Is there a Dutch approach ?

[Rex Brynen]

This is a place in which there is a great deal of experience and wisdom (and then again, there are people like me). You might, however, want to make sure the jargon:insight ratio tilts heavily to the latter.

We have to get rid of linear thinking, dogmatic and "stove piped" organisations.

When have these ever been good things in organizations? Were they during WWII?

Is this wholly a function of the way militaries are organized, or does it apply to all large organizations (including those in the diplomacy and development business). Oh, the stories I could tell..

Destroying the opponent’s (military) capabilities is not sufficient anymore to achieve the primary political strategic goals.

Actually it might be sufficient, if we could do it. Certainly there are very successful COIN campaigns based on such an approach (Syria, Hama 1982). However, we can't apply the "Roman" model in Afghanistan because 1) excessive application of military force generates new supporters for the insurgency, 2) we lack the military resources to do so, and 3) we're unwilling—on wholly appropriate moral grounds—to apply a sufficient level of force.

In fact, this is just a minor element of the operational environment.

Yes and no. Without adequate security on the ground, its difficult to do any effective diplomacy, and impossible to do any effective development (your other two Ds).

An environment of which society, politics, economy, culture and (non)governmental organisations are prominent.
An adapted way of acting asks for an adapted form of organisation. We have to relate to organisations as a system of systems, visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors.

I have no idea what "visualising synergetic effects by a balanced presence of sensors" means.

An organisation where kinetic and non-kinetic elements are permanently joined together into a module gives input in the ability to learn (training, practising, performing their job) from each other.

Doesn't the whole "permanently" imply a degree of rigidity that will undercut the ability to respond to changes in the insurgency, other insurgencies, or non-insurgency wars?

The effect will be complementary. Current symmetric organised elements are residues of the past, they relate to an enemy which we will not find at the coming battlefield in the potential arena of conflict (republics bordering Russia – Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan – Middle East – Northern part of Africa).

Is the issue one of "symmetric organization" (and I'm not sure what that means in this context), or appropriate resources, doctrine, intelligence, and strategic and operational approach?