studs talking directly to Apaches (with supervision ). That E4 is worth more than 10 Predator UAVs.
As for urban areas, I was taking an educated guess. The last time I owned major real estate in an urban area Sadr City was still Saddam City and BIAP was Saddam International Airport.
Ken- what's with this we stuff?
v/r
Mike
Last edited by MikeF; 04-07-2009 at 08:26 PM.
and that Speculist coulda talked to that Apache just as well w/o any supervision...
Being a Comm. guy by trade, and not knowing the details of TSAT, I will only say that the demand from the force (all services, Interagency etc...) for these type services coupled with the bandwidth intensive applications, necessitates a robust capability. I am not sure the TSAT is the answer, but there needs to be an answer.
out of this. We've seen the medevac variant fielded to non-stryker BCTs. The SBCT does have 3 maneuver battalions and a Cav SQDN giving it a bit more flexibility than a HBCT. I'd be the first to say this would not be the preferred formation to go against T-80s in open terrain. But its done a darn good job throughout Iraq. With the fielding of the MGS variant a company commander had the the ability to move thru a spectrum of PSYOP with the mounted speakers to .50 cal or MK-19; up to 105mm HE cannon direct or 120mm indirect all organic.
Cavguy would have loved the flexible T/O, and the ability to put 108 11Bs on the ground with trucks in support, more if you are not employing your mtrs or bringing all the trucks.
With the plug pulled on FCS will the Stryker variants, meant to bridge the gap become the endstate?
Village Light, Urban Heavy? Strkyers medium fill the void?
Yeah, I know. I've been reading too much poetry.
About time you voiced 699- much better than grumpy old NCOs grumbling over lambs and rice, of mice and men.
v/r
Mike
Last edited by MikeF; 04-08-2009 at 05:36 AM.
A bit off topic, but a question for you armor guys: Is the Abrams still competitive today against the latest from the Russians and others?
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